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1. The Commission and European 
Political Cooperation 1969-1976 
In November 1970 the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the European Community 
(EC) had their first meeting within the newly formed structure of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC).1 The Member States of the EC established EPC with the intention of 
keeping this forum for political cooperation separate from the existing EC-structure.2 One of 
the particular aspects of this intent was that the EC’s Commission was to be kept at arm’s 
length from the EPC initiative.3 However, when the early years of EPC are studied closely, 
the separation between the EC and EPC appear less than clear-cut, as the Commission played 
an evident role within the EPC cases of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) and the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD). By 1976 the Commission had 
participated in the CSCE as part of the national delegation of the country holding the 
presidency of the EC and EPC. Within the framework of the EAD, the Commission led the 
European delegation and chaired, on behalf of the European countries, two of the Dialogue’s 
seven working groups.4  
This thesis is the first historical analysis of the Commission’s policy towards the EPC in the 
1970s. Previously, EPC has mainly been studied within an intergovernmental framework. As 
a result of this, the Commission’s role in EPC and how it came about remains under-
investigated. This thesis investigates how the supranational Commission acquired a role in the 
intergovernmental structure of EPC, where EC and Commission participation was opposed 
from the very beginning.5 I argue that the Commission approached the EPC as a rational 
actor, making deliberate choices based on an un-provocative and pragmatic use of its 
expertise.  I find that the Commission’s quest for participation in EPC was driven by a wish to 
protect the EC. By linking the EC to EPC it also aimed to shape EPC. I claim that the manner 
                                                          
1 The initiative to EPC was taken in the Summit in The Hague held in December 1969.  
2 MAE, 3806, Telegram, Dialogue Euro-Arabe, 1 July, 1974. 
3 I will throughout the thesis use “the Commission” denoting the European Commission, the executive body of 
the EEC/EC. 
4 These two were the EAD’s working groups for Trade and Agricultural and Rural Development. 
5 Several scholars have laid down the supranational as the Commission’s guiding principle. In this thesis I adhere 
to Wilfried Loth’s formulation and treat the Commission as an inherently supranational actor as: “It [the 
Commission] also symbolised the Community’s supranational status. This was the principle the Commission 
wished to use as a basis for its institutional and political legitimacy, its inspiration, from the very first years of its 
life.” See Loth, Wilfried and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch. “The Hallstein Commission 1958-67” in Michel Dumoulin 
(ed.) History and Memories of an institution 1957-1972, Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European 
Union, 2014: 51, my inclusion in brackets. 
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in which the Commission approached and successfully acquired a role in EPC suggests that 
the institution that met with EPC was a distinct second generation Commission that succeeded 
in bridging the divide between the EC and EPC. By so doing, this thesis also contributes new 
empirical evidence to the larger discussion on the role of supranational institutions in the post-
war European integration project.6 On a more general level the thesis offers new, archive-
based knowledge on the early development of the policy-area that today is the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy where the Commission is a central actor.  
1.1 Supranational institution meets intergovernmental initiative  
The backdrop of this thesis is a conflict. France stood as the Commission’s staunchest 
adversary in the conflict over Commission participation in EPC. The thesis claims that this 
conflict formed the initiative that would become EPC, as well as the Commission’s 
relationship with this new structure. The conflict can be illustrated by the rather direct order 
the French President Georges Pompidou gave to Sir Christopher Soames, member of the 
Commission and responsible for External Relations of the European Community in June 
1973: 
 “Get back in place!”7  
When Pompidou met Soames in a corridor at the Elysée in June 1973, the President 
immediately brought up EPC.8 Pompidou emphasised that political cooperation was an area 
for governments, not for the machinery of the EC. If Soames had been British Foreign 
Minister, the President would have been more than happy to discuss political cooperation with 
him, but as this was not an area for the Commission, it should get back to where it belonged.9 
Following the empty chair crisis of 1965 where France chose to leave its chair in the Council 
of Ministers empty for almost seven months, the developments in European integration 
                                                          
6 In this thesis I will use the term European integration project denoting the creation and functioning of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community, the EC and eventually the 
European Union (EU). The deliberate use of this term is based on the discussion on the term “integration 
process” as found in Gilbert, Mark. “Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European 
Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46 (3) 2008: 641-662. 
7 TNA, FCO 30/1650, Untitled note from Ewart-Biggs, 22 June 1973. “Get back in place!” is my translation 
from the French “Retournez à vos places!” 
8 Georges Pompidou, French President 1969-1974. Sir Christopher Soames, British. Commissioner from January 
1973 and Vice President of the Commission in the period investigated by the thesis. 
9 TNA, FCO 30/1650, Untitled note from Ewart-Biggs, 22 June, 1973.  
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became less marked by supranational optimism.10 France withdrew from the Council in 
reaction to the Commission, which from the point of view of France had exceeded its role in 
the European integration project.11 In the period that followed, European integration took a 
more intergovernmental turn.12 The turn manifested itself in several initiatives of the Member 
States of the EC that were deliberately kept outside the EC institutional structure. The 
establishment of EPC is one example.13 For the Commission, the effects of the crisis of 1965 
were keenly felt and for some fractions within the institution, these effects called for an 
adjustment of the Commission as an actor.14  
The Commission was arguably by the time of the establishment of EPC no longer in a 
position to play an openly activist role. The first Commission of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) led by President Walter Hallstein can be perceived as different from the 
Commission that met with EPC in 1970.15 In the early phase of the EEC the Commission held 
an expansionist view of integration where the Treaty of Rome was simply a point of departure 
with potential for further integration which it was the Commission’s task of steering the EEC 
towards.16 This first Commission that I label a first generation Commission operated in an 
unprecedented period of success for the EEC; the years from its establishment until the late 
                                                          
10 The empty chair crisis was an unprecedented event which left the Community in a state of crisis. It was solved 
as the French returned to its chair following the Luxembourg compromise of January 1966. The crisis and the 
compromise is traditionally read as an expression of the ‘clash’ between supranational forces and 
intergovernmental forces, in which the intergovernmental side has been seen to come out of this seminal crisis as 
the winner, leaving the supranational side, and the Commission in particular as the ‘looser’. This crisis also gives 
evidence of the importance of the conflict between France and the Commission, which one of the side-products 
of the Luxembourg-compromise; the French ‘reprimande’ to the Commission forming what is commonly 
referred to as the «Decalogue».  
11 Loth, Wilfried. “The ‘empty chair crisis’” in Michel Dumoulin (ed.) History and Memories of an institution 
1957-1972, Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2014: 91-108;  Peyrefitte, Alain. C’était de 
Gaulle, “La France reprend sa place dans le monde”, Paris: Fayard, 1997: 292-297. 
12 A partial exception to this can be seen in the increasing role and importance of the European Court of Justice 
that occurred more or less at the same time as this intergovernmental turn. See for instance Davies, Bill and 
Morten Rasmussen. “From international Law to a European Rechtgemeinschaft: Towards a New History of 
European Law”, in in Johnny Laursen (ed.) The Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community, 1973-
83, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014: 97-130, and Weiler, Joseph H. H. “The Transformation of 
Europe”, The Yale Law Journal, 100(8), 1991: 2403-2483. 
13 The emergence of Summitry and institutionalising these as the European Council in 1974 is another.  
14 Spinelli, Altiero. The Eurocrats. Conflict and Crisis in the European Community, Maryland: the John Hopkins 
Press, 1966 as well as: Spinelli, Altiero. The European Adventure. Tasks for the Enlarged Community, London: 
Charles Knight & Co Ltd, 1972 and Dahrendorf, Ralf. Plädoyer für die Europäische Union, München and 
Zürich: R. Piper& Co.Verlag, 1973.  
15 Walter Hallstein, German, first President of the Commission who served two terms, 1958-1962 and 1962-
1967. 
16 For Hallstein’s expansionist use of the Treaty see for instance his first speech before the European 
Parliamentary Assembly: AEI, Proceedings of the sessions No. 1. Inaugural sitting, March, 1958. Retrieved on 2 
September 2015 from http://aei.pitt.edu/44450/:19;  and AEI, The Commission, a new factor in international life, 
speech by Hallstein at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London 25 March, 
1965.Retrieved on 16 November 2011 from http://aei.pitt.edu/13638/1/S35-S34.pdf. 
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1960s saw rapid developments toward major common policies, and the establishment of a 
customs union progressed at high speed. In these successes the Commission played an 
important role, earned the reputation of and perceived itself as the motor of European 
integration.17 Thus, by the time of the establishment of EPC in 1970 the Commission was an 
institution that had experienced both great success and grave crises. 
The originality of this thesis lies in its investigation of hitherto unexplored questions on the 
Commission and its policy towards EPC within the wider framework of how the Commission 
navigated the environment of the European integration project following the empty chair 
crisis. Previous research has contrasted the first Commission as an overambitious institutional 
motor driving integration with the following Commissions as weak and ideologically beaten 
after the empty chair crisis.18 These studies are unfit to explain how and why the Commission 
expressly wanted to be included when EPC was established. They are also ill-equipped to 
explain how the Commission to an extent succeeded to be included in EPC areas that touched 
on the EC’s competences. This thesis is tailored to explain both aspects of the Commission’s 
role in EPC and thereby to fill a gap in existing research on the history of European 
integration in this period. I argue that the role of the Commission in EPC was not Member 
State controlled nor inevitable based on the contents of EPC, but that it came as a result of the 
agency of the Commission. 19 Moreover, I suggest that based on its specific approach to EPC, 
and by a deliberate adjustment as an actor, the Commission emerged as a second generation 
Commission. This suggestion lays the foundations for questioning a traditional zero-sum 
game representation of a ‘black or white-relationship’ between Member States and 
supranational institution in which a dominant role of one excludes an influential role of the 
other. Even though it was not the supranational elements to the Commission that secured its 
role in EPC, but its expertise and administrative skills, they remained the main reason behind 
the attempts of keeping it on the outside.  
                                                          
17 Hallstein, Walter. United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1962: 21-22.  
18 Dinan, Desmond. Ever closer union? : an introduction to the European community, Boulder: L. Rienner 
Publishers,1994: 70, 161; Kaiser, Wolfram. “Political Dynamics in an Emerging Polity: Globalisation, 
Transnational Relations and Europeanisation”, in Johnny Laursen (ed.) The Institutions and Dynamics of the 
European Community, 1973-83, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014: 67; Urwin, Derek W. The 
Community of Europe. A History of European Integration since 1945 [2nd edition]¸ London and New York: 
Longman, 1995: 165. Contrasted to these, the account of the Commission in the comprehensive two-volume 
project of History and Memories of an Institution present a recent and more nuanced picture, see Dumoulin, 
Michel (ed.). The European Commission 1958-72, History and Memories of an Institution, Luxembourg: 
Publication Office of the European Union, 2014, and Bussière, Eric, V. Dujardin, M. Dumoulin, P. Ludlow, J.W. 
Brouwer and P. Tilly (eds.). The European Commission 1973-86, History and Memories of an Institution, 
Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2014. 
19 In this thesis agency is used as a term denoting both activity and the means or mode of acting.  
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Framing the Commission as a second generation Commission enables an explanation of the 
Commission’s role in EPC. It also ties this thesis to the most essential debate of the history of 
the present day European Union. This debate has revolved around the structuring of the 
relationship between sovereign European nation states. On the one hand the relationship could 
be labelled as integration where the nation states as Member States transferred some of their 
sovereignty to an entity above the states forming a supranational level. Alternatively, the 
relationship could be defined as intergovernmental cooperation where the nation states 
remained in control and where supranational institutions had little or no influence. By the 
1970s, both alternatives were at play: integration in the EEC/EC but also intergovernmental 
cooperation in EPC had been established to structure relations of European states.20 Debates 
of driving forces and causal roles within these structures inevitably arose, along with 
questions of the consequences of the establishment of supranational institutions.21 This thesis 
provides new knowledge that can fuel these debates by arguing for the resilience of 
supranational institutions following an intergovernmental turn of the European integration 
project.  
1.2 Previous research  
The thesis draws on research that falls into three categories: The Commission and European 
Political Cooperation, The Commission’s approach and Studying the Commission. The 
first category includes research that indicates a role for the Commission in EPC. The second 
and broader category is made up of research on the Commission’s agency, while the third and 
even broader category consists of research on the Commission as an actor.  
 The Commission and European Political Cooperation 
Recent research on EPC is characterised by an intergovernmental approach, however within 
this approach a role for the Commission in EPC is indicated.22 Maria Găinar’s comprehensive 
                                                          
20 The same Six and the same Nine comprised the Member States of both EEC/EC and EPC: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and from 1973 Denmark, Ireland and the UK  
21 See Pollack, Mark. “Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community”, International 
Organization 51(1), 1997: 99-134. 
22 A small number of the intergovernmental analyses of EPC do not take the Commission or the EC’s 
institutional framework into the investigation of EPC at all. Their claim that is refuted by this thesis is that the 
Commission was far more concerned about protecting its place in Community affairs than with extending its 
reach in EPC, see for instance Smith, Michael E. Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy. The Institutionalization 
of Cooperation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004: 147. The thesis also opposes the notion that 
neither the Commission nor the European Parliament (EP) based on their relation to EPC merits the need to 
systematically be included in the study of EPC as it “emerged as a strictly inter-governmental and highly 
10 
 
account of EPC from 1973-1980 includes the Commission and the European Parliament to a 
certain degree. Găinar interprets EPC as a result of a compromise between intergovernmental 
and supranational visions. She argues that in establishing EPC, the Six found a ‘third way’ 
that was "less than supranational but more than intergovernmental” as the EPC took place 
outside the EC-framework and that it was not legally binding.23 However, Găinar notes that 
bridges were established between EPC and the EC, and presents evidence of this in her 
analysis of the CSCE and the EAD.24 Găinar coins the concept of the Commission’s policy of 
small steps towards EPC, which this thesis builds on.25 Găinar’s study raises the bar on the 
previous attempts at telling EPC’s story by identifying a feature of EPC that no other scholar 
has done, namely the inherent double feature of EPC, while her focus and analysis remains 
undoubtedly intergovernmental. 
By highlighting the functional linkages and bridges that existed between the EC and EPC, and 
that facilitated the Commission’s participation in EPC there are contributions that establish a 
role for the Commission in EPC.26 Panayiotis Ifestos and Simon Nuttall both share the notion 
that the Commission indeed used the existence of these linkages and bridges between the EC 
and EPC to its advantage; through pointing to them at every occasion to highlight the 
artificiality of the separation of the spheres. The claim is that it would be of little value for the 
Member States to attempt to keep this separation if EPC was to function as it was intended to. 
For EPC to succeed a link to the EC was needed, and it was necessary to:  
(…) build and sustain a workable relationship between the otherwise distinct institutional 
frameworks of the EEC and the European Political Cooperation. It was precisely those 
occasional functional linkages between the EEC and the EPC mechanisms which gradually 
brought about a blurring of the distinction between these two Community institutions.27  
Nuttall’s and Ifestos’ accounts are eye-witness accounts which provide for the thesis valuable 
points of departure for its archival-based investigations. However, their accounts are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
secretive forum during the early 1970s”, see Möckli, Daniel. European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. 
Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009:7. 
23 Găinar, Maria. Aux origins de la diplomatie européenne. Les Neuf et la Coopération politique européenne de 
1973 à 1980, Euroclio no 64, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012: 30. 
24 Găinar’s analysis spans the entire EPC-realm in the period 1973-1980 
25 “La politique des “petits pas” de la Commission européenne”, Găinar 2012: 70-71. 
26 Ifestos, Panayiotis. European Political Cooperation. Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy?, 
Aldershot: Avebury, 1987. Panayiotis Ifestos was Greek diplomatic representative to the EEC 1979-87.  
Nuttall, Simon J. European Political Co-operation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Simon J. Nuttall, British. 
Amongst other tasks he was Director in the Directorate General for External Relations, Commission of the 
European Communities, and had responsibility for EC-EPC relations in his time in the Secretariat General. 
Nuttall worked in the Commission from 1981-1994. 
27 Ifestos 1987: 438. 
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somewhat tainted by being based mostly on own recollections and not so much on material 
available to other scholars.  
Nutall’s and Ifestos’ claims on the approach of the Commission are supported by the project 
History and memories of an institution that attempts at exploring the history of the 
Commission in the entire period 1958-86. Among the full range of the Commission’s 
activities it also touches on the subject of this thesis, the Commission’s role in EPC. History 
and memories of an institution observes both the artificial separation of the EC- and EPC-
spheres and the resulting relationship between the EC and EPC as one which:   
(…) essentially consisted of problems of interface. The dividing line varied depending on the 
subject and in a number of areas the separation between the Community sphere and the Member 
States’ responsibility was simply artificial.28 
The role of the Commission in EPC was based on its contribution to the two first cases of 
EPC, the CSCE and the EAD. Previous research has argued that the Commission’s role in 
these two cases was based on the Commission’s expertise being necessary for these EPC-
cases to succeed, a notion that this thesis builds on.29 The CSCE was the first case that 
launched the Commission’s battle for participation in EPC.30 This first case has been seen as a 
good illustration of the Commission’s “ability to seize small opportunities to mark out its 
territory and maintain its influence” and of the “unremitting efforts it had to make during the 
Malfatti era to avoid being sidelined”.31 
The EAD has been presented as a case where the Commission’s role in EPC became evident 
and indeed more or less inevitable.32  For Nuttall the EAD was seen as a case where the 
manner of the work done by the Commission determined its entrance into the policy-area; as 
an instance where the Commission’s expertise ensured a role for the Commission: “By 
                                                          
28 Vinas, Angel, Sigfrido Ramirez-Pérez and Éric Bussière. “Trade policy and external relations: new dynamics, 
in Eric Bussière, V. Dujardin, M. Dumoulin, P. Ludlow, J.W. Brouwer and P. Tilly (eds.). The European 
Commission 1973-86, History and Memories of an Institution, Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European 
Union, 2014: 427, my underlining. 
29 For the CSCE specifically see Romano, Angela. ”A single European voice can speak louder to the world: the 
EPC and the CSCE experiences”, in Morten Rasmussen and Ann-Christina L Knudsen (eds.) The Road to a 
United Europe: Interpretations of the Process of European Integration. Euroclio Studies and Documents(48). 
Brussels: Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2009: 257-270 and Romano, Angela. “The Nine and the Conference in 
Helsinki: a challenging game with the Soviets”, in Jan van der Harst (ed.) Beyond the Customs Union: The 
European Community’s quest for deepening, widening and completion, 1969-1975, Brussels: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007: 83-106. For both cases see; Găinar 2012 and Nuttall 1992. 
30 Găinar 2012: 359. 
31 Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse. “The development of the Single Commission (1967-72)”, in Michel Dumoulin (ed.). 
The European Commission 1958-72, History and Memories of an Institution, Luxembourg: Publication Office of 
the European Union, 2014: 143. 
32 Găinar 2012: 359-360, Nuttall 1992: 103. 
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fighting hard, and by taking the initiative of drafting good-quality papers on the technical 
aspects, the Commission secured its participation with the Arabs.”33 The EAD has also been 
seen as a case where a more conciliatory approach of France towards the Commission was 
found.34 This approach is asserted by Aurélie Élisa Gfeller whose study provides for 
important input for this thesis with its focus on France; as the Member State with most 
ambivalence towards the European integration in general and the Commission in particular.35  
 The Commission’s approach 
Previous studies have framed the period that this thesis investigates as different from what 
went before, the Commission’s approach likewise. This thesis builds on research that shows 
how the Commission in this period operated in a more pragmatic and less aggressive manner 
based on its Treaty-based competence and expertise. There is an ongoing reappraisal of the 
1970s in the history of European integration of which this thesis forms part.36 Giuliano 
Garavini distinguishes between the period of the Single Market in the 1980s and the Common 
Market of the 1960s and 1970s as almost constituting “several distinct “European 
integrations”.”37 A more traditional interpretation is that of Desmond Dinan where after the 
empty chair crisis, the European integration project lost momentum, and that due to the 
“feebleness” of a weak, hamstrung and poorly led Commission nothing of importance 
happened.38  
Piers N. Ludlow on the other hand points to the period after the crisis of 1965 as a period 
where the Commission temporarily shelved its leadership ambitions, and as a period “when 
the controversies became political as opposed to technical, Commission influence melted 
                                                          
33 Nuttall 1992: 103. 
34 Gfeller, Aurélie Èlisa. Building a European Identity. France, the United States and the Oil Shock, 1973-1974, 
New York: Berghan Books, 2012:103-4. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Most relevant for my study is the general contributions from the likes of Laursen, Johnny. (ed.) The 
Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community, 1973-83, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
2014 in addition to both volumes of History and Memories of an Institution; Dumoulin, Michel (ed.). The 
European Commission 1958-72, History and Memories of an Institution, Luxembourg: Publication Office of the 
European Union, 2014 and Bussière, Eric, V. Dujardin, M. Dumoulin, P. Ludlow, J.W. Brouwer and P. Tilly 
(eds.). The European Commission 1973-86, History and Memories of an Institution, Luxembourg: Publication 
Office of the European Union, 2014. More specifically I draw on the contributions to the study of this period by 
Găinar 2012, Gfeller 2012, Möckli 2009 as well as from Varsori, Antonio and Guia Migani (eds). Europe in the 
International Arena during the 1970s – Entering a Different World, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2011. 
37 Garavini, Giuliano. After Empires. European Integration, Decolonization, & the Challenge from the Global 
South 1957-1986, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012: 5. 
38 Dinan 1994: 70, 2004:161. 
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away”.39 The Commission of the mid-1960s was not seen as ‘en route’ to becoming the 
dominant force within the EEC, and could no longer harbour short-term aspirations to lead the 
integration project, as the duty to do so now lay elsewhere; with the Member States.40 In the 
most recent research, Wolfram Kaiser states that: “as is well-known, the Commission suffered 
from the aftermath of the Empty Chair crisis and from weak leadership at the top.”41 This 
thesis argues that while the effects of the empty chair crisis on the Commission might be 
‘well-known’ they are far from ‘well-analysed’, which this thesis in turn attempts to 
overcome.  
In History and Memories of an Institution a notion of a change both of European integration 
and the Commission’s approach is supported. Marie-Thérèse Bitsch has identified the 1969 
Summit in The Hague as a point of change for the Commission where it by adapting to the 
new circumstances, avoiding being side-lined and contributing with its expertise added to the 
Summit’s success.42 The essence of how the Commission worked in the period 1967-1972 as 
applied in the EC-sphere, both Treaty-based and beyond has also been identified as one where 
the Commission had to:  
(…) rely on its own resources, the quality of the work it did, its members’ positive image and 
moral authority, and the effectiveness of its Secretary-General. It was extremely vigilant and 
determined to act, in particular in institutional matters and even more so in political matters, 
where the Treaties did not secure its status as thoroughly as in economic matters. It was energetic 
in guaranteeing a place at the summits of the Heads of State or Governments so as to avert any 
risk of being sidelined and in the hope of preserving the strong points of the Community system.43  
By 1970 the Commission has been observed to attempt to resume its leadership, and to 
venture into “political dossiers from which the Member States – or some of them at least – 
wished to exclude it.”44 Kaiser has defined the period of 1973-1983 as one where  
(…) the Commission developed new strategies for strengthening once more its institutional profile 
and legitimacy and for re-asserting its role in EC policy development through the expansion into 
new policy fields such as the environment and monetary policy for which there was no clear 
treaty basis.45 
                                                          
39 Ludlow, Piers N. The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2006b: 209, my underlining. 
40 Ludlow 2006b: 210. 
41 See for instance Kaiser 2014:67. 
42 Bitsch 2014: 136. 
43 Ibid: 151.  
44 Ibid: 138. 
45 Kaiser 2014: 52. 
14 
 
On a general note, Katja Seidel argues that the Commission in its first years in part could be 
characterised as operating on the basis of “prudence and pragmatism”, and although this is not 
the only manner in which the early Commission is characterised, her work presents nuances 
to the Commission as an actor.46 In the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the more 
confrontational and politically ambitious Commission is visible in an area where it held a 
defined Treaty-based role. Ann-Christina L. Knudsen establishes the Commission as one of 
the main actors in the development of the CAP. This turns our attention to the very influential 
first Commission where the personal skills, expertise, competence and supranational ideology 
of individual Commissioners and Commission staff all were determining factors in shaping 
this policy area.47 Knudsen also argues that the Commission’s shaping of the CAP went 
beyond what was stipulated as the Commission’s role in the Treaty. 48  
The Commission’s ability to gain entrance to an area in which it held limited Treaty-based 
responsibilities is also explored by Ivo Maes in a study on the Commission’s role in the 
process of monetary integration.49 By using its right of initiative the Commission was able to 
apply monetary integration to protect the functioning of the common market and the CAP, in 
addition to formulating initiatives and policy in the European interest that were acceptable for 
both French and German interests, traditionally opposed to each other.50 These abilities of the 
Commission were also in this policy area based on the personal skills and expertise of the 
Commissioners behind the propositions.51 Maes argues that gaining entrance to the world of 
the central bankers in the Committee of the Governors constituted influence for the 
Commission in the case of monetary integration. 52 The policy area of monetary integration 
had a long and winding development as it stretched out to include the period both before and 
after the empty chair crisis. This has prompted Maes to note a change in the Commission 
where it following the crisis induced more cautious proposals, however, the crisis had no 
effect on its will to influence the policy area.53 
                                                          
46 Seidel, Katja. The Process of Politics in Europe. The Rise of European Elites and Supranational Institutions, 
London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010:65-108. 
47 Knudsen, Ann-Christina L. Farmers on Welfare. The Making of Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy, Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2009:109, 113-114, 118. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Maes, Ivo. “The ascent of the European Commission as an actor in the monetary integration process in the 
1960s”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 53(2), 2006: 224. 
50 Ibid: 226-227. 
51 Ibid: 227. 
52 Ibid: 238. 
53 Ibid: 236. 
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Enlargement is another policy-area where the Commission played an important role based on 
its expertise identified by both Michael J. Geary and Ludlow:  
(…) the Commission’s ability to steer the Community’s position through its technical and expert 
advice, and its unique knowledge of the acquis, knowledge that became an important source of 
influence.54  
Once again therefore, the Commission’s importance sprang not from high-profile politicking over 
enlargement, a game in which it could not compete with the strong member state opinions at play, 
but instead from the lower-key and unromantic, but absolutely essential, work it could do 
establishing the precise manner in which new member states could take their place in the already 
highly complex Community system. Technical expertise, not political clout, was the Commission’s 
main asset.55  
The 1970s saw development of several new policy areas both internationally and on the 
European level; for environmental policy Jan-Henrik Meyer emphasizes the facilitating role 
in the early phase of both the Commission and the European Parliament by using their 
expertise to place environmental policy on the agenda.56 The fact that the Commission had 
competent officials in the international forums and networks in which the area of 
environmental policy was developing, where most Member States had not, contributed to 
placing environment policy on the EC agenda.57  
Studying the Commission 
There are many ways to study the Commission, a complex actor at the intersection between 
being a political actor and an administrative actor with many levels to it. Different focus 
provides for different results. In order to frame the visions and leadership of the Commission 
as an institution, the thesis turns to the comprehensive study History and Memories of an 
institution which features chapters on each of the Commission Presidents of the period 1958-
1986.58 In addition to pointing towards the highest level of the Commission; the 
Commission’s President, previous literature also points to the level directly below; the 
                                                          
54 Geary, Michael J.  Enlarging the European Union. The Commission Seeking Influence, 1961-1973, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013: 3-4. 
55 Ludlow, Piers N.  “A Welcome Change: The European Commission and the Challenge of Enlargement, 1958-
1973”, Journal of European Integration History, 11 (2), 2005: 13.  
56 Meyer, Jan -Henrik. “The Europeanisation of environmental policy in the 1970s”, Vingtième  
Siècle, No.113, 2012: 117-126 and Meyer, Jan -Henrik. “Getting started: Agenda-setting in European 
Environmental Policy on the 1970s”, in Johnny Laursen (ed.) The Institutions and Dynamics of the European 
Community, 1973-83, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014: 221-242. 
57 Meyer 2012, 2014.   
58 Dumoulin, Michel (ed.). 2014; Bussière, Eric, V. Dujardin, M. Dumoulin, P. Ludlow, J.W. Brouwer and P. 
Tilly (eds.). 2014. 
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Secretariat-General (SG), the two instances that were most directly visible in the battle for the 
Commission’s inclusion in EPC.59  
The SG is a natural point of departure for investigating any policy area of the EC, as the 
literature presents it not exclusively as an administration but as the instance that provided the 
Commission with its overarching strategy and as “the appropriate home of the European 
Idea”.60 The SG is in the literature portrayed as an active agent, contributing to coherence 
over all community processes and actions. Its importance in EPC is well established by the 
literature as it became responsible for the Commission’s relationship with EPC.61 Providing 
for an illustration of this importance is for instance the remarkable role played by its deputy 
secretary-general Klaus Meyer in the EAD.62   
The SG was very much a place of continuity and expertise as Emile Noël sat at its helm in the 
entire period 1957-1987, although the break that the empty chair crisis constituted has been 
made a point also in the research on the SG.63 Previous research argues that the Commission 
in 1969-76 relied more on the SG’s abilities than the first Commission. The reason was that 
the SG had more expertise at its disposal than the individual Commissioners. 64 Whenever the 
political process of the EC provided new initiatives, these were turned to the SG, and EPC 
was no exception.65  
Previous literature has also emphasised less tangible conceptualisations used for legitimising 
a role for the Commission not defined by the Treaty. Several scholars has emphasised a 
‘myth’ of the Commission, including the claim of it being a competence-maximizer.66 Seidel 
                                                          
59 In the very last phase of writing this thesis An impossible Job? The Presidents of the European Commission, 
1958-2014, edited by Jan van der Harst and Gerrit Voerman was published (2015) and while I am aware of its 
existence and relevance there has not been time to apply this work in my investigation of the Commission. This 
thesis devotes parts of chapter 4 to an analysis of the Commission from 1958-1973 at this highest level of its 
President. 
60 Kassim, Hussein. “The Secretariat General of the European Commission, 1958-2003” in  
Andy Smith (ed.) Politics and the European Commission. Actors, interdependence, legitimacy, London: 
Routledge, 2004: 47-66. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Găinar 2012: 360. Klaus Meyer, German. Deputy Secretary-General of the Commission of the European 
Communities, 1969 -1977. 
63 Emile Nöel, French. Executive Secretary of the Commission of the European Economic Community, 1958–
1967, Secretary-General of the Commission of the European Communities, 1967–1987, and President of the 
European University Institute in Florence, 1987-1993. 
64 Kassim 2004. 
65 Ibid: 57. 
66 The term “competence-maximiser” is most commonly associated with the work of Giandomenico Majone, see 
Regulating Europe, London: Routledge, 1996. 
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claims that the High Authority and the Commission’s legitimacy both internally and 
externally was: 
(…) enhanced by a founding myth that was to justify the European administrations’ claim to 
embody the European cause. Their early years were not only crucial in terms of setting up 
administrative structures and establishing working methods, but also in generating such a 
founding myth.67  
This embodiment of the European cause that legitimated the work and ambitions of the 
Commission resonates easily with a contemporary analysis of the Commission written by 
David Coombes in 1970.68 Coombes claims that the Commission had been given 
responsibility to act as “the conscience of the Community”, which corresponds well with 
Seidel’s ‘embodiment of the European cause’.69  
Previous literature thus provides for a range of potential manners in which to approach the 
question of the role of the Commission in EPC, based on insights but also on shortcomings. 
There are examples where previous literature fails to distinguish between the EC and EPC in 
this crucial period.70 Paradoxically, instances of over-emphasis on the completeness of the 
separation between EPC and the EC in previous studies also exist alongside these.71 What 
lacks in both accounts, for the ones that fail to recognise EPC as a distinct entity, and the ones 
that fail to recognise EPC’s interconnectedness with the EC, is an investigation into the 
explanatory potential of the EC’s institutional machinery in relation to EPC.  
                                                          
67 Seidel 2010: 174, my emphasis.  
68 Coombes, David. Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community – A Portrait of the Commission of the 
E.E.C., London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1970: 78-86. Coombes’ work is still used to describe the role of 
the Commission, both Seidel and Geoffrey Edwards use his 5 points of role and functions, see Seidel 2010: 2; 
Edwards, Geoffrey. “Introduction: The European Commission in Perspective” in David Spence and Geoffrey 
Edwards (eds.), The European Commission (3rd edition), London: John Harper Publishing, 2006: 7-8. 
69 Coombes 1970: 78-86, Seidel 2010: 174.  
70 There are instances where scholarly work, and then in particular of a newer date is flawed by the effects of 
hindsight and the more recent developments in the realm once covered by the EPC. As the establishment of a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) usurped the EPC, its history as once an intended separate and a 
purely intergovernmental initiative seems to have been lost in some accounts. The terms denoting the EPC, as 
“European Political Community” might of course be nothing more than a mistake, but there are several instances 
of where the terminology describing what really happened within the EPC faultily is being referred to as 
“Community”-action in the sense of being performed by the EC. See for instance Varsori, Antonio “The 
European Construction in the 1970s. The Great Divide” in Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani (eds). Europe in 
the International Arena during the 1970s – Entering a Different World, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2011:37 and 
Kaiser in 2014: 72. 
71 Previous research both recent and more contemporary has over-emphasised the completeness of the separation 
between EPC and the EC. See Möckli 2009, Smith 2004 and Urwin 1995: 199. These accounts fail to note that 
there indeed were several touching points between the EC and EPC, and that relationship between the two 
formed the backdrop for an ongoing discussion between the Member States and the Commission throughout the 
period.  
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The shortcomings of the previous literature call for an investigation of two aspects relevant to 
the role of the Commission. Firstly, the literature indicates a role for the Commission in EPC, 
but this role has hitherto not been analysed.72 As a result, the previous intergovernmental 
framework that has characterised studies on EPC is unable to explain the Commission’s role 
in EPC as anything but inevitable or the results of a weak institution controlled by the 
Member States. Secondly, previous studies indicate that the period following the empty chair 
crisis that saw the establishment of EPC was a period characterised by change that also had 
effects on the Commission.73 This perceived change in an intergovernmental direction along 
with what seems a paradoxical role for the Commission in EPC has led this thesis to answer 
the call from Seidel; time is now ripe for investigating the role of the Commission in the 
period of the 1970s.74  
1.3 Approach  
To answer this thesis’s main research question: how the supranational Commission ended up 
with a role in the intergovernmental EPC I conduct a qualitative historical analysis. This 
thesis does not aim to test theoretical hypotheses, nor does it set out to develop new theory. It 
is a theoretically informed empirical investigation that aims to contribute to ongoing debates 
about the role of the Commission in European integration. The thesis covers the period 1969-
1976. In December 1969 the initiative to political cooperation was taken resulting in the 
Commission being explicitly kept on arm’s length.75 Given this point of departure, the high 
point of EPC’s Euro-Arab Dialogue in May 1976 seems like a paradox. The Commission’s 
representative, Klaus Meyer, co-chaired this first meeting on the highest level of the EAD on 
behalf of the European Community, side by side with the representative for EPC.76  
This thesis is an analysis of the Commission and EPC, not one of the Member States and 
EPC. In order to determine whether or not the role of the Commission in EPC was based on 
Commission agency or if it was a role determined and controlled by the Member States, I 
investigate the Commission’s activity towards EPC. This choice entails to a certain degree to 
leave aside detailed investigations into the activities of the Member States, which admittedly 
is a limitation of this approach. To include investigations of all Member States’ activities 
                                                          
72 The indication of a role for the Commission in EPC is clear in the work of Găinar 2012 and Nuttall 1992. 
73 See amongst others Bitsch 2014; Dinan 1994; Kaiser 2014 and Ludlow 2006a,b. 
74 Seidel 2010: 178. Here Seidel coins the term “a second-generation Commission” that I apply to my analysis.   
75 TNA, FCO 30/567, Telegram no 632 from Paris to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 3 July 1970; TNA, 
FCO 30/568, Europe Agence Internationale d’Information pour la Presse, 27 July 1970. 
76 HAEC, BAC 327 1993 8, SI (26)394, Note à l’attention de monsieurs des membres de la commission, 
«Dialogue euro-arabe, Réunion de la Commission générale de 18-21 mai 1976», 26 May 1976. 
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related to EPC and the Commission would most certainly prove too comprehensive and well 
beyond the scope of a PhD-thesis. Still, a basic premise in analysing the Commission’s 
activity towards EPC is that it came as a reaction to Member States’ activity in EPC. As such 
the Member States’ actions are indirectly included in the thesis’ analysis.  
In order to answer the main research question I undertake a two-step analysis, where the first 
step investigates the Commission’s activity towards EPC. The results of this analysis enable 
the thesis’ analysis’ second step where I investigate the Commission as an actor. In reality the 
two elements that form the two steps of the analysis; activity and actorness were and are 
interconnected. For analytical purposes these two steps are kept apart in order to make them 
more approachable.  
In the first step of the analysis I address two operationalising questions: how the Commission 
responded to the establishment of EPC and how its approach to EPC developed. To answer 
the first question, I investigate the basis for the Commission’s response. I search specifically 
for how the Commission legitimated its claims for participation in EPC. I begin with the 
notion that the Commission’s Treaty-based mandate in the EC was complemented by a myth 
of the Commission. Exploring the elements of mandate and myth forms the basis for further 
investigations into the determining factors of the Commission’s response where I track the 
formation of this response to the establishment of EPC chronologically. I assess what the 
Commission did following the initiation of political cooperation in The Hague 1969 and 
throughout the establishment and formative phase of EPC from the Luxembourg Report 1970 
to the Copenhagen Report 1973.77 
In order to answer the second question of how the Commission’s approach developed I 
investigate two distinct cases, the CSCE and the EAD. This choice is based on two elements; 
the point in time these two cases emerged and their contents. In its first and formative phase 
1970-1973, EPC was characterised by work done on the CSCE and what would become the 
EAD. As EPC came of age, its scope was extended, and a range of other cases from the 
period 1973-1976 could have been relevant for this study, for instance EPC’s response to 
crises in Cyprus, Portugal and Spain in addition to an emerging response to events in 
                                                          
77 Throughout the thesis I will apply the more “official” term of the Luxembourg Report denoting the Report 
from 1970 establishing EPC. However, the report was also known as the «Davignon-Report» after the man who 
led the work on the report, Belgian Political Director Étienne Davignon. I have kept the original formulations in 
the references from the sources that use this term denoting both the report and the EPC as the «Davignon»-
structure, machinery or similar. 
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Southern Africa.78 However, by focusing on the two cases that emerged in EPC in this early 
phase that had contents that extended “pure” foreign policy and thus ventured into areas 
covered by the Treaty, I facilitate the investigation of the relationship between EPC and the 
existing EC framework and of the Commission and its developing approach to EPC. The 
choice of these two cases also enables tracking of a potential change in the Commission as an 
actor as EPC developed because they can illustrate how the Commission’s approach to EPC 
matured alongside EPC itself, and the manner in which the Commission legitimised its claim 
for a role in both the CSCE and the EAD. 
The second step of this thesis’ analysis is on a more aggregate level. Here I investigate what 
kind of actor the Commission that acquired a role in EPC was, based on the analysis of the 
Commission’s activity. A range of choices of how to study the Commission as an actor arises 
when aiming to investigate the Commission’s role in EPC. One of my aims is to unveil and 
open the “black box” of the Commission in this period. By approaching the Commission as an 
actor that operated on several levels, investigating the internal and external presentation of the 
Commission as a supranational actor and analysing this actor over time the thesis is well-
equipped to answer the questions posed.  
In order to unveil and open the black box of the Commission the thesis launches an 
investigation into whether or not the Commission was a coherent actor internally and 
externally and if there was internal division over EPC. The questions over coherence are 
explored by analysing various written contributions emanating from Members of the 
Commission in the period in question. Commissioners Altiero Spinelli, Ralf Dahrendorf and 
the Commission’s Secretary-General Emile Nöel all presented different views of European 
integration in general and as a part of this, the establishment of EPC in particular.79 The 
analysis of these texts together with the analysis of the basis for the Commission’s response 
and approach to EPC forms the basis for the thesis’ evaluation of which forces within the 
Commission that were the most decisive.  
                                                          
78 See Nuttall 1992: 81-148. 
79 Altiero Spinelli, Italian. Commissioner for Industry and Technology between 1970 and 1976. An ardent 
federalist, Spinelli co-authored the Ventotene Manifesto of 1941 and on account of this and his role in the early 
phase of European integration is often referred to as one of the ‘Founding Fathers’ of the European integration 
project. Spinelli left the Commission and stood in the first direct elections for the EP in 1979. Ralf Dahrendorf, 
German. From 1970 to 1973 he was Commissioner for External Relations and Trade, and from January 1973 
until he left in 1974 he was Commissioner for Research, Science and Education. Dahrendorf went on to become 
Director of the London School of Economics between 1974 and 1984, and became a British citizen in 1988 after 
being awarded a knighthood in 1982. In 1993 he was created a life peer, and took the Liberal Democrat whip in 
the House of Lords. Both Spinelli and Dahrendorf left the Commission of their own volition, perhaps in part due 
to disappointment over the way the institution developed contrary to their visions. 
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An analysis of the Commission’s Presidents from 1958-1976 further broadens the analysis of 
the thesis. By basing the thesis’ analysis mostly on the Commission highest levels of its 
President(s), the SG and individual Commissioners, I address the levels that were most 
closely affected by EPC. Admittedly, by excluding the Commission’s lower levels, the 
detailed EPC-work on the level of Directorate-Generals is left mostly out of the analysis. 
However, including also these levels would again prove beyond the scope of a thesis, as the 
level of detail and amount of material would be too vast. The relationship between the two 
most prominent supranational institutions of the EC at the time, the Commission and the 
European Parliament was also played out on the institutions highest levels. By exploring the 
various Commission Presidents speeches before the EP this thesis’ analysis includes to an 
extent the relationship between the Commission and the EP. This element of tracking 
supranational rhetoric facilitates the investigation of the Commission as an actor over time, 
and the investigation into an eventual change or adjustment in the Commission in this period.  
An institution like the Commission is and was of course incapable of feelings. However, in 
the period analysed it was made up by individuals and existed within a structure that placed 
great value on the Commission as a symbol for a perceived European interest, which arguably 
facilitated a self-perception of the Commission and its members. Any study of one actor in a 
process risks developing ‘tunnel vision’ through overemphasizing the role of the actor in 
focus. This thesis is most definitely not a study that argues that the Commission played a 
leading role neither in establishing EPC, nor acting as a main player in the setting of its 
agenda. Those roles were indisputably in the hands of the Member States.  
1.4 Sources 
This thesis has made use of primary sources from several archives. Material from the 
Commission’s own archive in Brussels; the Historical Archives of the European Commission 
(HAEC) has been complemented with material from The National Archives (TNA) in 
London; the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) in Florence; the Archive of 
European Integration (AEI) and material from the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE) 
in France. 
There are limitations to the material; which reflect the fact that EPC lay outside the EC’s 
sphere and that it was highly confidential. For the period covered by this thesis, EPC had no 
secretariat, and no archive was kept in a designated place. Preparing documents for EPC was 
in the period 1970-1987 the responsibility of the Member State (and its foreign ministry) that 
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held the Presidency.80 What existed of archival material was thus “…carried halfway across 
Europe in a suitcase every six months”.81 This only changed following the SEA in 1987, 
when a secretariat and an archive for EPC were established.82 This secretariat from that time 
onwards held the responsibility for preparation of EPC-documents and maintaining the EPC-
archive.83 Other than making several requests to the Central Archives of the General 
Secretariat of the Council, I have not embarked on what presumably would be to no avail 
given other scholars’ attempt and failure; to gain entrance to what might exist but that is not 
de-classified of EPC-material in the now existing EPC-archive from the period covered in the 
thesis.84 As a thesis with the Commission in focus, this undoubtedly leads to an unfortunate 
but inevitable imbalance in the available material, as the Commission’s side is well covered, 
however; without complete access it is impossible to evaluate the contribution any EPC-
material might have provided for in this thesis. 
Not disregarding the lack of EPC-material, by using material from different sources and from 
different actors, I have worked around this challenge and had at my disposal a rich and 
complex material. 85 This material serves the thesis well in its attempt to investigate the 
Commission’s response and actions towards EPC directly, and indirectly to investigate what 
happened as consequences to these responses and actions on the side of the Member States 
and indeed, but more limited, within EPC.  
The material from the HAEC consists of minutes from Commission meetings, letters and 
notes from Commissioners and particularly the Secretariat-General. In addition it consists of 
material on the policy initiatives in the EC-sphere relevant for EPC; for instance documents 
relating to the CSCE and the EAD and the EC-policy areas that were affected by these. The 
material is rich when it comes to the official response of the Commission to EPC as well as 
providing bountiful information about the Commission’s expertise and skills in the policy-
areas in question.  
                                                          
80 Nuttall 1992: 18. 
81 Ibid: 20. 
82 The European Commission, Guide to the Archives of the Ministries of the Foreign Affairs of the Member 
States, of the European Communities and of the European Political Cooperation, Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1989: 5-13, 78. 
83 Pijpers, Alfred, Elfriede Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.). European Political Cooperation in the 
1980s, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988: 93.  
84 Smith 2004: 13-14. 
85 Another approach to the problem of access to the EPC material would be to consult the Member States 
archives in the hope of piecing together a “fuller” picture. Due to the timeframe of this project and the additional 
challenges this would pose for instance related to languages this has been rejected.  
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The material from the HAEC and HAEU complements one another and provides an entrance 
for the thesis into the inner workings of the Commission, as well as a representation of how 
the Commission worked outwards. The material the thesis has consulted from the HAEU 
consists of correspondence between individuals in the Commission but also external 
communication; letters and notes from the individuals in the Commission that were working 
on EPC and indeed on the EC-policies touched by EPC. The thesis has mostly made use of 
the personal archives that are made available online by the HAEU, for instance the archive’s 
holdings of material from Emile Nöel, Franco Maria Malfatti, Klaus Meyer and François-
Xavier Ortoli.86 Also from the HAEU, a different set of material following the release of the 
Oral history-project material which formed the basis for History and Memories of an 
Institution has been consulted, for instance the interviews with Commissioners working with 
EPC.87 Electronically available material from the vast holdings of the AEI has been used to 
further complement the HAEC/HAEU material.88   
The thesis has made use of material from two Member States; the UK and France. The thesis 
draws on a limited but very specific material related to the EAD and the French Presidency in 
the second half of 1974 from the Ministère des Affaires Étrangerès. This material has 
provided valuable insight for the thesis into the most ardent opponent to Commission 
participation in EPC, France. The British material is admittedly more comprehensive than the 
French, and this makes for some imbalance. The UK was at this time ‘pounding’ at the EC’s 
door as it were and was very interested in all aspects of the newly established EPC: “We had 
missed the economic bus. We should very much like to be on the political bus from the 
beginning.”89  
The British efforts to be included in EPC results in the material from the TNA being very rich 
in terms of EPC and its Member States, the EC and its Member States and the relationship 
between EPC and the EC, and hereunder the Commission’s relationship within this matrix. 
The Commission and the UK ‘shared destiny’ in being on the outside of EPC looking in, as 
well as in sharing a strained relationship with arguably the most powerful Member State in 
                                                          
86 See the HAEU’s webpages: http://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/#Individuals. Franco Maria Malfatti, Italian. 
Commission President 1970 until he left to stand for national elections in 1972. François-Xavier Ortoli, French. 
Commission President 1973-1977. 
87 The Commission's oral history programme 1973-1986 is now available in a new online database found at 
http://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history/, where 218 interview recordings produced as part of work for the second 
volume of  History and Memories of an Institution have been deposited at the Historical Archives of the 
European Union (HAEU) and are now available to researchers. 
88 See the web-page http://aei.pitt.edu/  
89 TNA, FCO/30 567, Record of Conversation at the Belgian Embassy in Bonn, 4 June 1970. 
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the EC and EPC; France. The material from the TNA is valuable due to these circumstances 
as well. As an applicant country Britain gained access to an extensive amount of material 
from the EC but also EPC, which the Commission’s and the individuals’ archives lack.  
To shed light on the internal workings of the Commission and on the conflict over the 
Commission’s wider role in European integration as well as its role in EPC, I have selected a 
few ‘voices’ from within the Commission who published their reflections on these subjects in 
the period of focus.90 This analysis enables an investigation into different elements within the 
Commission and of the contrasting beliefs of the individuals that made up this institution. It 
also enables an analysis of which forces within the Commission that formed the institution’s 
collective approach to EPC.  
1.5 Theoretical perspectives on the role of supranational institutions 
This thesis is informed by theoretical perspectives on the role of supranational institutions 
within structures of integration or intergovernmental cooperation. A debate between neo-
functionalists and intergovernmental theory coincided in time with the period covered in this 
thesis, as intergovernmental approaches emerged as a rival to neo-functionalism from the 
mid-1960s.91 Relevant for this thesis are the elements of the debate on the role of 
supranational institutions in the integration project. Crudely put, neo-functionalism opens for 
supranational agency and for an influential and even determining role for institutions such as 
the Commission, while intergovernmentalism explain these institutions as instruments created 
in order to cater to the Member States’ needs.92 For the neo-functionalists, political activism 
                                                          
90 Dahrendorf 1973; Nöel, Emile. “The Institutional Problems of the Enlarged Community”, Government and 
Opposition, 7 (4), 1972: 413-425; Spinelli 1972. 
91 The period covered by this thesis correlates with the period in which the intergovernmental response to neo- 
functionalism amounted most clearly to a shift in paradigms when it came to theory building on European  
integration. Neo-functionalist reasoning in this period is mostly associated with the first work of Haas, Ernst. 
The Uniting of Europe, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. The first phase of intergovernmentalism is  
associated primarily with Hoffmann, Stanley. “Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case 
of Western Europe”, Daedalus 95,1966: 862-915, and continued by other scholars, most notably Milward, Alan. 
The European Rescue of the Nation-State [2nd edition], London and New York: Routledge, 2000 and Moravcsik, 
Andrew. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, London: UCL 
Press, 1998. By the early 1970s the intergovernmental challenge to neo-functionalism had amounted to a shift in 
paradigms and Haas deemed neo-functionalism obsolescent (but not obsolete) by the mid-1970s. See Haas, 
Ernst. The Obsolesence of. Regional Integration Theory, Institute of International Studies working paper, 
Berkeley, 1975 and “Turbulent Fields and the Study of Regional Integration”, International Organization, 
29(3), 1976. On the specific case of EPC as explained by intergovernmentalist in the period see Taylor, Paul. 
“The politics of the European Communities: the confederal phase”, World Politics, 27 (3), 1975: 335-360 and 
Taylor, Paul. “Intergovernmentalism in the European Communities in the 1970s: patterns and perspectives”, 
International Organization, 36 (04), 1982: 741-766. 
92 For the neo-functionalist importance of central institutions, like the Commission, to be able to secure enough 
autonomy, see for example Haas, Ernst. “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process”, 
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was needed to drive integration forward, and according to this school this would be provided 
by a “higher authority” which in the case of the EEC/EC the Commission would come closest 
to.93 Contrary to this, by intergovernmentalist reasoning it was the nation states that moved 
integration or cooperation. Importantly the nation states attempted to move in the direction 
most in line with their national interest.94 Intergovernmentalist reasoning would explain the 
setting-up of institutions like the Commission as part of securing these national interests, 
where the institutions would be instrumental in holding all Member States accountable to the 
agreed commitments. 95 
The thesis draws some useful premises out of what can be termed as a crude debate between 
neo-functionalist primacy of supranational activism in an integration process, and 
intergovernmentalist primacy of sovereign national states in complete control. These premises 
are that even within a European integration project admittedly and undoubtedly driven 
primarily by nation states, once created the supranational institutions could matter, and need 
to be included in any analysis of this project. 96 
The starting point of Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) is the primacy of states.97 This 
starting point is by proponents of RCI-approaches however applied as a premise that enables 
taking the role of supranational institutions into account.98 This basic premise underpins this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
International Organization, 15(3), 1961: 376.  Contrary to this, see intergovernmental notions of the EC’s 
institutions with limited authority entailing limited autonomy from the Member States, limited powers as in 
control over the acts of others as well as limited legitimacy; being accepted as a “rightful” centre of action; 
Hoffmann 1966: 885. Hoffmann also refuted the notion of “integration “beyond the nation-state”” as the 
emergence of a new kind of political community, as he argued the vindication of the nation-state as the basic unit 
within integration, where the institutions of the EC only held limited authority that in his  and other 
intergovernmentalist view was “conditional, dependent and reversible”, see Hoffmann 1966: 909.  
93 See Haas 1961: 376 and 1968: 283-317 for the institutions’ role in spill-over, the basic premise of neo-
functionalist reasoning of the forward moving of integration and the need for political activism provided for by 
supranational institutions. For the concept of spill-over refined to cultivated spill-over, see Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 
Jeppe.“Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC”,  
Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 20(1),1991: 1-22. 
94 See particularly Milward 2000 and Moravcsik 1998 for the importance of and the formation of national 
interest. 
95 For a recent account of the instrumental use of institutions as commitment-checks see Dijkstra, Hylke. 
“Approaches to Delegation in EU Foreign Policy: The Case of the Commission”, in Maciej Wilg and Ireneusz 
Pawel Karolewski, New Approaches to EU Foreign Policy, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2014: 38-55. 
96 As a response to what has been termed as a ‘stalemate’ in the debate between neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism in the mid-1990s, several new more middle-range theoretical approaches to European 
integration emerged that took these premises more into consideration. For this thesis, one of these approaches 
has been found of particular value; Rational Choice Institutionalism as part of a larger “school” of “New 
Institutionalism”. For an overview see Pollack, Mark. “The New Institutionalisms and European Integration”, in 
Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, European Integration Theory (2nd edition) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009:125-143 and Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000: 113-126. 
97 See Pollack, Mark.  “Realist, Intergovernmentalist, and Institutionalist Approaches” in Eric Jones and Anand 
Menon (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012: 3-17. 
98 For questions over if they matter and the conditions under which they matter see Pollack 1997. 
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thesis’ attempt to investigate supranational agency of the Commission within the 
intergovernmental structure of EPC. As the neo-functionalist vs intergovernmental debate 
provide for extreme versions of supranational agency where the institution either “run amok” 
or blindly obey and become the instrument of the Member States, I find a need for them to be 
refined.99 This thesis takes these extreme versions into account, particularly in terms of what 
they undoubtedly contributed to when it came to perceptions of the Commission. However, 
the call for a refinement is based on the paradoxical result where the Member States created 
EPC for the express purpose of treating foreign policy cooperation within an 
intergovernmental structure and still saw the Commission end up with a role. This 
necessitates investigations of supranational agency.  
In this thesis, I investigate whether the Commission was in a position where it could pursue 
its own preferences, and how it went about doing so by devising an approach towards EPC. In 
so doing the thesis draws on theoretical approaches within RCI, notably the supranational 
agency elements of both a Principal-Agent model (P-A) of delegation and the notions of the 
Commission’s preferences as a competence maximizer and purposeful opportunist. In 
addition I make use of the notion of path dependency.  
In a P-A model the relationship between the principal(s), in this case the Member States of the 
EC, and the agent, in this case the Commission is explained through investigating under what 
conditions institutions matter.100 The questions posed by this model are to what extent the 
principals control the agents, and to what extent they can follow their own preferences.101 The 
notion of a competence maximizer is associated with the work of Giandomenico Majone, and 
refers to what the preferences of a supranational actor are most likely to be: to seek to 
maximise its own role and in this case the scope of the EC.102 This is closely connected to 
Laura Cram’s notion of a purposeful opportunist, which describes the manner in which a 
                                                          
99 Ibid: 110. 
100 Admittedly, the P-A concept also holds potential for investigations of the role of the Commission within the 
European integration project as a principal; able to initiate and govern, or an agent; able to manage or administer, 
see for instance Hooghe, Liesbet. The European Commission and the Integration of Europe, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001: 165. For the purpose of the investigation of the Commission’s role in EPC 
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EPC; a privilege held by the Member States.  
101 Pollack 1997. 
102 Majone 1996, Pollack, Mark. “Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community”, 
Journal of Public Policy, 14(2), 1994: 95-145. The notion of «creeping competence» to an extent combines the 
notions of competence maximising and path dependency. 
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supranational agent most efficiently can act in the hope of reaching its aim of maximising its 
own role. 103 
The notion of path dependency, associated with the work of Paul Pierson, attempts to explain 
how previous decisions may shape an ongoing process in a manner that might lead to 
unforeseen or even unwanted results. 104 The thesis’ analysis of the role of the Commission in 
EPC can provide knowledge on supranational institutions’ role in processes characterised as 
path dependent. The notion of path dependency might be applied as a structural explanation 
for the role of the Commission in EPC, along the lines that the Member States’ actions within 
EPC, due to the existing framework of the EC, were ‘pushed’ by the Commission in the 
direction or path already had set up under the EC. 
In this thesis I analyse the Commission’s preferences and role in the case of EPC.  The thesis 
might as a result form the basis for questions over the Commission’s wider role in the 
European integration project. The results of the analysis of the Commission in EPC can 
provide insights into whether or not the Commission can be said to operate as a rational actor 
within the EC where it held a defined P-A relationship with the Member States. Also, it can 
contribute to answering questions of whether or not the preferences the Commission held 
within the EPC-sphere were the same as it held for the EC-sphere. What are the implications 
of a result where the Commission is found to have acted in EPC purposely opportunistic to 
maximise the competences of the EC, and by so doing, also maximising its own 
competences? The theoretical implications of the thesis’ main findings will be revisited in the 
thesis’ conclusion.  
1.6 Structure and main arguments of thesis 
The structure of this thesis investigates the basis for and the Commission’s response to the 
establishment of EPC in chapters two and three in exploration of the thesis’ first step of 
analysis. However, the thesis’ structure breaks with a chronological approach and the form of 
the two step-analysis outlined in chapter 1.3 as chapter four initiates the investigation of the 
Commission as an actor which makes it a part of the thesis’ second step of analysis. I claim 
that this move enables the investigation of the developing approach of the Commission 
                                                          
103 Cram, Laura. Policy-making in the EU. Conceptual lenses and the integration process, London: Routledge, 
1997. 
104 Pierson, Paul. “The path to European integration: A historical institutionalist analysis” Comparative Political 
Studies, 29, 1996: 123-63. 
 
28 
 
towards EPC that is found in chapters five and six. The thesis’ conclusion is structured along 
the lines of the two-step analysis.  
Chapter two explores two elements that defined the conflict over the Commission’s 
participation in EPC. It argues that the Commission used the two elements of an unchanging 
Treaty-defined mandate but also to a certain degree a myth to legitimise its entry to EPC. The 
chapter establishes the relevant competences of the EC and the Commission in the EC-
machinery. The chapter goes on to establish how the Commission could use these 
competences in its attempt to enter the EPC-machinery. I find that these demands for 
participation of the EC and the Commission in EPC were based on competences in the EC’s 
external relations and in particular the Common Commercial Policy (CCP).  
Chapter three tracks the development of the Commission’s response and approach to EPC in 
the period 1969-1973. It argues that the development of response and approach was 
characterised by internal divisions within the Commission, where the proponents of a 
pragmatic middle way characterised by deliberate choices set the pace. The Commission 
argued for participation in EPC based on its Treaty based competences, and to an extent this 
mandate was complemented by a myth and the role the Commission held for itself in its view 
of European political unification. Importantly I find that the Commission in this developing 
approach aimed to proceed in a manner that would not cause conflict with the Member States. 
While the chapter presents the development of EPC in this early phase as one characterised by 
the continuing opposition of France for EC and Commission ‘contamination’ of EPC, it also 
argues that on some levels of EPC there was a call for Commission participation based on the 
expertise it could provide. The chapter argues that the Commission’s chosen approach to EPC 
was characterised by its intention to participate in order to protect the EC from EPC. The 
Commission’s approach was further aimed at acting as the institutional link between the EC- 
and EPC-machinery, and if possible to shape the development of EPC.  
Chapter four investigates a perceived change of the Commission as a supranational actor. It 
further unveils and opens the black box of the Commission as it explores a set of diverging 
voices. The chapter argues that the Commission deliberately adjusted from an actor that was 
characterised as a super-government in spe to an actor characterised more as a sombre realist. 
The chapter’s chronological analysis of developments and changes on the level of the 
Commission’s President further tracks this adjustment. The main argument is that the 
Commission that met with EPC led by Presidents Malfatti, Mansholt and Ortoli emerges as 
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markedly different from the first Commission led by Hallstein, and that these findings holds 
an effect for the explanation of the Commission’s role in EPC.105  
In chapter five, I examine how the Commission’s approach to EPC developed in the first test 
case for EPC and indeed for the Commission’s role in EPC. The chapter thus establishes how 
the Commission acquired a role in the CSCE. The chapter argues that the Commission as a 
relentless pragmatist in the case of the CSCE succeeded, its aim was to secure participation of 
the EC and also adequate participation of the Commission itself. The Commission achieved to 
participate in the CSCE through entering as a member of the delegation of the Member State 
holding the EC/EPC-Presidency. In the chapter the Commission’s efforts and success in 
shaping the Moro-declaration and in securing the double signature of the CSCE’s Final Act 
by Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro on behalf of both Italy and of the EC is traced.106 This 
declaration held prior to the signature of the Final Act highlighted the importance that the 
Community as an entity had participated in, and agreed to the final agreements of the CSCE. 
The chapter argues that as both machineries contributed to the declaration’s formulation, this 
led to closer relation between the EC and EPC.  
Chapter six continues the examination of how the Commission’s approach to EPC developed 
as it establishes how the Commission acquired a role in the EAD. The chapter argues that the 
EAD became a joint EC-EPC venture based on the Commission’s efforts. This joint venture 
saw the Commission deeply entrenched in the Dialogue’s institutional structure by its own 
right, in the EAD-case alongside the EC/EPC-Presidency contrary to the CSCE where it was 
included in the national delegation of the Member State holding the EC/EPC-Presidency. The 
chapter’s main argument is that by May 1976 the Commission had, through its efforts within 
the EAD to an extent managed to bridge the divide between the EC and EPC. 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis and argues that in the case of EPC, the Commission as a 
rational actor successfully managed to navigate a complex and hostile environment. I argue 
that this result was a result of the Commission’s pragmatic approach to EPC by which it 
secured an unintended role for itself in EPC. I claim that the role of the Commission in EPC 
came as a result of a developing approach that I have traced. The origin of this approach was 
continuously the Treaty based mandate of the Commission. I argue that this approach moved 
from an initial response that was based more on the Commission’s own view of its role in 
                                                          
105 Sicco Mansholt, Dutch. Commission President for nine months following Malfatti’s resignation, March-
December 1972. 
106 Aldo Moro, Italian. Foreign Minister 1969-1974 and Prime Minister 1974-1976.  
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European political unification, to an approach that legitimated a role in EPC by the specific 
provisions within the CCP. Moreover, from this Treaty based legitimation I find evidence of 
the approach towards EPC as evolving into one that in addition was based on the 
Commission’s expertise.  
Based on the results from the case of EPC, a wider characterisation of the Commission as an 
actor in this period emerges. I suggest that the manner in which the Commission is seen to 
actively have made deliberate choices and adjust to its environment it can be characterised as 
a distinct second generation Commission. By comparing the results of the Commission’s role 
in the EPC-cases of the CSCE and the EAD to the stated preferences of the Commission, its 
chosen approach proved successful. The implications of these results are that they serve to 
question established truths of the Commission in this period as weak and inconsequential. The 
results also have implications for theoretical debates that go beyond the Commission’s role in 
EPC. The results of this thesis contribute to debates on how supranational institutions matter: 
by providing evidence of a supranational institution that proved to possess and apply agency 
that shaped outcomes that were of importance for the sovereign states that had intended an 
intergovernmental EPC.  
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2. The Commission– mandate and myth 
This chapter explores two elements that I claim to be defining in the conflict over the 
Commission’s participation in EPC: the mandate and the myth of the Commission as an actor. 
The chapter introduces both legal and less tangible aspects underpinning the Commission’s 
agency in the case of EPC, thus providing background for the thesis. I this chapter I argue that 
in addition to having a defined treaty-based mandate, the Commission that met with EPC was 
also defined by a myth. This myth encompassed how both the Member States and the 
Commission itself interpreted what the Commission ‘was’ and what it wanted to achieve.  
The intergovernmental cooperation in EPC was based on a non-legally binding framework of 
founding documents in the form of reports agreed to by its Member States. The EC’s external 
relations and the Commission’s role in these had their base in the Treaty of Rome.107 
The Commission will be consulted if the activities of the European Communities are affected 
by the work of the Ministers.108 
This was the formulation upon which the Commission’s participation in EPC hinged, a 
formulation that in substance remained unchanged until the London Report 1981, in which the 
Commission was formally associated with EPC work at all levels.109 The EC’s legal base in 
the Treaty also remained substantially unchanged throughout the period 1969-1976.110 The 
foundation for the Commission’s claim for EPC participation emanated mainly from its 
treaty-based mandate.  
                                                          
107 In this thesis I refer to the Treaty of Rome from 1957, retrieved from University of Groningen’s law library 
on 19 September 2015: http://www.rug.nl/bibliotheek/support/law-library/document-
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109 AEI, London Report 1981, Source: European Political Co-operation (EPC) Press and Information Office, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, 1988, retrieved on 11 June 2015 from 
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110 However, Court decisions further specifying the treaty-based foundation for the EC’s external role were made 
in this period. For a thorough analysis of the EC’s external policies and the Commission’s role see for instance 
Eeckhout, Piet. EU External Relations Law (2nd edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 and Boussuat, 
Gérard and Anaïs Legendre. “The Commission’s role in external relations”, in Michel Dumoulin, The European 
Commission 1958-72, History and Memories of an Institution, Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European 
Union, 2014: 339-376. 
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The conflict over the Commission’s participation in EPC had its roots in a basic premise of 
separation. From the beginning, the EC’s external relations were characterised as external 
economic policy and placed at the core of supranational integration. In particular was the 
Common Commercial Policy’s (CCP) status as a common policy with exclusive Community 
competence clear from the Treaty. However, at the same time, the Member States attempted 
to separate these external relations of the EC from the ‘pure’ foreign policy that with the 
emergence of EPC became the subject of intergovernmental cooperation between the Member 
States of the EC.111 Some Member States did not want the Commission in EPC, based on the 
myth of an overambitious supranational actor that surrounded it. I claim that this myth also 
forms the background for the intended separation of the EPC and the EC spheres.  
2.1 Mandate – the Treaty of Rome, a ‘framework Treaty’  
The Treaty of Rome was an expression of the Member States’ will and of how far they were 
prepared to venture in integration within the framework of the European Economic 
Community. The creators of the Treaty wanted to achieve two aims, and this duality marked 
the Treaty (and thus the EEC and the Commission) from the very beginning. The first aim 
was to create a solid and efficient European framework for integration, capable of taking 
decisions and implementing these, framed by a European interest that at the same time was of 
national interest for the Member States. The second aim was to protect the Member States’ 
national interests, which explains the attempts of the national states to retain control over 
important parts of their sovereignty. This duality formed the basis for the Treaty of Rome as a 
framework Treaty, as it set more or less definite goals for integration, but left the means 
through which to achieve these somewhat less specified.112 Even within such an 
unprecedented agreement as the Treaty of Rome, there was ripe potential for conflicts. As the 
Treaty created institutions to manage the EEC, this potential was extended from inter-state 
conflicts to conflicts between Member States and the established Community Institutions.  
                                                          
111 Eeckhout 2011: 501 
112 The Commission could and did use this feature of the Treaty as an “outline Treaty” as a flexible point of 
departure that entailed a political role for the Commission as an initiator, an honest broker and a watchdog of 
Treaty that also entailed an international role for the Community and the Commission. I find evidence for an 
expansionist use of the Treaty in the period of the first generation Commission, a feature less pronounced 
following the empty chair crisis. For Hallstein’s expansionist use of the Treaty see for instance his first speech 
before the European Parliament: AEI, Proceedings of the sessions No. 1. Inaugural sitting, March, 1958. 
Retrieved on 2 September 2015 from http://aei.pitt.edu/44450/:19;  and AEI, The Commission, a new factor in 
international life, speech by Hallstein at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London 25 
March, 1965.Retrieved on 16 November 2011 from http://aei.pitt.edu/13638/1/S35-S34.pdf. 
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A long-standing division over the meaning of and the means through which to reach political 
unification had its roots in the unspecific character of the Treaty of Rome. The Community 
was ill-equipped to fulfil the ‘grandest’ of goals as heralded in the Treaty’s Preamble to “lay 
the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”.113 In addition, political 
unification was left more or less undefined from the very start, as the Treaty did not give any 
specific provisions of how to proceed with political unification or what an ‘ever closer union’ 
would entail. In addition, Article 2 of the Treaty even qualified this goal merely as “closer 
relations between the States belonging to it”.114  
The inception of EPC divided the parties conflicting over political unification in Europe into 
two clear sides. On the one side, the Commission and some Member States, particularly the 
Netherlands, championed the development of the EC into a political union in which the 
Commission would continue to have a privileged status. The other side (represented mainly 
by France) wanted to extend cooperation between the MS of the EEC/EC into new areas by 
creating new and intergovernmental political institutions.115 Paradoxically, both sides saw the 
establishment of EPC as a stage in the development of a political union by both the 
supranational Commission and the Member States. 
In contrast to the Treaty’s political provisions, its economic provisions were more specific. 
Article 1 of the Treaty of Rome established a European Economic Community among the six 
Member States of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The 
EEC’s would-be ‘backbone’, the Common Market set out in the Treaty’s Article 2, underlined 
the supremacy of an economic guiding principle, not a political one, for the newly established 
EEC. The Treaty further supplied the EEC with a fixed set of timetables for achieving the 
goal of a Common Market. This schedule was set out in Article 8, which stated that the 
Common Market would be progressively established during a transitional period of 12 years. 
This transitional period would be divided into three stages of four years each. Each stage had 
an assigned set of actions to be initiated and carried through concurrently, which were also 
subject to some exceptions and procedures provided for in the Treaty. The expiry of the 
transitional period constituted the latest date by which all the rules laid down would have to 
enter into force. Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome set out three Common Policies to be 
implemented for the purpose of establishing the Common Market set out in Article 2: a 
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Common Commercial Policy, a Common Agricultural Policy and a Common Transport 
Policy.116 The Treaty’s Article 9 defined the establishment of the Customs Union, abolishing 
quotas and customs duties between the Member States.117 Furthermore and of particular 
relevance for this thesis’ investigation, the Customs Union established a common external 
tariff, and the Customs Union was accompanied by a common trade policy of the CCP. 
2.1.1 The Commission’s treaty base  
The attempts to balance the need for a solid framework on the European level with the needs 
of the Member States to protect their national sovereignty are evident in the institutions set up 
by the Treaty. To carry out the tasks entrusted to the Community, and to act within the limits 
of the powers conferred upon them by the Treaty, the Treaty’s Article 4 set up four 
institutions: an ASSEMBLY, a COUNCIL, a COMMISSION, and a COURT OF JUSTICE. 
In contrast to the ECSC’s High Authority that was listed at the top of the institutional ‘list’ of 
the Treaty establishing the ECSC, the Commission was listed as number three out of four.118 
This deliberate ‘ranking’ of the institutions can be perceived as a downgrading of the 
Commission and could suggest an unwillingness on the part of the Member States of the EEC 
to confer upon the Commission the same range of supranational powers granted to the High 
Authority of the ECSC.119 From the EEC’s very beginning, the status of the Commission in 
relation to the Member States was thus an issue for ongoing debate, and at some points, like 
the empty chair crisis, an issue that spurred outright conflict. The fact that the appointment of 
the Commission rested in the hands of the Member States did not prevent these outbursts of 
conflict. 
Articles 155-163 of the Treaty were devoted to the Commission as an institution. Two 
important founding principles that guided the Commission’s response and by which its role in 
EPC was legitimated are found in this part of the Treaty, and in particular:  
ARTICLE 157(2) 
The members of the Commission shall perform their duties in the general interest of the 
Community with complete independence. 
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In the performance of their duties, they shall not seek or accept instructions from any 
Government or other body.120  
These two founding principles of the Commission’s task to guard the European general 
interest and the completely independent manner in which this task should be observed 
constituted a “constitutional doctrine” for the Community and the Commission. 
2.1.2 Agency – the role and function of the Commission  
The general provisions of the Treaty of Rome gave the Commission a role and some basic 
functions that have been described and analysed at great lengths in the existing literature.121 
Formulated in 1970, Coombes’ five broad headings describing the Commission’s role and 
functions have been particularly long-lasting. 122 They are still used today, and will be applied 
by this thesis, defining the Commission’s treaty-based role as having:     
1. An initiative role; right to initiate legislation for instance in Article 155, which created 
a subtle interplay between the institutions that again gave the Commission room for 
manoeuvre 
2. An administrative and management role as in the CAP, policy areas delegated to the 
Commission by the Member States 
3. A mediating role; among and between the Member States and institutions to reach 
agreement and decisions 
4. A representative role; representing the EC in third countries and in international 
organisations 
5. A normative role; both as the guardian of the Treaties and the acquis communautaire 
and as the conscience of the Community.123 
Through these five roles, the Commission occupied a strategic position in the EEC/EC’s 
institutional matrix. It has been noted that the Commission was not as supranational as the 
High Authority of the ECSC. The affirmation of the Commission’s supranational status lay in 
the power it held both through its legislative initiative and as the defender of the EEC/EC’s 
general interests. In this period, the Commission’s role in the established EEC/EC decision-
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making, called the Community method, was that its initiatives were put before the Council. 
The decision-making power in the EEC/EC was thus held by the Council.124 However, in the 
Treaty there was potential for the Commission to expand its role and increase its importance. 
2.1.3 Policy-specific mandate – the Common Commercial Policy  
Based on the establishment of the Customs Union, the Common Commercial Policy is the 
policy area that bridges the investigation of the general mandate and competence of the 
Commission and its more specific competence in external economic policy. The CCP was 
based on three principles: the common external tariff, common trade agreements with third 
countries (see chapter 2.1.4) and uniform application of trade instruments across Member 
States.125 The CCP was the only common policy mentioned in the Treaty’s Preamble, 
emphasising the EEC’s political and outward-looking character;  
DESIRING to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy, to the progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade.126   
The Commission’s CCP mandate was clear and unchanging within the period investigated by 
this thesis. The exclusive competence that was granted the EEC/EC by the Treaty of Rome 
and the original wording of Article 113 (see below) was left almost unchanged until the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. However, the unresolved issue over the scope of the CCP characterised 
the period investigated in this thesis also included the question over exclusive and implied 
competences of the EC.127 This issue affected the role of the Commission in the EEC/EC and 
held implications for its role in EPC. This situation of conflict over the scope of trade 
competence of the EEC/EC, including the Commission’s role as sole negotiator revealed 
boundary disputes. These disputes characterised by the question of how to distinguish 
between domestic and external policies, I claim became particularly apparent in the period 
investigated in this thesis have been pointed out by Michael Smith as: 
Many of the problems faced by the Commission in the pursuit of external relations are 
effectively ‘boundary problems’. The developments of complex linkages in the world economy 
has made it quite difficult for even the most monolithic of states to say where ‘domestic’ policy 
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ends and ‘external’ policy begins. A related problem is that of the boundary between 
economic issues and political and security issues.128 
The treaty base for the CCP, the main source for the EEC/EC’s external activities and thus its 
international role were set out in the Treaty’s Article 110:   
ARTICLE 110 
By establishing a customs union between themselves Member States aim to contribute, in the 
common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers. The common 
commercial policy shall take into account the favourable effect which the abolition of customs 
duties between Member States may have on the increase in the competitive strength of 
undertakings in those States.129 
For the Commission, an international role for the EEC/EC entailed the balancing of the 
internal interests of the Community with the external interests that were set out in the 
Treaty.130 This feature was what created difficulties for the Commission in relation to the 
Member States. The Treaty’s Article 113 was the basis for the Commission’s wide 
responsibility for the CCP:   
    ARTICLE 113 
1. After the transitional period has ended, the common commercial policy shall be based on 
uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and 
trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy 
and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies. 
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common 
commercial policy. 
3. Where agreements with third countries need to be negotiated, the Commission shall make 
recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary 
negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special 
committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the 
framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. 
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4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by a 
qualified majority.131 
Interpretations of the scope of the CCP became a source of debate. This was evident as EPC 
was established, and the Member States of the EC began activities in the external sphere that 
were intended to be kept separate from the activities of the EC. The CCP was to come into 
force by the end of the transition period on 31 December 1972, which coincided 
chronologically with the early phase of EPC. The period leading up to the end of the 
transition period was characterised by disputes over the CCP’s boundaries. The arguments 
concerned how a CCP devised for the late 1950s would serve the EC in the 1970s, as the 
framework for international trade had changed considerably in the meantime.  
The Commission was ambitious and expansionist, as in the early 1970s it argued for a foreign 
trade policy in which it called for an extension of EC policy into what eventually became the 
EPC sphere.132 The Commission argued for an external economic policy which would span 
more than just tariffs and trade, but the Member States would not permit the CCP as defined 
in the Treaty to be replaced by something more extensive. The Commission also wanted to 
expand even further by developing a common commercial, economic and industrial policy.133 
The competing interests of the Commission and the Member States in these policy areas 
resulted from the fact that the Commission’s requirements for a well-functioning economic 
union overlapped with the area of foreign policy, which the Member States had kept and 
wanted to keep in their competence. The question posed by this conflict was further 
emphasised by the fact that the lack of a political union or concerted work towards developing 
any such thing also impacted negatively on the work to make an extended CCP a reality.134  
In the conflicts surrounding both the CCP and EPC in this period, the role of the Commission 
and its potential were evident. The Commission was the actor that had facilitated the new 
situation in which the EC of the early 1970s had become a “recognised and envied partner for 
non-member countries”.135 The conflict arose from the fact that the Member States would not 
allow the CCP to be expanded in order to strengthen the EC and the Commission 
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accordingly.136 The fact that the Treaty had conferred external relation competences upon the 
Commission, and that third parties held a perception of the EC as a political entity, meant that 
the Commission indeed already held a de facto political role. 137 Smith points out that the 
dilemma for the Member States was that if the EEC/EC was to have an efficient CCP, which 
was what the Treaty made provisions for, the Commission would have to be placed in a key 
position and thus assume a highly political role:  
Given the intense dependence of the EU [and EEC] on all kinds of international trade, it is 
clear that policy-making and implementations in external relations are the highest of high 
politics, while at the same time being complex and technical in nature.138 
Thus the CCP was a source of conflict, both in regard to its scope, but also in regard to the 
implications that a wide scope of the CCP would entail. For the Commission, an extended 
CCP would entail an increasingly important role, but the Member States continued to guard 
their sovereignty and national interests jealously in the area of an extension of the scope of the 
CCP and in EPC.139 As the Member States of the EC were dependent on international trade, 
the issue of how to conduct the EC’s policy of external relations and trade became a very 
important and contentious area.  
2.1.4 Community agreements and international organisations  
In addition to the Treaty’s provisions for a CCP, other articles in the Treaty of Rome held 
implications for the Commission in the sphere of external relations, and eventually for the 
Commission’s relationship with EPC. Of particular relevance for the Commission’s role in 
EPC were Articles 228, 229 and 238.140  
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Articles 228-229 empowered the Commission to negotiate agreements with third countries 
and international organisations:  
    ARTICLE 228 
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and 
one or more States or an international organisation, such agreements shall be negotiated by the 
Commission. Subject to the powers vested in the Commission in this field, such agreements 
shall be concluded by the Council, after consulting the Assembly [European Parliament] 
where required by this Treaty. The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain 
beforehand the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is 
compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of Justice is 
adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance with Article 236. 
2. Agreements concluded under these conditions shall be binding on the institutions of the 
Community and on Member States.141 
ARTICLE 229 
It shall be for the Commission to ensure the maintenance of all appropriate relations with the 
organs of the United Nations, of its specialised agencies and of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. 
 The Commission shall also maintain such relations as are appropriate with all international 
organisations.142 
Following the ratification of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission’s Secretary General Emile 
Nöel reportedly stated that these articles were the Treaty base for the Commission’s ambition 
to represent the Community in international organisations, and in all international negotiations 
of an economic nature.143 The case of the Commission’s role in the negotiations in GATT are 
relevant to this thesis’ investigation of the Commission’s role in EPC as this was a role that 
according to Boussuat and Legendre was contested by France, although not hindered.144 Prior 
to the establishment of EPC, the Commission had successfully represented an negotiated on 
behalf of the EC and its Member States within two trade rounds under the GATT, the Dillon 
Round (1960-1962) and the Kennedy round (1964-1967). After the establishment of EPC, the 
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Tokyo Round commencing in 1973 saw some limitations to the status and supreme role of the 
Commission as sole negotiator, as a result of the issues over the scope of the CCP.145  
Article 238 established the EC’s right to conclude agreements with states and unions of states: 
ARTICLE 238 
The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an international 
organisation agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedures, 
These agreements shall be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the 
Assembly. 
Where such agreements call for amendments to this Treaty, these amendments shall first be 
adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 236.146 
The European Community’s agreements with the individual states under the Global 
Mediterranean Policy, and thus of relevance to the development of the Euro-Arab Dialogue 
discussed in this thesis’ chapter 6, were concluded on the basis of Article 238 and constituted 
mainly commercial cooperation agreements.147 
The battle for the Commission in EPC was over EC and Commission representation within 
EPC. The Commission based the legitimacy for this representation mainly on Articles 228, 
229, 238 and the specific CCP treaty base. Boussuat and Legendre show how the Commission 
prior to the existence of EPC in 1966 had stated that it would “seek the formula that best 
represented the Community interest” in all international negotiations.148 In cases where 
competences were shared between the EC and its Member States, it accepted that the EC was 
represented by one representative of the Commission and a representative of the Member 
State holding the Council Presidency.149 In a memo from 1970 the Commission however 
claimed an exclusive right of representing the EC in areas where the EC held exclusive 
powers.150 In such cases the Commission claimed that there was no longer a possibility for the 
Member States, regardless of the amount of prior coordination to express the EC’s point of 
                                                          
145 Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999:483 
146 Treaty of Rome - Article 238. 
147 Piening, Christopher. Global Europe: the European Union in World Affairs, London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc., 1997:72. For the Global Mediterranean Policy, see chapter 6 in the present thesis. 
148 Boussuat and Legendre, 2014: 370.  
149 Ibid.  
150 Ibid.  
42 
 
view on an individual or collective basis. While the Treaty base for the Commission’s role in 
representing the EC externally was clear in the Commission’s view, this role was opposed 
even before the establishment of EPC and was to represent the one of the main challenges for 
the Commission’s relation with EPC.151 The Commission based its demands for the 
participation of the EC in EPC on the potential for overlap between EC and EPC polices and 
the threat of EPC intruding into the EC’s external economic policy. This protection of the 
EC’s external economic policy was one of the Commission’s most important and prestigious 
responsibilities. In the face of the threat posed by the establishment of EPC, the Commission 
thus used its treaty-based competences as laid down in the Treaty of Rome from 1958 to 
defend itself. 
2.2 Myth – the Commission as an actor 
Other less tangible aspects than the Commission’s mandate formed part of the conflict over its 
participation in EPC. The myth of the Commission rested on its treaty-based role and 
functions. But it also extended these, and the Commission was perceived by some Member 
States as a supranational threat that intended to usurp national sovereignty. This was a 
perception of the Commission as one attempting to steer the integration in a direction where it 
would emerge as a new supranational power-centre: and become the ‘super-government’ of 
the EC. In the Member States’ eyes (at least in the eyes of the French), this intention revealed 
that the Commission had “run amok” with the tasks it had been delegated by the Treaty.152 In 
contrast to this, the Commission perceived itself as the motor of integration with an aim of 
moving towards the political unification of Europe. It would work towards this aim for the 
general European interest, above and removed from national interest.153  
The genesis of this myth was most visible in the first Commission’s perception of its role and 
function and in particular how this perception was expressed by its President, Walter 
Hallstein. He interpreted the Treaty in an expansive manner that did not limit the Commission 
in any way, but instead served as a departure point for the Commission to initiate further 
integration.154 This use of the Treaty can also be seen in the illustrative description of 
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Hallstein’s efforts to do “his best to expand the playing field”.155 This perception was, as it 
turned out in the case of the empty chair crisis and in the period that followed, not one shared 
with (all) the Member States, and it forms part of what this thesis calls the myth of the 
Commission. 
The inherent duality of creating a solid European framework and at the same time guarding 
national interests became visible in the diverging perceptions of the Commission. The 
Commission’s institutional ‘self-perception’ versus how it was perceived by the Member 
States created conflict.156 The role of the Commission was an elusive one, as its activity could 
run counter to national interest and thus be targeted as a threat to it. The Commission could 
also be used as a scapegoat by the Member States to take the blame for unwanted aspects of 
the results or direction of European integration, even though these really were in the hands of 
the Member States at all times. These ‘initial’ perceptions proved to have a long-term effect 
on the relationship between the Commission and the Member States, and in time this became 
evident also in the case of the Commission’s relationship to EPC.157 Although the most 
dramatic event of the conflict between the Commission and the Member States, the empty 
chair crisis, occurred during the early phase of the Community’s existence, the diverging 
perceptions that the crisis came about as a result of also ‘stuck’. 
In all the areas that came together in EPC – political unification, external relations and foreign 
(economic and commercial) policy – the Commission claimed inclusion based on its Treaty 
mandate and competences, which the Member States and France in particular opposed. It is 
however important to note that in the period when EPC was established, the Commission was 
both well aware of and took into consideration the effects of the empty chair crisis that were 
still felt in 1970. The negative perception that some Member States had of the Commission as 
an institution and the conflict that this spurred were noted by Nöel in June 1970. In Nöel’s 
view, even though the Commission’s mandate, its “prerogatives”, had not changed following 
the Luxembourg compromise, something else and less tangible had: its “prestige”.158  
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So, even though the legal basis of the EC and the Commission’s competence was clear and 
unchanging, there were still conflicts when the Commission demanded inclusion in EPC 
based on this mandate. This conflict was also determined by the misgivings of certain 
Member States based on the perception of the Commission as an actor; a myth that led to the 
desire to exclude it from EPC. In addition to the Commission’s mandate, the manner in which 
the demands of the Commission were made and how it dealt with this myth could prove 
crucial for reaching its aims of participation in EPC. The manner in which it proceeded, how 
the Commission responded and approached EPC shows how the conflict over the 
Commission’s participation in EPC was not merely one over competence; also other and more 
doctrinal elements were at stake here. Could and should a supranational institution be allowed 
to be part of what was intended to form an intergovernmental forum for consultation between 
the Member States’ foreign policies, an area most crucial to national sovereignty?   
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3. Responding to European Political 
Cooperation – A foot in the door, or a 
door in the face?  
This chapter establishes how the Commission responded to European Political Cooperation 
and how its approach developed in the period from the Hague Summit in 1969 until the 
Copenhagen Report of July 1973. While this response was based on deliberate choices, it 
came as the result of the internal divisions within the Commission that this chapter analyses. 
The chapter’s main line of argument is that the Commission’s emergence as a ‘realist’ in this 
period characterised its response and approach to EPC.  
The chapter chronologically tracks the development of the Commission’s response and 
approach to EPC. It starts by investigating the initiative that became European Political 
Cooperation, which was established by the Luxembourg Report of October 1970. The chapter 
continues to analyse how the Commission immediately responded to this intergovernmental 
initiative, and how it continued to do so in the first EPC ministerial meeting in November 
1970. The chapter then goes on to investigate the development of a response and approach to 
EPC through the Commission’s emergence as a ‘realist’, deliberately distancing itself from 
perceptions of the first Commission as an overambitious ‘super-government’. By showing 
how this ‘realism’ reflected diverging views and internal division within the Commission, 
where three distinct categories were presented, the chapter presents what emerged as the 
Commission’s general response to EPC from February 1971. The present chapter argues that 
this response, which was based on deliberate choices, formed a continuous basis for the 
Commission’s approach to EPC in the period analysed by this thesis. 
The chapter goes on to analyse the development of EPC, which was characterised by 
continuous French efforts to retain its intergovernmental structure, while the other Member 
States took a less doctrinal approach. The chapter analyses the Paris Summit in October 1972 
where the EPC’s scope was refined, leaving the task of political unification to the Community 
institutions, and the Copenhagen Report in 1973 where the EC and EPC sphere moved closer 
together, albeit only slightly. The chapter argues that the results of these analyses present a 
Commission with a ‘foot in the door’ of EPC. Despite the continuous French opposition 
towards Commission participation in EPC and closer ties between the EC and EPC 
mechanisms, this chapter argues that on some levels – such as in the EPC Political Committee 
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– there was a call for Commission participation based on what the Commission could provide 
EPC with in terms of expertise.  
3.1 The initiation of European Political Cooperation – from the Hague 
Summit to the Luxembourg Report  
The initiative that became EPC was launched at the Hague Summit on 1 and 2 December 
1969. The initiative was framed by conflict between France on the one side and the other five 
Member States of the EC and the Commission on the other. This conflict can be described 
roughly as a dichotomy of intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism. The clash 
concerned whether a summit should take the lead in determining of European integration and 
whether further intergovernmental structures such as EPC should be initiated, and ultimately 
came down to diverging views on how national interests should be balanced against more 
general European interests. 
The conflict was very much determined by how the French side succeeded in framing both 
Summit(ry) and EPC in their interest. The ‘resignation’ of de Gaulle as French President 
heralded a new start.159 However, the Hague Summit, which was called by the new French 
President Pompidou, was characterised by both new departures and old resentments.160 The 
initiative of holding a Summit was accompanied by a fear of institutionalising Summits and 
thus moving the EC in an intergovernmental direction. However, this fear was balanced by 
the real threat of stagnation to European integration. ‘Something’ was needed to get the EC 
going again and to revitalise it. The Hague Summit has been interpreted as this ‘something’, 
and one of its results was EPC.161 
Similar to what would become the case in EPC, the Hague Summit represented an instance of 
the Commission wanting to be associated with Member States’ activities on the side of the 
EC. In general, the launch of a summit by the French was welcomed by both the other Five 
Member States and the Commission led by its Belgian President Jean Rey.162 However, some 
reservations and concerns regarding the relationship between the structure of Summit(s) and 
the EC existed. There was a specific French reservation against repeating the Commission’s 
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privileged role in the EC in the Summit structure. The Commission was envisaged to be 
heard, but not to play a role in the Summit.163 The stance of the Five and of the Commission 
was that without the Commission present, the Summit would have to be limited to general 
political discussions, where the only EC matters that it would be acceptable to discuss were 
the political aspects of enlargement.164 This position reflected a fear of a further 
intergovernmentalisation of the EC, which was also evident in the rejection of any 
suggestions to institutionalise summits.165  
Several Member States put pressure on France to make sure that the Commission was not 
merely heard, but associated with the discussions that concerned the Commission and the 
EC.166 The French opposed this. The British observed that it was a shame that the French 
views seemed to continue to prevail in the preparations for the Summit, in spite of a prior 
agreement of the Five to not let this happen.167 The Five had insisted that the Commission 
participate in discussions related to EC business, but in the end resistance had “crumbled” and 
the French had been able to push through that the Commission was to be consulted only if 
necessary.168 An ‘association’ of this kind was not very specific, and did not provide the 
Commission with any rights. France had got what it wanted.169 
How did the Commission react? The invitation to the Hague Summit was extended only to 
Rey as President and only for the second day of the Summit, where EC matters would be 
discussed.170 This resulted in severe discontent within the Commission, which was directed at 
the Member States for ignoring its collegiate status.171 Still, the prevailing view within the 
Commission was that this limited invitation should not provoke any action on its part, and that 
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there was nothing that the Commission could or would do about this in order so as not to risk 
whatever goodwill there was.172 The Commission’s President Rey and the Commission as a 
collegium reacted pragmatically, as they considered their chances of being included in the 
Summit’s restricted sessions better if Rey agreed to go alone. The Commission thus equated 
less people with ‘less fuss’, which can be read as an attempt to minimise its demands in return 
for maximum output.173 
The Commission stated its attitude towards the Summit in a memorandum of 19 November 
1969.174 The importance of political unification was expressed, as the Commission 
recommended that “the Conference stress the essentially political nature of the task in hand 
and accordingly indicate its will to impel Europe towards political union.”175 In this process 
of political unification, the Commission was supported by a close supranational ally: the 
European Parliament. The EP had an outspoken fear of summitry as part of a process that 
could replace the Community structure, but it still held the view that a conference like the 
Hague Summit would provide a wide political base for more concrete achievements within 
the European project. The EP maintained that the Summit(s) should not substitute for the 
EC’s institutions, and urged the Commission to play an active part in it.176 
In the discussions in The Hague that led to the EPC initiative, German Chancellor Brandt 
suggested that to remedy the lack of political integration, the Foreign Ministers should be 
instructed to draft an agreement on the gradual development of political cooperation between 
the Member States of the EC, in the context of enlargement.177 This was very much in line 
with French interest, and contrary to what the Commission ideally wanted, which was that 
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such tasks should be carried out within the EC structure. Following these discussions, the 
Communiqué of the Summit stated in point 15 that  
They agreed to instruct the Ministers for Foreign Affairs to study the best way of achieving 
progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement. The Ministers 
would be expected to report before the end of July 1970.178  
In his speech to the EP following the Summit, Rey pointed out the two areas that would 
become most important in the early stages of EPC, the Middle East and the CSCE: 
Europe as such should try to help solve the economic and social problems which are partly 
responsible for the present drama in the Middle East. Similarly, if the Community as such 
were to attack the problem of easing the tensions between East and West, it could perhaps 
bring the solution nearer.179 
The Commission thus adequately analysed what the first issues the EPC would turn to would 
be, and launched its take on what economic and social means could be employed to solve 
these.  
Following the Summit, it seemed that integration continued in an intergovernmental direction 
that was framed by the conflict between the Commission and France. The main actors 
steering integration were now the Heads of State and Government, who no longer seemed 
willing or obliged to follow the rules and norms that earlier had privileged the Commission as 
a motor of integration in the EC’s structure.180 The question for the Member States and the 
Commission alike remained: would the EPC initiative of The Hague become a promise of 
political unification, or would it turn out to be nothing more than a political free trade area?181 
3.2 The establishment of European Political Cooperation and the 
Commission’s initial response 
The EPC initiative of the Hague Summit catered to the French interest of establishing new 
intergovernmental structures instead of expanding the existing EC structures. Point 15 in the 
Communiqué from the Hague Summit had commissioned a report. The result was the 
Luxembourg Report of 27 October 1970. The Foreign Ministers of the Six approved the 
principles of the Luxembourg Report on 20 July 1970, and the Council formally adopted the 
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principles on 27 October 1970.182 The Report emphasised political unification as its main 
objective, stating that tangible form should be given to the will for a political union. In 
accordance with the implementation of common policies, corresponding developments in the 
political sphere would be required. Europe had to prepare itself for the imperative world 
duties that came as a result of its greater cohesion and increasing role in world politics.183  
The stated objectives of foreign policy cooperation were to ensure greater mutual 
understanding between the States by exchanging information and consulting regularly, and to 
work for harmonisation of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action.184 To facilitate 
these objectives, a structure with half-yearly meetings between the Foreign Ministers of the 
Six was set up. If the Foreign Ministers considered it appropriate due to the level of 
seriousness, a conference of Heads of State or Government could replace a ministerial 
meeting. The ministerial meetings were to be prepared by a committee of the heads of 
political departments, the Political Directors. This Political Committee, which in time proved 
to be EPC’s most important body, was to meet at least four times a year to prepare the 
ministerial meetings, and was mandated to set up working groups and expert panels for 
specific tasks.185  
Importantly, even though the Report’s formulation on the scope of the EPC as “all major 
questions of foreign policy” did entail a complete separation of EPC and EC structures, the 
authors of the Report nevertheless felt a need to include the institutions of the Community in 
the Report. By doing so, they created a link between the two spheres merely by mentioning 
that the Community institutions should be related to EPC.186 In order to ensure a democratic 
process, the EP was associated with the political unification process. Ministers and the 
members of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament were to meet every 
six months to discuss matters related to foreign policy cooperation.187 As for relations with 
the Commission, the Report stated that it would be consulted if the activities of the European 
Communities were affected by the work of the Ministers.188  
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In this formulation lay the crux of what must have seemed likely to create a conflict. First, 
what would the term “consult” entail? Observation? A voice? Participation on what level?  
Second, what exactly came under the “activities” of the EC, and third, what was meant by the 
term “affected”? Most importantly: which body could legitimately claim to hold the decisive 
voice in determining these questions that were bound to surface, that is, who would decide? 
The Member States (particularly France) claimed that they would decide. The Commission 
was determined to decide on behalf of the EC, and thus conflict ensued.  
The reactions to the Report followed traditional lines of division. For the proponents of 
political union and the process of political unification along supranational lines, the results 
seemed somewhat meagre. One observer, a diplomat who had worked on the Report, saw 
EPC as nothing more than a “political free trade area”.189 The responsibility for this 
intergovernmental direction lay largely with the French, and consequently with President 
Pompidou and the Gaullist legacy.190 EPC was used as an instrument to achieve several of 
France’s goals: on the one hand, it was presented as an extended part of Community 
activities, intended to keep the UK on the outside, whilst on the other hand it was 
simultaneously presented as an external process between Members of the Community but 
outside of the EC’s institutional structure, intended to keep the Commission on the outside.191 
EPC came to be known for its distinctive character that attempted to separate the economic 
cooperation of the EC from the political cooperation of EPC. Due to the diverging views 
between the Six on political unification and the meaning of political union, EPC 
developments did not follow the EC’s Community method. The type of progressive 
integration that the Community method entailed – timetables and deadlines for the execution 
of programmes – was by British officials seen as not applicable for integration in the political 
sphere.192 The Hague Summit’s paragraph 15 and the Luxembourg Report only set a loose 
timetable for further development, calling for the production of a second report within two 
years.193  
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The Commission’s initial response to EPC took the form of a general call for participation on 
all levels of EPC. This was based on the Commission’s view of its role in the political 
unification process. The Commission perceived itself as a political actor in the development 
of a political union, not merely as providing the EC with an executive power.194 On this basis, 
it claimed inclusion in EPC as it was being established. In one of Franco Maria Malfatti’s first 
speeches to the EP, the Commission’s new Italian President stated that EPC immediately 
would pose a problem for the Commission. The planned relationship between EPC and the 
EC in regard to the role of the Commission was not acceptable.195 The Commission could not 
and should not be excluded from participation in the process of constructing a European 
political union, because the Commission was, and implicitly should continue to be, the main 
protagonist of Community construction.196 Malfatti also stated that the planned EPC would 
benefit from Commission participation, which would provide efficiency in both EPC’s 
political consultations and in the process of political unification.197 The Commission objected 
to the drawing of lines between the predominately economic Community activities and 
competences as they were before EPC began developing, and the more political activities 
intended for this forum.198  
The Commission’s initial response thus gave the impression of an actor that considered it was 
entitled to EPC participation. The Commission saw EPC as part of a development towards a 
political union, a development in which the Commission held a treaty-based right to take part. 
In line with this, Malfatti initially highlighted what he termed the unique role of the 
Commission, which could not be compared to any institution on the national level.199 As the 
new Commission President was facing a situation where such a privileged role for the 
Commission seemed less than evident, his emphasis on the Commission’s irreplaceable status 
in European integration was understandable.200 The uncertainty regarding the role of the 
Commission would explain why Malfatti argued that a reduction of the Commission’s role 
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would cause a loss of momentum and dynamism in the project of European integration. In the 
Commission’s view, such a loss could even entail the failure to reach the goals set for 
integration in both the economic and the political spheres. The Commission President initially 
perceived EPC as a threat, and the Commission’s fear of further intergovernmentalisation also 
informed part of its response to EPC.201 Malfatti stated that the Commission would 
relentlessly use every potential it could find in the Treaty, and use it for what it was worth, but 
at the same time it would not venture into conflictual terrain by claiming powers that it was 
not given by the Treaty.202  
At the first EPC meeting in Munich on 19 November 1970, the conflict of Commission 
participation took on a more tangible form, going from the merely abstract to concrete cases 
where the Commission claimed legitimate reasons for inclusion in EPC. This first EPC 
meeting was a case in point. The agenda for the meeting was threefold. First, France 
introduced the issue of the Middle East. The Commission wanted to be present, but was not 
permitted to be so.203 Second, Belgium introduced the issue of the proposed conference on 
European Security (which would become the CSCE). For this issue, the Commission was 
present for discussions of the economic aspects. As Malfatti spoke on what would become the 
CSCE and the EC’s contribution to this, he pleaded for wider Commission participation for in 
EPC. Third, Germany introduced the issue of the attitude of the Soviet Union towards 
Western European integration, which also was related to the CSCE. The Commission was 
present for this issue.204 
The importance of this first EPC ministerial meeting lay in the content it presented, in the 
structure it began to consolidate, and in the fact that the Commission called for increased 
participation. Content-wise, the most detailed and thorough discussion during was on the 
issue of the Middle East, where the Commission was not present.205 Structure-wise, the most 
remarkable feature of EPC introduced by this first meeting was the Political Committee that 
was to form an essential part of EPC in order to secure efficiency.206 Another innovation that 
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proved vital for providing EPC with the potential to facilitate the “coordination reflex” was 
the installation of a special telecommunications network, the COREU (Correspondance 
Européenne), which enabled direct communication between the Member States.207  
Following this first meeting, French opposition to including the EC structure and the 
Commission in EPC was evident. One of the main points that had been emphasised prior to 
the first EPC meeting was its intergovernmentalism; the lack of a secretariat and records from 
the meetings would serve as a measure that would keep the proceedings of the EPC as 
confidential as possible.208 In line with this, the French Director of Political Affairs 
Beaumarchais did comment on the meeting in Munich the 19 November that there had been a 
substantial amount of leakage to the press, with which the French were not pleased.209 
Beaumarchais also commented on the late arrival of the Commission’s President to the 
meeting, which served to show the French discontent with the Commission. Furthermore, as 
the comment was made in connection with the comments on the leakage, the French Political 
Director could be seen as indirectly placing the blame on the Commission.210 
This first meeting on EPC thus cemented the conflict over the Commission’s participation as 
one of the Five and the Commission against France. Malfatti had demanded the Commission 
be included, for which he gained some support from the Five, while France voiced its 
concerns on this matter.211 The external criticism of the newly established EPC was precisely 
that the most important Community institution, the Commission, was not granted more than 
“a foot in the door”, which along with the fact that institutional development was non-
existent, were the features of EPC that were most dear to the French.212 
3.3 The emergence of the Commission as a realist? 
Although the main legitimation for Commission participation continued to be its role in 
political unification, a more diversified range of arguments began to arise from the 
Commission in late 1970 and early 1971. The Commission now based its response to EPC on 
                                                          
207 Smith, Michael, E. “Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation”, in 
European Journal of International Relations  10 (1) 2004: 108;  AEI, Bulletin of the European Communities 
No.1 – 1971: 15, retrieved on 4 September 2015 from http://aei.pitt.edu/4548/1/4548.pdf. 
208 TNA, FCO 30/569, Telegram, Political Unification, 11 November, 1970. 
209 Jacques Delarue Caron de Beaumarchais, French. Political Director 1965- 1971. 
210 TNA, FCO 30/569, European Political Unification, the Munich meeting of the Six, 20 November 1970. 
211 Ibid. 
212 TNA, FCO 30/569, Political Unification – The Davignon Report, full brief for the Prime Minister on the 
Davignon Report, 10 November 1970.  
55 
 
a more general approach to its political role.213 This political role was to be a balanced and 
cautious one, as illustrated by a recommendation from Nöel to Malfatti that in the political 
sphere, the Commission should aim to combine boldness with prudence. Being bold might 
bring the most gain in terms of securing the EC’s and the Commission’s interests, but the 
approach in the political realm of integration should be well considered, Nöel noted, as failure 
would hit the Commission hardest in the areas where the Commission was not protected by 
the Treaty, which was the case with EPC.214    
Quite early in his term as Commission President, Malfatti attempted to establish a different 
image of the Commission. Changing how the Commission was perceived by the Member 
States could potentially have a profound effect, including in terms of the Commission’s 
participation in EPC. This attempt could also have the effect of changing the Commission’s 
self-perception. The new President began this attempt by going to what presumably was the 
core of the conflict over the Commission’s participation in EPC - the myth of the 
Commission’s aim to become a super-government. Malfatti attacked the perception of the 
Commission as the “super-government” of Europe by launching a new and more nuanced 
image of the Commission as a “European realist”.215  
Malfatti still held on to the traditional legitimation aspects of the Treaty, which illustrates that 
his attempt entailed a change in means and in the perception of the Commission, but not in 
ends: 216 
On the Commission’s role, some commentators have felt my remarks to be unduly cautious. As 
I have said before and will say again at the risk of causing controversy, the Commission’s role 
is carefully defined in the Treaty of Rome; we must adhere to that definition. Its role is both 
technical and political, as the Commission holds both power of initiative and power of 
proposal. It is not a super-government, and it is not a mere secretariat to the Council… The 
fluidity of the political circumstances amid which our Community is evolving requires us to 
interpret the role of the Commission and the other Community institutions – not restrictively 
but rather flexibly.  
Here too we must be realistic. We have a job to do, and the important thing is that it be done. 
Trying to write the facts of the future into detailed formulas serves no practical purpose. We 
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must get on with building Europe using the facts in the political context of the present. We 
have to work with the means at our disposal.217 
Here Malfatti expressed new ways of formulating the Commission’s role which pointed 
forward to the aspects that became the basis for Commission’s approach towards EPC. For 
the “building of Europe” to work, both the Commission and the Member States had to adhere 
to the Treaty.218 The Commission needed to interpret its role flexibly and realistically and use 
what it was equipped with to ‘get on with it’. Indirectly Malfatti argued that in order for the 
job to be done, the Commission needed to change. With this call for a change, Malfatti could 
be seen as suggesting that the Commission of the past had been too concerned with its federal 
goal and formulas to actually be able to make them a reality.  
These new aspects of the Commission’s role also appeared in the views of Ralf Dahrendorf, 
Commissioner for External Relations and Trade, on the EC’s external role and the 
Commission’s purpose there.219 In the specific policy areas of external relations and external 
trade policy, which were the areas most closely related to EPC besides the more vague area of 
‘political unification’, the Commission was pushing for an extension of EC action. 220 The 
Commission thus had two sets of ‘stakes’ in the EPC as it developed: first the element of 
political unification, and second the element of the EC’s external relations and the extension 
of the CCP. In addition, the Commission viewed the EC as being a political entity on the 
international scene already; primarily based on its economic ‘power’ that had an indirect but 
important political effect.221 As the Community and the Commission already viewed 
themselves as deeply entrenched in the international political arena, the distinction between 
political EPC and the economic spheres of the EC caused the Commission nothing but 
dismay.  
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3.4 Developing the Commission’s response to European Political 
Cooperation – internal division 
The Commission’s initial response to EPC continued to develop after the first EPC meeting of 
19 November 1970. Following this meeting, President Malfatti asked the Commissioners to 
provide their individual views on political unification in light of the newly established EPC.222 
Their response illustrated the diverging views within the Commission, leading to a split in 
opinion on how to proceed towards EPC.  
The Commissioners’ views fell into three categories. The first category comprised traditional 
and more dogmatic views along federalist lines held by actors such as Altiero Spinelli and 
Sicco Mansholt. In the second category, Raymond Barre and Albert Borchette comprised the 
middle ground and argued for a more cautious, concrete and pragmatic approach.223 The 
views of Ralf Dahrendorf formed a third category which, while it was more radical, also 
argued for a more concrete and pragmatic approach, an opinion shared by the second category 
along with Malfatti himself.  
Spinelli and Mansholt gave no sign of any strategic calculations to quietly move into EPC 
territory. This approach echoes that of the Commission under Hallstein as it encompassed 
more dogmatic demands for inclusion in EPC based on what the Commission was, not on 
what the Commission could do or contribute to EPC. Unsurprisingly, Spinelli’s view on the 
developments of political unification and the initiative for political consultation ran along 
traditional federalist lines. Spinelli argued that to give weight to the Commission’s demands 
for inclusion in all levels of political consultation, the Commission needed to reformulate the 
definition of the Common Commercial Policy and to extend its scope, in order for the CCP to 
become a determining element of a common foreign policy. 224 
Spinelli noted the Commission’s limitations. In order to be able to play an important role in 
both political unification and a common foreign policy, the Commission needed new tools. In 
Spinelli’s view, the current Commission was not well equipped. The Commission depended 
on the Commissioners’ personal competences and skills, while it lacked institutional skills. 
The solution to this would be to politicise the Commission by institutionalising it further. 
Spinelli argued for a service within the Commission devoted particularly to the political 
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developments of the Community, a so-called “diplomatic service”.225 Spinelli thus argued for 
an expansion of EC policy as a response to EPC, with a strategy for political unification and a 
common foreign policy as a part of this. The CCP was and should be discussed in the EC 
sphere, but it would still be necessary for the Commission to participate in EPC to link the 
developments of a CCP to issues discussed in EPC with the view to develop a common 
foreign policy and participation in the planned CSCE, a conference which in Spinelli’s view 
would have the strongest effect in the areas of economic cooperation and trade. 226  
Concerning the Commission’s participation in the ministers’ work regarding a second report, 
Spinelli argued (rather unrealistically) for full inclusion of the Commission.227 In Spinelli’s 
view, the Member States’ attempt to separate the “economic process” from the “political 
process” was impossible and would only cause problems for the Commission.228 Regarding 
the Commission’s participation in EPC, Spinelli highlighted that the Commission needed to 
be involved at all levels. Participation on the highest levels would be purely formal and thus 
meaningless if the Commission was not represented in the Political Committee. Spinelli 
thereby acknowledged that the real work of EPC would be conducted in the Political 
Committee.229 Spinelli urged the Commission to proceed with “courage” towards its ultimate 
goal of political union and to declare its will for this union in public. In his view, mere 
pragmatism would not work.230  
Sicco Mansholt was in line with Spinelli regarding many of these questions. In a traditional 
manner, Mansholt attacked the initiative and establishment of EPC, but unlike Spinelli, he did 
not venture into criticism of the current EC structures. Mansholt’s claim was that the real 
intention behind EPC was to create an entity of political development outside the EC, which 
would threaten the Community; in his view, all that EPC boasted could be achieved could in 
fact be done within the EC.231 Mansholt went on to question whether EPC really was 
convincing as a development in the process of developing a political union. Mansholt himself 
was not persuaded. Mansholt addressed the EPC’s establishment from a historical 
perspective, and attempted to show how the Commission really had no business in EPC. 
Rather, he argued that all business that potentially would include the Commission in EPC 
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really belonged within the EC. Consultation between Foreign Ministers was not a new 
feature. This had been a characteristic in the debates over achieving political union between 
the Member States of the EC from 1959 through the Fouchet plans of 1961-1965 to the 
current EPC.232  
Mansholt noted further that the disagreements and diverging views surrounding these debates 
and former initiatives had resulted in the term ‘Political Union’ becoming associated with 
something negative. The Commission’s role was to critically assess the current EPC initiative 
in order to protect European integration and the process of political unification, in which the 
Commission in Mansholt’s view held a privileged role. Mansholt questioned the very 
premises for EPC as he argued that the Luxembourg Report’s point 5 on the Commission 
made its existence superfluous. In Mansholt’s opinion, this point should have been opposed 
by both the Commission and the EP, because any areas that affected the Community’s 
activities should be treated within the EC institutional framework already existing. According 
to Mansholt, the EC and its Council constituted the forum in which the Commission and the 
national ministers should meet, not EPC. Either EPC’s scope should be constructed so that 
there was no role for the Commission, or else the EC should be the only forum for such cases. 
Like Spinelli, Mansholt called for bolder moves from the Commission on political union.233 
Notes from other Commissioners expressed more pragmatic views on political unification and 
the emergence of EPC. Albert Borchette’s note to Malfatti of 14 January 1971 forms a 
contrast to the views of Spinelli and Mansholt.234 As the Treaties would not have to be revised 
by its establishment, EPC was seen as limited in scope. Borchette still indicated that there 
could be some threats or challenges to the EC’s autonomy and functioning. EPC’s undefined 
scope was part of these challenges, because the Luxembourg report described the scope of the 
planned cooperation as any questions of their choice, and thus it could not be excluded that 
the domains of the EC could be affected by EPC activities.   
In Borchette’s view, the Commission’s short-term tactic towards EPC should be to continue 
to “assert and defend” its “birth right” in the areas of external economic policy, as the EC was 
determined by its economic core.235 For Borchette, the Economic and Monetary Union was 
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more important than a limited cooperation between the Foreign Ministers of the Six. EPC 
might turn out to be useful for the EC and the Commission, but as it still represented 
uncertainty, the Commission should focus on the more important tasks at hand. For Borchette 
it was evident that in the long term, no EMU could exist indefinitely without a common 
external policy. And since the EC had acquired a “natural vocation” in the domestic policies 
of the Member States as opposed to more traditional foreign policy, “logically” this relation 
and its balance would shift over time. The EC structure that determined the internal policy of 
a group of states would in time also determine their foreign policy.236  
However, considering the nature and the history of developments in this area, it would be 
unwise in the short term for the Commission to claim external competences that were not 
already covered by the Treaty. It should rather, in view of the “logical” and predetermined 
long-term development, signal on every important occasion that the mission of the original 
European integration was that of the Community in general and the Commission in particular. 
Borchette concluded that the Commission should be represented in all EPC meetings of 
Foreign Ministers and Political Directors where issues that concerned the EC were discussed. 
For the moment, the demands of the Commission should be limited to this. The justification 
was defensive; the Commission should not demand too much, as exaggerated requests would 
only lead the Member States to reject Commission participation. Although defensive in 
nature, this approach also emphasises how factions within the Commission attempted to 
strategically position the Commission as an actor in EPC. The argument was that it would be 
wise to limit the Commission’s demands at this point to prepare for inevitable future 
developments. 237 
Raymond Barre’s note of 17 December 1970 echoed that of Borchette, and countered the 
views of Spinelli and Mansholt.238 Barre argued that given the Treaty-based scope of the 
Commission’s competences, the Luxembourg Report had to be regarded as a starting point for 
more extended participation and an extended role for the Commission in the political 
consultation between the Member States. It was up to the Commission to be present whenever 
the Luxembourg Report opened up that possibility. Barre’s view on the manner in which the 
Commission should proceed was closely linked to Borchette’s strategical calculations; in 
Barre’s view, the Commission had an interest in having its presence gradually recognised as 
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useful rather than claiming a status and role which would be easy for the Member States to 
challenge and refuse from the beginning.239  
Barre saw the Commission’s participation in all levels of EPC as both desirable and logical; 
but he adopted a cautious approach to this: the Commission should avoid entering into EPC in 
great numbers and with various representatives, shifting with the topics discussed. The best 
solution would be to appoint a senior official of the Commission that held horizontal 
competence, such as the Secretary-General of the Commission.240  
While Ralf Dahrendorf’s contribution to this discussion was radical and in some areas quite 
distinct from the others, particularly the views of Spinelli and Mansholt, he shared some 
ground with Barre and Borchette. Dahrendorf explored the possibilities and limits of a foreign 
policy of the EC, establishing the Community as an economic and political actor in world 
politics. Dahrendorf and Spinelli shared some common ground on this. More radical was 
Dahrendorf’s attack on the long tradition of political union and supranationalism which time 
and again got in the way, “blinding” people to concrete achievements and decisions that 
needed to be taken. Dahrendorf was positive to EPC while calling for closer links between 
EPC and the Community institutions: 
Today, we know that the Davignon formula has provided the most effective stimulus for a long 
time to European political cooperation. (…) If, indeed there is any criticism to be levelled at 
the Davignon formula today, it is that it does not provide any pointer on how the new impulses 
of cooperation are to be translated into decisions by the institutions set up under the 
Treaties.241 
Dahrendorf suggested a role for the Commission in EPC as a link to rectify this. In his view, 
the Commission should not only be “an occasional guest” in EPC, but a permanent participant 
able to perform this translation between the EC and EPC machineries.242 
3.5 The Commission’s response to European Political Cooperation – 
deliberate choices 
Following the input from the various Commissioners, the Commission continued its work on 
how to respond to EPC. A debate on political union was held in the EP on 26 January 1971 in 
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which the Commissioners participating in the discussion argued along the same lines as 
presented in 3.4.243 The Commissioners’ view, the EP debate and the discussion that the 
Commission as a collegium held at Val Duchesse on 17 February 1971 was the background 
for the formulation of the document SEC (71) 650, Coopération en matière d’“ Union 
Politique”, which I argue is what formed the basis of the Commission’s response to EPC in 
the following period.244  
In SEC (71) 650, the Commission clearly placed the establishment and development of EPC 
within the development of a process of political unification leading to political union. 
However, as demonstrated by the present chapter, there were voices within the Commission 
that were sceptical of this link, questioning whether EPC really was the start of a political 
unification process. Two distinct chapters of the SEC (71) 650 dealt with the EC, the 
Commission and EPC. The first chapter covered the implications of EPC for the activities of 
the EC, while the second dealt with the role of the Commission in the planned EPC. Both 
chapters shared a critical view of EPC, along with a desire to participate in it. The 
Commission did not consider EPC cooperation an appropriate starting point for a political 
union.245 However, after years of waiting for some tangible form of political unification, this 
initiative, albeit limited, was better than nothing.  
The Commission noted that in the context of political unification the form chosen for EPC 
was sub-optimal, as the initiative attempted a structural separation between the EC sphere, 
where political unification belonged in the Commission’s view, and the EPC consultation 
process for foreign policy. The Commission noted that this separation would produce 
instances of overlap, a fact already recognised by the Luxembourg Report, which referred to 
how the Commission and the EP were to be associated. As the political unification process 
was a Community process, there needed to be a link between EPC and the EC, and thus the 
Commission should participate in EPC. In the Commission’s view, the political consultation 
that claimed to be in line with political unification would benefit from including the 
Commission and the EP. The Community institutions could contribute to EPC expertise, 
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serving to facilitate and accelerate the political unification process, including the parts of it 
that would be conducted within the EPC framework.246  
The role the Commission envisaged for itself in EPC was formed to achieve three main goals: 
to protect the EC, to become the link between EPC and the EC and to shape EPC. In order to 
protect the EC, the Commission wanted to “avoid the effects of political consultation resulting 
in an undermining of the European Community”.247 In the Commission’s view, the EC was 
superior to EPC and there was a fear of ‘contamination’. The Commission pointed to the fact 
that although the Community’s activities were limited to a number of sectors, it had its own 
set of definite regulations, competences and institutions, while the process of political 
cooperation lacked an institutional base of the same calibre.248 The Commission stressed how 
important it was that no political cooperation machinery interfere or weaken the existing and 
more or less well-functioning Community. This first goal should be achieved through the 
Commission being associated with the process at all levels. To protect the EC, the 
Commission should follow an active strategy, paying close attention to the agendas of the 
meetings of the Ministers and opposing any decision made there that would intrude on the 
competences of the Community. The Commission should demand that the Community’s 
institutional framework be used when this was called for. 249 
The second goal of the Commission was “to become the link between the policies of the 
European Community and foreign policy ‘proper’ as discussed in the consultations between 
the Six.”250 The Commission’s argument that it would provide the best functional link 
between the EC and EPC shows the Commission’s perception of itself as an integrative 
nucleus. Importantly, as part of the Commission’s cautious approach, it stressed the need to 
act as a link and participate in EPC in a manner that was realistic and viable in the long 
term.251 
As the third goal, the first definite potential for the Commission to shape EPC would be to “be 
associated with the process of developing a new report by the foreign ministers of the Six 
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within two years of the first one.”252 As the Commission’s main goal was to facilitate political 
unification, inclusion in the development of EPC through this second report was considered 
vital.  
In SEC (71) 650, the Commission argued for formalised inclusion on all levels of the planned 
political consultation, which was not successful until the London Report of 1981. The 
Commission had greater success in regard to its inclusion in the work of the Political 
Directors of the Member States, the ECP Political Committee.253 The Commission recognised 
early on that this was an important arena where a great deal of the work of the political 
consultation machinery would be planned and prepared, an arena in which the Commission as 
the watchdog of the Treaties should be represented. Inclusion here was a necessary 
precondition if the Commission was to achieve its three goals related to the political 
consultation machinery. By November 1971, a representative from the Commission was 
allowed at the meetings of the Political Committee, but this was not formalised, due to French 
opposition.254 
3.6 Developments in European Political Cooperation – 1971-1972 
In developing its approach to the dual challenge of summitry and EPC, the Commission took 
on the upcoming Summit more actively in 1971-2 than it had in 1969. Still, the formal results 
of this approach were more or less the same, as the Commission was not granted any right of 
participation that went beyond that which it had enjoyed at the Hague Summit.255 The Six 
Member States still held diverging views of what they wanted from EPC, and the French 
continued their opposition towards Commission participation. The diverging views centred on 
two related issues; the first issue, the relationship between the EC and EPC, played a part in 
the second, the development of EPC and the debate on whether to institutionalise EPC or not. 
However, there was movement on the lower levels of EPC, as the Political Committee 
launched its demand for closer cooperation with the Commission. 
The continuance of the French opposition to bringing EPC any closer to the EC became even 
more evident when the other Five started to express their views on how to develop EPC 
further. The diverging views between the Member States became clear, as did the continuance 
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of the Commission’s approach and response to EPC. The Five criticised EPC developments 
for the failure to anchor EPC in the EC structure, that is, a lack of involvement of the 
Commission in the process, as well as the failure to institutionalise the process with a 
secretariat, for instance. The Five’s critique was based upon a consultation procedure claimed 
to be less effective than it would have been if the methods of the EC had been applied.256 
Both Belgium and the Netherlands supported the Commission’s claim for inclusion in EPC as 
they argued in favour of placing EPC within the EC structure.257 In the Dutch view, it was 
hardly a surprise that the results of the cooperation had been meagre so far, given the 
intergovernmental character of EPC.258  
On 17 March 1971, the political directors agreed on the creation of a sub-group for the 
implementation of the Luxembourg Report’s Part Three, to create a second EPC report.259 
Initially this sub-group had been proposed as a working group that also was to consider 
potential new topics for the political consultations, as well as which topics should be placed in 
EPC and which in the EC.260 However, as the French opposed this mandate, the result was a 
sub-group with a more limited mandate, which had the effect of slowing down the progress 
for political unification envisaged in the Luxembourg Report.261 Germany suggested setting 
up some form of permanent secretariat for EPC in this sub-group, but this was shot down by 
the French as “premature, indiscreet and too supranational” if such a secretariat would mean 
to make use of the Commission’s services.262 The impression given by the French was that at 
this stage in the development of political consultation, the focus should be on relations 
between the Member States and third countries, and not on questions of the internal 
institutional development of EPC. In any case, the French still did not see the Commission as 
an actor with any substantial role in the machinery established for political consultation.263  
The German view of political consultation changed as it realised that the distinction between 
work done within EPC and the EC was difficult. Germany had agreed to the concept of 
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‘separate but parallel progress’ in EPC, but saw that this distinction did not work well in 
practice. Although it was not explicit, a shift in the German approach to EPC ensued, as it 
now favoured closing the gaps between the EPC and the EC structure.264 Thus Germany laid 
out proposals for institutionalising the consultation process in November 1971.265 Although 
the proposal included that of a secretariat, the Germans themselves did not envisage coming 
to an agreement on this with the French. In the German view, it was more plausible that a 
standing committee would be set up, which to please the French would (although placed in 
Brussels) “underline the independence of the system from the Community.”266 Germany did 
consider the possibility of accepting that political consultation could be based in Paris, as long 
as the French agreed to let the Commission participate along the lines defined by the 
Luxembourg Report. The institutionalising of EPC was more important than situating it in 
Brussels, as long as the Commission was allowed in.267 In a meeting of the Political Directors 
in late December 1971, it was reported that there had been no progress on the question of the 
Commission’s participation in the political consultation process. The Commission would be 
granted the same right of participation in the Summit as it had had in the run-up to The 
Hague. In time, as the Member States could not agree, the proposal for a political secretariat 
was laid to rest.268    
There was some movement in EPC’s relation to the Commission, however. The developments 
on the lower EPC levels ran contrary to the continuous opposition on the highest level. By the 
fall of 1971, EPC’s Political Committee was still in its infancy, but had begun its work, which 
was characterised by informality and pragmatism.269 The Political Committee’s pragmatic 
approach wanted the EC and EPC to relate to each other in the best possible way so EPC 
could function as efficiently as possible. The chairman of the group that formulated the 
Luxembourg Report and Belgian Political Director, Étienne Davignon himself, highlighted 
the importance of the work conducted in the Political Committee.270 Davignon claimed that 
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(…) the best discussions were those where the Political Directors met on their own. These 
were the freest, and they were also the most fruitful, in that it was at such meetings that 
misunderstandings could be most easily corrected and positions most easily modified.271  
The Political Directors themselves complained of the Committee’s lack of solidarity and that 
the Commission’s status in the consultation framework was part of the problem.272 Part of the 
work of the political directors was to advise the foreign ministers and permanent 
representatives on the potential political implications of initiatives that came from the 
Commission.273 The Directors wanted a more robust set-up for their Committee, with a 
“proper relationship” with the Commission. This entailed that the Commission should be 
present at all political committee meetings, which it already de facto was. However, this 
presence was not formalised, and attempts to do so would undoubtedly create problems with 
the French.274  
The Commission’s approach to and view of summits were also moving in a new direction. 
Instead of opposing the initiative to the Paris Summit that was to be held in October 1972, the 
Commission chose to work with it. It adopted a constructive approach and adjusted to the 
environment that had produced the initiative for the Summit. This approach was in keeping 
with the cautious and unaggressive manner and followed the same ends of participation and 
influence as the Commission under Rey in 1969. Contrary to Rey’s approach in 1969, 
however, Malfatti looked forward to a Summit of the Ten with anticipation, and firmly 
supported the French initiation of the Summit.275 Malfatti emphasised the important role of 
the Commission in preparing for such a Summit, and assured that it would contribute in the 
most constructive manner possible.276 Malfatti continued the Commission’s arguments that 
“the Summit must in no way replace the Community institutions”, but contrary to the 
Commission under Rey, Malfatti also qualified any misgivings concerning institutionalised 
Summitry with the emphasis he placed on the potential the Summit held for providing 
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political guidelines.277 As for the Summit’s contents, Malfatti went straight to the issue of 
political union and thus to the conflict over Commission’s role in EPC:  
Regarding the process of political union in particular, it is important that when the next report 
of the Foreign Ministers, scheduled for 1972, is drawn up, the interdependence and 
complexity of the problems of constructing Europe should be taken into account. Hence it 
would seem indispensable that the Commission be fully associated with the preparation of the 
report, both in its role as guardian of the Treaties and in view of its right of political initiative 
in the development of a united Europe.278 
3.7 The Paris Summit of 1972  
The Paris Summit of 19-21 October 1972 had significant effects for the development of EPC, 
as it was decided to relieve EPC of the task of political unification and keep it as a structure 
for foreign policy cooperation. This development or ‘split’ had consequences for the 
Commission’s approach to EPC. In line with the decisions made at the Summit, the 
Commission began its own work on creating a European Union, and the particular focus on 
political unification was directed at this work and not on EPC.279 Nevertheless, the 
Commission’s approach to EPC did not change drastically; it still aimed to participate in and 
shape EPC, to protect the EC and to link the two. EPC still represented a threat to the EC, 
regardless of the ‘split’ in 1972. In the year 1972, when little other than preparations for the 
CSCE went on within the context of EPC, the Commission continued its approach towards 
EPC, which was now closing in on specific EC policy areas.280  
Prior and in response to the Commission’s request to participate in the preparations for the 
Summit, the Council had specified that a summit meeting was outside the scope of the 
Community’s competence, which meant that the Commission could neither expect to 
participate in all parts of the meeting nor in its preparation.281 The Commission would be 
invited to some parts of the Summit where the Community’s competence was obvious. For 
other areas, such as institutional reform and political progress, the Ministers would have the 
prerogative of deciding whether or not the Community and the Commission should be 
involved. In response, Malfatti argued strongly that both institutional reform and political 
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progress were well inside the Community’s sphere of competence in the Commission’s view, 
and that it would not be possible to exclude it.282  
The Commission was not included in the preparatory work dealing with institutional reform 
and political progress.283 This exclusion created a very grave situation in the eyes of the 
Commission and its President.284 President Malfatti “energetically protested” against the 
exclusion and appealed to Council President Thorn to make the Commission’s view known to 
the Foreign Ministers.285 The Commission threatened to make its grievances public if its 
request to participate went unheard.286 
The results of these efforts soon became clear; the answer was still ‘Non’. According to the 
Commission’s wish, Thorn had presented its case to the Foreign Ministers, but as there was 
no unanimity between them, it was not granted complete inclusion.287 Still, the impression 
was that several of the Member States’ representatives stood behind the Commission’s 
demands and were reluctant to discuss issues affecting the Community without the 
Commission being present.288  
In the middle of the rather long run-up to the Summit in Paris, the Commission experienced 
an unexpected change of leadership.289 Franco Maria Malfatti left his position as Commission 
President on 21 March 1972 and was replaced by Sicco Mansholt from 22 March.290 As a new 
Commission was planned for the enlarged Community of 1 January 1973, it was determined 
that Mansholt would hold this position for only eight months. As discussed in Section 3.4 
above, Mansholt was part of the grouping within the Commission that expressed its 
resentment of the development of EPC most vocally. Furthermore, he was personally 
affiliated with the Hallstein Commission. As Mansholt’s period was limited in time, the Paris 
Summit was the high point of his period as President.291  
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Mansholt continued the approach of the Commission under Malfatti, but also went further. In 
a more confrontational style, Mansholt sent the Council a letter of protest, in which he 
demanded the Commission’s inclusion in all preparatory work in relation to the planned 
Summit, including the discussions on strengthening Community institutions and progress in 
the political field.292 The result of this was that the Council stated on 5 July 1972:  
(…) in line with what had been agreed on 20 March, the Commission would be excluded from 
examining the problem of political progress, but would be included in the discussion on 
strengthening the Community institutions.293  
In the period from the initiation of what became EPC in The Hague in 1969 and until the 1972 
Paris Summit, the French position on EPC and its relation to the EC remained unchanged. 
The opposition to the Commission’s attempt to join the preparatory work for the Summit in 
full is a case in point. Albeit very slow and limited, a shift in the French position can be 
distinguished in points 14 and 16 of the Declaration of Paris, where the results of the Paris 
Summit are related to EPC and the issue of political progress.294 Point 14 of the Declaration 
dealt with EPC in particular:  
14. The Heads of State or of Government agreed that political co-operation between the 
Member States of the Community on foreign policy matters had begun well and should be still 
further improved. They agreed that consultations should be intensified at all levels and that the 
Foreign Ministers should in future meet four times a year instead of twice for this purpose. 
They considered that the aim of their co-operation was to deal with problems of current 
interest and, where possible, to formulate common medium and long-term positions, keeping 
in mind, inter alia, the international political implications for and effects of Community 
policies under construction. On matters which have a direct bearing on Community activities, 
close contact will be maintained with the Institutions of the Community. They agreed that the 
Foreign Ministers should produce, not later than 30 June, 1973, a second report on methods of 
improving political co-operation in accordance with the Luxembourg report.295  
This point of the declaration refined the scope of EPC by defining its aim as dealing with 
problems of current interest, and inched EPC a little bit closer to the realm of the EC by 
stating that the political implications for and effects of Community policy should be kept in 
mind while formulating EPC policy. Finally, by restricting the instruction for a second report 
to improving political co-operation and not political unification, this point limited the scope of 
EPC further, as the issue of unification was dealt with in the Declaration’s point 16: 
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16.  The Heads of State or Government, having set themselves the major objective of 
transforming, before the end of the present decade and with the fullest respect for the Treaties 
already signed, the whole complex of the relations of Member States into a European Union, 
request the Institutions of the Community to draw up a report on this subject before the end of 
1975 for submission to a Summit Conference.296 
In this point, the instructions on how to manage what was interpreted as political unification 
transformed into what was a new term, a ‘European Union’.297 The work on the draft of this 
declaration reveals the continuing French opposition against bringing EPC closer to the EC. 
However, a small but discernible change was seen in point 14 of the draft, where Pompidou 
initially had put square brackets around the phrase “keeping in mind, inter alia, the 
international political implications for and effects of Community policies under construction”, 
presumably in an attempt to remove it.298 During the debate, the square brackets were 
removed, and the French opposition towards what the Five and not least the Commission 
regarded as obvious, namely that the political and economic spheres of the Community had to 
be viewed as interconnected, changed, albeit temporarily.299 This represented a certain 
weakening of the French stance towards keeping political issues separate from the economic 
issues, but it was not given up completely, and it was observed that “the French are still likely 
to give us and the rest of the Community a lot of trouble over this.”300  
The Commission’s initial reaction to the Summit was that the term “European Union” was too 
vague and could amount to much or nothing, depending on the will of the actors involved.301 
Regarding the Commission’s role in EPC, Mansholt was quite direct in his characterisation:  
But the Commission is not satisfied and cannot be satisfied with trailing the movement of 
political cooperation between the Member States. It must also intervene and bring in the 
required procedure whenever the Community as such is at stake.302  
Mansholt outlined how the Commission still wanted EPC to develop in such a way that in the 
end any distinction between political problems and Community problems would be 
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eliminated.303 The Commission continued to frame EPC as part of the progress towards 
political unification, and the Commission’s quest for inclusion in ECP activities continued in 
line with its task to prepare for the creation of a European Union.304 The EP agreed with the 
Commission, as it deplored that  
(…) over political cooperation and foreign policy the Commission and Parliament have not 
been accorded the position which is their due; mainly with regard to the terms and effects of 
Community action on the international scene.305 
The results of the Paris Summit were thus a vague instruction to create a European Union. A 
refinement of the scope of EPC left the Commission with much the same approach it had held 
since the early part of 1971.  
3.8 Slow movements towards closer relations between the Community and 
European Political Cooperation – the Copenhagen Report of July 1973  
As Ortoli took over as President of the Commission of a Community that now counted Nine 
Members as of January 1973, the international arena was concerned with economic crises 
following conflicts and war in the Middle East.306 The most notable development within EPC 
was the formulation of a second EPC report: the Copenhagen Report.307 This second founding 
document for EPC did not change the Commission’s status. However, despite the continued 
opposition of the French, the Copenhagen Report represented a slight movement towards 
closer EC-EPC relations. The meeting between Commissioner Soames and President 
Pompidou in June 1973, in which the Commission was ordered to leave the EPC sphere alone 
and get back to the EC sphere where it belonged, has already served as an illustration of the 
continuing French opposition to the Commission.308 At the same time, there were 
expectations that Ortoli as President would change the way in which the Commission 
‘behaved’ in EPC.309 
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On a lower level, the tone was quite different from President Pompidou’s, as noted by 
Christopher Audland who served as Deputy Secretary-General of the Commission from 1973 
to 1981.310 Although formally prevented from attending EPC dinners as the Commission’s 
EPC representative, he never saw this as a disadvantage: “when I wanted to know what 
happened at dinner, I would ask one of my chums, and he would tell me. It wasn’t an 
inconvenience really.”311  
On 23 July 1973, the Foreign Ministers of the EC adopted the Copenhagen Report, which 
strengthened EPC in matters of foreign policy by further intensifying it.312 In line with the 
developments resulting from the Paris Declaration’s point 14, the report to a certain degree 
entailed some increased sensitivity towards the effects EPC activities had on the EC sphere. 
The Copenhagen Report did not result in substantial formal changes, as on the Commission’s 
particular status it merely stated that “the Commission is invited to make known its views in 
accordance with current practice”.313  
Although the Report attempted to clarify the relationship between EPC and the EC, there was 
still opposition to what amounted to a relatively modest move of the two spheres towards one 
another, which shows the continuance of the French opposition. The Copenhagen Report’s 
point 12 illustrates what the limited movement of the two spheres towards each other 
consisted of:   
12. Relationship between the Work of the Political Co-operation Machinery and that 
carried out within the framework of the European Communities  
(a) The Political Co-operation machinery, which deals on the intergovernmental level with 
problems of international politics, is distinct from and additional to the activities of the 
institutions of the Community which are based on the juridical commitments undertaken by 
the Member States in the Treaty of Rome. Both sets of machinery have the aim of contributing 
to the development of European unification. The relationship between them is discussed 
below.  
(b) The Political Co-operation machinery, which is responsible for dealing with questions of 
current interest and where possible for formulating common medium and long-term positions, 
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must do this keeping in mind, inter alia, the implications for and the effects of, in the field of 
international politics, Community policies under construction.  
For matters which have an incidence on Community activities close contact will be maintained 
with the institutions of the Community.314 
But even this very slight shift towards greater alignment between the EC and EPC 
machineries caused conflict. EPC was still “distinct from and additional to” the Community 
structure. Regardless of this explicit wording that distinguished the separateness of the two, 
the formulations that placed them side by side were a problem for the French.315 It was the 
formulation of and the ensuing conflict between France and the other Member States over 
point 12 that had held up the work with the second report and made it miss the deadline set in 
the Luxembourg Report.316  
In July 1973, France still opposed moving EPC closer to the EC. But as point 12 of the 
Copenhagen Report shows, France had to agree (albeit with some misgivings) to include the 
formulation in which the EPC and the EC machineries were placed side by side. Nevertheless, 
by the time of the Copenhagen Report the Commission had managed to get a foot in the door 
of EPC. 
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4. The Commission – from super-
government in spe to sombre realist? 
This chapter establishes the ways in which the Commission that met with EPC actors differed 
from the Commission of the EEC’s first years. This difference can be illustrated by 
comparing Hallstein’s 1958 idea of a Commission ready and able to change people’s lives by 
changing their habitual thoughts to Malfatti’s 1970 assurance that the Commission was not 
and had no desire to become a super-government.317 The present chapter argues that the 
Commission adjusted following the empty chair crisis. There were diverging views within the 
Commission concerning how and in which direction it should develop, however, and the 
establishment of EPC played a part in this process. The main argument presented in this 
chapter is that the Commission as a distinct supranational actor deliberately chose a ‘middle 
ground’ based both on institutional continuity and on change in its engagement with EPC.  
The chapter consists of two parts; both parts further unveil and open up the ‘black box’ of the 
Commission as an actor. The chapter investigates the Commission’s development and 
adjustment as a supranational actor. The first part of the chapter analyses three diverging 
voices of the Commission that met with EPC actors in the early 1970s, and presents the 
‘middle ground’ that became the Commission’s approach towards EPC. The second part of 
the chapter analyses the Commission as an actor over time. It chronologically tracks the 
Commission as a developing institution from the beginning through its first President 
Hallstein, moving on through the presidencies of Rey, Malfatti and Mansholt and ending with 
the Commission under President Ortoli. The chapter argues that a development resulting in an 
adjustment of the Commission as a second-generation Commission is visible in this analysis 
and that the EPC case serves as an illustration of this.  
4.1 The diverging voices of the Commission  
There were diverging views of the Commission’s role within the institution itself. The 
elements constituting these diverging views became clear and specific when the Commission 
had to respond to the establishment of EPC. The way in which the Commissioners Altiero 
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Spinelli and Ralf Dahrendorf engaged in debate with one another in the early 1970s is 
illustrative of this. Spinelli’s and Dahrendorf’s diverging visions of Europe were particularly 
evident in their published work of 1972 and 1973.318 The writings of the most ‘senior’ 
representative of the Commission at that time (and indeed for all time to come), Secretary-
General Emile Nöel, formed a middle ground between these two.319  
Spinelli and Dahrendorf were both members of the Commissions under Malfatti, Mansholt 
and Ortoli, and the two held very different views of Europe, the EC and the Commission. 
What they both had in common, and where they differed in part from the more ‘apologist’ 
Nöel, was that they were dissatisfied with the Commission as an institution and sought 
change. By 1972, the Commission had become unsatisfying for the federalist Spinelli, who 
argued in favour of turning back to the virtues of the more politically ambitious first 
Commission, and even to move beyond this in a federal direction. Dahrendorf on the other 
hand wanted a more efficient and not overly political Commission in order to provide the EC 
and its Member States with a more efficient institutional machinery. Nöel’s views can be seen 
as covering the middle ground, as he did not argue strongly against the status quo. His 
opinions can thus be seen as a defence of the current Commission, an institution that met with 
a range of criticism both for being too politically ambitious and at the same time for not being 
politically ambitious enough. 
Spinelli claimed that the European Community as an integration project had not fulfilled its 
potential.320 In his opinion, the responsibility for this lay to a great extent with the 
Commission:  
The Commission has not yet been able to develop the constructive political imagination which 
the European adventure needs. To the extent that it realises this deficiency it will, however, 
still be able to fulfil this role – and it is difficult to see who else could do so with the same 
prestige.321 
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Spinelli was clear on which other party that also bore responsibility for the Commission’s 
deficiencies: France and in particular President de Gaulle.322 In its current form, the 
Commission was not able to do much in Spinelli’s view; but if it developed in what he 
perceived as in the ‘right’ direction, it held potential:  
The Commission of the Community has been until now the most authoritative and effective of 
such centres of common action. It is due to its existence that the Community has survived the 
long winter of de Gaulle and may be considered today as the original nucleus to be reinforced 
and developed later, if new moments of creative European tension arise… It [the Commission] 
must then wait patiently…323 
Spinelli argued that there was an observable post-empty chair crisis trend towards using the 
intergovernmental method, which was inherently less efficient than a method wherein the 
Commission played a more political role. In spite of de Gaulle’s negative effect on the EC 
and the Commission, Spinelli held that the Commission’s potential as integrative nucleus 
remained unchanged.324 While noting the previous Commission’s attempts to behave like a 
political actor, Spinelli launched a critique of the EC:  
Until the defeat of 1965 the Commission had at least attempted to be the political guide of the 
Community. Since then it has renounced the task, at least until the present, without, 
incidentally, the Council or any other body having wished or been able to take its place. 
Politically speaking the Community is today mute and headless.325 
Spinelli noted that the “stubborn resistance of national conservatism” was responsible for the 
Commission’s exclusion from the newly established EPC structures.326 Furthermore, Spinelli 
argued that the logic of the Community would in due course lead to a unification of foreign 
policies under the auspices of the Community.327 In Spinelli’s view, EPC was a step in the 
opposite and thus wrong direction, as a structure designed to “remain outside the Community 
and aim for an imprecise union or political co-operation.”328 These forces of national 
conservatism (Spinelli was clearly pointing in the direction of France) were seen as attempts 
to achieve two goals. The first goal was to protect intergovernmental political cooperation 
from the supranational ‘contamination’ of the Community system. The second goal, which 
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was to be achieved through superimposing this political cooperation on the purely economic 
EC, was to limit the EC’s autonomy.329 
Spinelli argued that the extension of the EC’s external relations also should encompass 
foreign policy and that the Commission should play an important part in this process:  
(…) the Commission should make full use of this right and formulate precise proposals 
designed to determine methods and stages by which foreign policy would become wholly a 
policy of the Community. There is no reason to introduce in this field of external relations 
structures which differ from those used for the overall developments of the Community. There 
is no doubt that the institutional system of the Community will have to be changed and 
adapted to suit its new tasks and this will be handled by the constitutional procedure 
described in the previous chapter. But the present system already has the great advantage that 
it contains the ingredients for further Community development, the capacity to progress 
wherever a certain high degree of general agreement among the governments is reached and 
to resist successfully the inevitable periodic reversion to national conservatism.330 
For Spinelli, the EC was hampered by a certain ‘pragmatism’ which had led to the 
intergovernmental parts of the EC being kept stronger than the supranational and to 
opposition to any extensions of the EC’s powers and competences. Spinelli criticised 
‘pragmatism’ as follows:  
Everywhere it is asserted, apparently with good conscience, that one should be pragmatic, 
stick to realities, envisage only what is possible and leave on one side doctrinaire quarrels. As 
if it was possible to advance over the difficult and treacherous terrain in which the European 
adventure is being acted out, without being guided by ideas which measure up to the facts and 
to the opportunities ahead.331   
In Spinelli’s view, through EPC this pragmatism was now being applied to provide a single 
voice on the world stage for Europe, but merely by the means of traditional intergovernmental 
cooperation, “even though we know a priori that they will produce neither a common voice 
nor independence nor the personality [in world affairs for Europe] of which men dream.”332 
The development of which EPC was a part ran completely contrary to the more dogmatically 
federal vision that Spinelli represented, but which by now only was supported by a minority. 
Another ‘extreme’ voice was that of the German liberal and Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf, 
who published a more general critique of the European Community and the Commission in a 
rather unusual manner, namely under a pseudonym. In a series of articles entitled “Beyond 
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Brussels: A Plea for a Second Europe” published in Die Zeit in the summer of 1971 under the 
name Wieland Europa, Dahrendorf argued that the contradiction between the EC’s political 
objectives and its daily realities had become evident.333 When his identity was revealed in 
September 1971, Dahrendorf was criticised harshly, particularly by devoted supranational 
‘Europeans’ within the Commission and the EP, but also by President Malfatti.334 
Nevertheless, Dahrendorf’s place in the Commission was safe; he was even reappointed and 
only left the Commission in 1974 of his own accord.   
In his texts, Dahrendorf also went back to the first Commission of Hallstein. Contrary to 
Spinelli, who lamented that Hallstein had not been ambitious enough, Dahrendorf criticised 
Hallstein for being overambitious, unrealistic and inflexible.335 Like Spinelli, Dahrendorf was 
also critical of the EC and the Commission in their current forms. He criticised the 
inclinations towards what he termed two “orthodoxies” in Europe. The first was that of the 
federalists, where Spinelli was mentioned explicitly, the other (which in Dahrendorf’s view 
was just as despicable) was the Gaullist orthodoxy.336  
To overcome the limits of these two orthodoxies, Dahrendorf – both as “Wieland Europa” and 
in Plädoyer für die Europäische Union – launched what amounted to his plea for a “Europe à 
la carte”, in which his ideal for the future of Europe was described.337 Dahrendorf’s pragmatic 
Europe à la carte was quite contrary to Spinelli’s views, stating that Europe should not be 
made “by plan”, which was his criticism of Spinelli’s federalist ideal, but rather in a manner 
that provided for flexibility. Every Member State would be free to participate in the parts of 
cooperation or integration that suited them best and the Commission should serve them.338 
Common policies should come about as a result of common interests and not as the result of a 
line of argument that the European interest was “either general or it does not exist”.339 Thus 
the establishment of EPC was a favourable development in Dahrendorf’s view, although he 
did not embrace it unconditionally, as he believed there should be closer links between the EC 
and EPC.340 Dahrendorf would later go even further in his criticism of the Commission; while 
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the series of articles of 1971 described the Commission as a “bureaucratic Leviathan”, 
Dahrendorf stated in 1979 that the “Commission of the European Communities has become 
an obstacle to European union rather than a motor of progress.”341 
Explicitly criticised by Spinelli and indirectly praised by Dahrendorf, the term ‘pragmatism’ 
was also a keyword for the approach advocated by Emile Nöel in an essay published in March 
1972. For Nöel, pragmatism meant being unaggressively supportive of both ‘sides’ as 
represented by Spinelli on the one hand and by Dahrendorf (and to a degree also the Member 
States) on the other. The title of Nöel’s essay was “The Institutional Problems of the Enlarged 
Community”. A significant part dealt with what Nöel termed “the short-cuts of integration”, 
which included the development of EPC.   
Nöel presented a clear and unconfrontational view of the developments in the areas on the 
fringe of the EC’s competences. In going back to the limits of the Treaty, Nöel described EPC 
as being part of a pragmatic solution to challenges in areas not covered by the Treaty of 
Rome.342 Without being critical, Nöel described much of the EC’s activity as pragmatic, 
stating that in the “absence of sufficient instruments within the Treaties the governments and 
institutions were forced to use a ‘pragmatic’ method, consisting of using a special formula for 
each case”.343 Nöel suggested remedying this with “a purely Community system, and not a 
partially inter-governmental one”.344 These changes, he argued cautiously, could be extended 
to also encompass EPC, but with a different timetable, as this area demanded more of a long-
term strategy.345  
Nöel considered the type of “fringe activity” that EPC and other activities represented as 
important. EPC was thus not seen as wholly negative, since these activities could contribute to 
an increase in scope of the EC’s integration. Nevertheless, Nöel voiced concern over what 
effects such “fringe activity” might have on long-term balance, and thus favoured a Treaty 
change (by Article 235) to extend the EC’s competences.346 
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Nöel discussed the proposal for an EPC political secretariat that had been debated in 1971-
1972 but had not become a reality.347 The line he took was in keeping with the Commission’s 
strategy of defensively but actively working for inclusion in EPC in all areas of EC 
competence. The creation of a political secretariat was seen as especially challenging, as this 
secretariat would be technically linked to EPC but at the same time connected to and of 
importance to the Community.348 The eventual creation of such a secretariat would hinge on 
what kind of objective was envisaged for the future development of EPC; was it to stay more 
or less intergovernmental with lightweight connections to the European institutions. or should 
it gradually be integrated into the EC structure?349 Nöel proved a pragmatist in regard to this 
issue and saw the advantages to both alternatives, although he was increasingly positive 
towards linking EPC and the EC closer together. In the case of the former alternative being 
chosen (which indeed was the case, with EPC remaining inherently intergovernmental), Nöel 
envisaged that the links between the EC and EPC that were already in place could be retained.  
These lightweight bridges between the EC and EPC that Nöel foresaw the Commission would 
have to make do with corresponded to his description of the existing relationship between the 
European Institutions like the Commission and intergovernmental EPC.350 In Nöel’s view, 
this type of relationship could continue if EPC was to “keep its original character and its own 
structures”.351 In this case, a political secretariat needed only to be a lightweight one, and to 
stress the fact that “this venture [EPC] was quite distinct from the Community by proposing 
that it should be established somewhere other than Brussels”.352 This shows that Nöel 
acknowledged that the likely outcome would indeed be that EPC and the EC would stay 
separate, and in that case it would be most pragmatic to keep a structure where there was 
some kind of relationship between EPC and the institutions and not alienate EPC further by 
demanding more. In the end, as the suggestion for a political secretariat was shelved since the 
Member States could not agree, the Commission was able to continue its work towards 
gaining entrance to what remained of the international initiatives: EPC.   
Nöel’s attitude seemed positive and pragmatic when it came to the relationship between EPC, 
the EC, and the Commission. His stance was that even though it would be preferable to tie 
EPC closer to or to encompass it completely within the EC structure, this should not be 
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voiced to avoid controversy between the Commission and the Member States. Nöel’s 
observations tie in with an approach supporting the existence of EPC whilst pragmatically and 
unconfrontationally trying to work for as great inclusion as possible so as to tie EPC closer to 
the EC. The Commission’s number one priority was to secure EPC’s functioning, which for 
Nöel was more important than pushing as hard as possible for inclusion. Nöel thus 
represented a Commission that was prepared to accept EPC, but that hoped that EPC’s 
development would “finally be made in a European spirit”.353  
4.2 The Commission as an adjusting actor  
When analysing the development of the Commission from 1958 until the mid-1970s, an 
adjustment can be seen. Arguably, this could be seen as a change from the Commission as 
‘European prophets’ defining the future direction of integration to a clergy left simply with 
the task of management.354 However, I argue that this adjustment was characterised by a 
change in means more than a change of ends; the Commission attempted to retain its crucial 
role in European integration but by applying a less confrontational style.  
Since its creation in 1958, the Commission of the European Economic Community had gone 
through a merger and become the Commission of the European Communities.355 As the EC 
enlarged with three new Member States from 1 January 1973 onwards, going from the Six to 
the Nine, the Commission accordingly expanded to 13 members: two Commissioners from 
the larger Member States of France, Germany, Italy and the UK, and one each from Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands.  
The period investigated was mainly characterised by institutional change. There was a change 
in the role, perception and self-perception of the Commission following the empty chair crisis 
of 1965.356 Evidence that this change was also reflected upon within the Commission can be 
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found in a letter by Nöel to Malfatti in June 1970, just prior to the new President of the 
Commission taking up his office. Nöel claimed that the Commission’s role and actions were 
contested by the Member States both before and after 1965, but that the empty chair crisis had 
had its most definitive detrimental effect on the Commission’s prestige.357       
In this period, the highest level of the Commission was also marked by change. Five different 
Presidents led the Commission between 1958 and 1976, and their leadership is analysed 
below: Walter Hallstein (Germany, 1958-1967), Jean Rey (Belgium, 1967-1970), Franco-
Maria Malfatti (Italy, 1970-1972), Sicco Mansholt (Netherlands, 1972) and finally François 
Xavier Ortoli (France, 1973-1977). The early years of EPC, 1970-1973, thus coincided with a 
period with no less than three different Commission Presidents. The situation was more stable 
in the Secretariat-General of the Commission, and continuity on the top level of the 
Commission was ensured in this period by Emile Nöel (France), who held the position of 
Secretary-General of the Commission from 1958 until 1987, and by Klaus Meyer (Germany) 
as Deputy Secretary-General from 1969 to 1977.358 The Secretariat-General was the place for 
the coordination of the Commission’s relationship to EPC, and due to the rapid changes on 
the presidential level, Nöel and Meyer came to play important roles in the management of the 
Commission’s role in EPC. 359   
In the ‘battle’ between intergovernmental and supranational forces within the EC, which was 
still ongoing in the period under investigation, the European Parliament was and had been a 
natural ally for the Commission.360 Hallstein noted: “the European Parliament is often the 
Commission’s best ally in the quest for integration.”361 The following analysis of the different 
presidencies delves into the relationship between the two institutions. It provides insights into 
the Commission’s supranational aspirations, showing how these were communicated in its 
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dialogue with the EP, and provides evidence for the adjustment of the Commission. As the 
chronological survey of the period reveals, all of the Commission Presidents from Hallstein to 
Ortoli encountered different initiatives that challenged or even threatened the EEC/EC and the 
Commission’s position. The first of these to actually come into effect was EPC from 1970 
onwards. In the early 1970s, the Commission thus faced and had to respond to a concrete 
initiative that was both related to but to a degree also competed with the EC. As such, EPC 
serves well as a case illustrating how and what lay behind the adjustment of the Commission 
and the development of this supranational actor into what this thesis argues was a second-
generation Commission.   
4.2.1 Walter Hallstein – Commission President from 10 January 1958 to 5 July 1967 
Walter Hallstein has been called “a supranational Icarus”.362 Dahrendorf was one of many 
who viewed the first Commission over which Hallstein presided as characterised by over-
ambition, with wide-ranging consequences for the Commission as an institution and the 
development of European integration: “The supranational illusions of the European 
beginnings have turned out to be an obstacle rather than a motive force for real political 
cooperation.”363 Nevertheless, Hallstein’s contribution to the role of the Commission for both 
better and worse should not be ignored. The consequences of the first Commission’s approach 
forms an important base for its potential role in EPC. This base is important in explaining 
both why the Commission was not wanted and what it actually was able to contribute to EPC 
in terms of its expertise. 
The Treaty of Rome set out the mandate of ‘a Commission’, but it became more or less 
Walter Hallstein’s job as the first Commission’s President from January 1958 to shape this 
mandate into an institution with nine members. Hallstein’s inaugural speech before the 
European Parliamentary Assembly (EPA), which would later become the European 
Parliament, was (as might be expected) filled with grand visions of the future.364 This speech 
had a supranational focus, as Hallstein emphasised how the very existence of the EPA was 
what guaranteed the EEC’s supranational character; the Commission’s supranational features 
were also highlighted. Hallstein went straight to the characteristics that would define his 
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Presidency: federalism and supranationalism. For Hallstein, the EEC was a Community of 
states created in a distinct federative spirit, a supranational body with its own political 
personality, a new stage in European politics.365 Hallstein claimed that the political elements 
of this new stage would “change people”.366 The first Commission President thus set out an 
ambitious federative political project for the EEC, and emphasised the important role its 
institutions would hold in bringing about these changes.367  
Hallstein’s ambitions for the Commission contributed to creating the myth and the perception 
of the Commission as an actor that could and indeed should go beyond the Treaty.368 For 
Hallstein, the Treaty could not and should not limit the Commission in its tasks, but rather 
serve as a point of departure.369 This interpretation and use of the Treaty’s limits as the 
legitimation for the Commission’s political ambition was particular to the Hallstein 
Commission, and characterised the first Commission up until right before the empty chair 
crisis.370 Hallstein described the Treaty of Rome as a departure point and an “outline Treaty” 
with the potential for both a political and an international role for the Commission as late as 
1965.371  
Hallstein’s idea was that the Commission would represent the European aggregated interest in 
a process that took the form of “an inner logic (Sachlogik): a set of stages, each following on 
from the one before, which arise logically”.372 In Hallstein’s view, the Commission’s role was 
legitimated through its position as a guardian of this “Sachlogik”, reminiscent of the 
‘spillover’ concept of the neo-functionalists. Hallstein was not alone, as his Commission 
consisted mainly of likeminded “Eurocrats”.373 These dedicated ‘Europeans’ were highly 
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skilled in their policy areas.374 Their values and visions of Europe and the role of the 
Commission in it has been written on extensively by other scholars.375 The composition of the 
first Commission of these skilled Eurocrats forms part of the Commission’s self-perception, 
in which the EEC in its first years was presented as being “run first and foremost by its 
Institutions”, also based on their expertise.376  
There were relatively early intergovernmental challenges to the Commission and its 
supranational guiding principle. The first seeds of the conflict between the Commission and 
France over European integration were sown by de Gaulle’s initiation of the Fouchet Plan.377 
This very first incidence of Member State(s) attempting to sideline the EEC structure and in 
effect also the Commission in a manner comparable to the EPC initiative of 1969-1970 
occurred as early as 1960.378 The vision that the Fouchet Plan represented was, in de Gaulle’s 
own words, to amount to more than an organisation; it was the ‘spirit’ of the national states’ 
independence.379 This spirit was what Mansholt saw as resurfacing in the establishment of 
EPC some years later and feared.380 In the Fouchet Plan, de Gaulle called for cooperation in 
the areas of foreign policy, defence, economy and culture. The decision-making body would 
be regular meetings of Heads of State or Governments. The other Five and the Community 
institutions did not react positively. Concerns were voiced concerning the duplication that 
would occur by including the economic aspect already covered by the EEC in de Gaulle’s 
intergovernmental initiative.381 This feature was to rise again in the EPC initiative.  
The Commission in particular was threatened by the proposals of de Gaulle. Would the spirit 
of the Fouchet Plans lead to the weakening or sidelining of the Commission? The 
Commission could do little more than emphasise what it perceived was the “superiority” of 
the Community method over the intergovernmental initiative on the table, and be relieved 
when de Gaulle’s plans (for the time being) came to nothing.382 Nevertheless, the spirit of the 
Fouchet Plan and the vision of Europe that it represented continued to surface and conflicts 
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over the diverging views on European integration and cooperation would be rife over the 
years to come.  
The empty chair crisis, the seminal event in the early phase of European integration, had 
consequences for the period that followed. The empty chair crisis can be interpreted not only 
as the Commission going ‘too far’, but also as an instance where France wanted to create the 
perception of the Commission “running amok” with the Member States’ vital interests.383 The 
solution to the crisis was the Luxembourg Compromise, stifling the introduction of qualified 
majority voting along with a reprimand given to the Commission through the French-initiated 
‘Decalogue’. No changes were made to the Treaty, so the treaty-based mandate of the 
Commission outlined in this thesis’s chapter 2 still stood, but the effects of this incident were 
felt and remarked upon within the Commission both at the time and during the following 
period. The crisis exacerbated the conflict between two very different visions of Europe, 
respectively embodying the essential duality between a supranational and an 
intergovernmental direction of the EC. In this conflict, the Commission had to adjust, 
attempting to balance boldness with prudence.384 
Part of the Commission’s adjustment was its strategy of ‘don’t rock the boat’, which was first 
seen in the wake of the Luxembourg Compromise. This strategy was evident in Hallstein’s 
speech before the European Parliament of 20 January 1966, which took place only a couple of 
days after the meetings that ended the empty chair crisis.385 The President was on the 
defensive, taking on the Commission’s share of responsibility for the crisis as well as noting 
the Commission’s contribution to solving it. This contribution lay in the Commission’s lack 
of express protest when left out of the extraordinary session of the Council in Luxembourg, 
implying that Hallstein believed it legitimately could have objected:  
I repeat, we believe that by abstaining we have in fact contributed something which will 
perhaps count when the crisis is finally solved and the question is put: what has the 
Commission done? Even abstention can have its uses.386 
However, at the same time Hallstein was also defending the Commission’s actions as “simply 
the duty laid upon us by the Treaty to act as guardians of the latter”.387 The Commission 
would not bend completely to the will of supporters of a different vision of Europe, but the 
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crisis and the compromise in its wake heralded the start of a different use of the Treaty by the 
Commission. 
In the case of EPC, two elements were to create conflict between the Commission and the 
Member States. Both the Fouchet Plan and the empty chair crisis were illustrations of this 
conflict, in which political unification and the question of which actors were to take the lead 
in European integration were the most contentious issue. However, the interrelated second 
element of external relations was also a bone of contention between the Member States and 
the Commission. The conflict over the extent to which political cooperation could be kept 
separate from economic integration formed the essence of the clash of visions in the early 
1960s, much as it did at the time of the initial stages of EPC in 1969/1970. This first 
Commission saw quite clearly that the “economic integration of Europe is in essence a 
political phenomenon” because of its implications beyond Europe.388 Following the crisis, the 
terms under which Hallstein would be able to continue as President were not clear, and 
without support from all Member States he requested to not be re-nominated.  
4.2.2 Jean Rey – Commission President from 6 July 1967 to 1 July 1970 
Jean Rey’s period as Commission President was characterised first by the Single 
Commission’s development into a well-functioning institution and second by the seemingly 
neverending preparations for EC enlargement. While the Merger Treaty fusing the executives 
of the three European Communities, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the 
EEC, and Euratom, had been signed 8 April 1965, it did not enter into force until 1 July 1967, 
a delay caused by the empty chair crisis. Rey was appointed to lead the Commission of 14 
members for two years, and had his appointment renewed for one final year from July 
1969.389 During this period, the Commission was also absorbed in consolidating the goals set 
out by the Treaty of Rome, of which the completion of the Customs Union on 1 July 1968 
was one achievement. The Rey Commission, like Hallstein’s, also had to face Member State 
initiatives intended to take place outside of the established EC structure. The Hague Summit 
was one example, and the initiative that resulted from the Summit, EPC, was another. 
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Following the events of 1965 and 1966, the Commission adjusted. Prior to the 1965 crisis, the 
Commission had been eager to express its desire to move beyond the Treaty.390 The 
Commission under Rey could not use such language nor risk to be perceived as this 
ambitious, and thus had to use the Treaty not as a departure point but rather as a shield of 
protection against the Member States that wanted to take away what the Commission 
considered to be its mandate. In contrast to Hallstein’s abovementioned reference to the 
Treaty as not constituting a constraint on the Commission, Rey emphasised the way in which 
the Commission’s responsibilities should be exercised through conforming to the Treaty. 
Nevertheless, it was Hallstein’s “political courage” that Jean Rey paid tribute to in this first 
speech before the EP as President of the Commission.391 
In line with this adjustment, Rey made explicit reference to the relationship between the 
Commission and the Member States as one that needed improvement, and that this 
improvement was very much the responsibility of the Commission.392 Rey stated his wish that 
the Commission would be invited into any work between the Member States that was within 
the Commission’s and the Community’s sphere.393 In Rey’s speech, a change in the 
relationship between the Commission and the Member States was evident. Following the 
empty chair crisis, the Commission saw the potential for new conflict over the political role of 
the Commission, of which EPC became a case in point. Rey stressed that unification was not 
solely an economic, but also a political task. These areas were not considered separate by the 
Commission, as it pointedly emphasised from 1968 onwards.394 
Rey’s period as President of the Commission also encompassed elements of continuity that 
served to build the myth of the Commission that began with Hallstein. Examples of this are 
Rey’s comments about how the Commission saw itself not only as the administrator of the 
Community, but considered itself and its members to be the leaders.395 In addition to this 
(perhaps half-jokingly) he added that “we [the Commission/Commissioners] cannot be 
content to be the clergy, we must stay the prophets”.396 In Rey’s period there thus seems to be 
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a mixture between a continuance of Hallstein’s ‘Sachlogik’, where the Communities’ policies 
seem to progress in a somewhat automatic manner with a privileged place and status for the 
Commission, and an increase in the Commission’s sensitivity towards the Member States.397 
This mixture could explain the reoccurring references to the Member States’ interests and not 
least their “understandable national resistance” as evidence of the effect of the empty chair 
crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise.398 It also explains the Commission’s use of a more 
toned-down and indeed ‘apologetic’ language in its direct communication with the Member 
State with ‘the most sensitive’ national interest in its relation to the Commission, France.    
The Rey Commission was not void of political ambition, however; evidence of this is found 
for instance in the Declaration by the Commission of the European Communities of 1 July 
1968 on the completion on the Customs Union, which occurred a year and a half before the 
Treaty schedule.399 This was regarded as a great accomplishment for the EC and in turn the 
Commission.400 Suitably for the occasion, the Declaration represented great optimism for the 
EC’s future, and great ambition for the Commission as an institution: “By beginning the 
unification of the European territory in this first form, the Six are taking a decisive step in the 
economic history of the continent.”401 There was also a call for political unification based on 
the EC’s existing structure.402 In addition, the Declaration stated that this European Federation 
should be based on political decisions and federal institutions and by facilitating détente thus 
provide for a political and international role of the EC.403 To accomplish this political goal, 
the right of veto that in practice was laid down by the Luxembourg Compromise had to be 
renounced and the Council should be re-established as an institution that could take majority 
decisions.404 For the Commission, the Declaration demanded:  
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(…) implementing powers enabling it not only to take the initiative in Community progress but 
genuinely to manage the Community, with the task of management growing as the new 
Community policies gradually enter into force.405   
At the same time as the Declaration of July 1968, which applied the more ‘declaratory’ and 
indeed traditional language seen above, a more pragmatic language was used by the 
Commission when communicating directly with Member State representatives, especially 
France. This serves as evidence for an ongoing adjustment of the Commission at this time, 
and reflects that at least two competing views existed within the Commission on how to 
handle the aftermath of the empty chair crisis.  
In contrast to the ambitious tone used in the Declaration, in which the Commission adopted a 
federalist and political voice, Rey as Commission President formulated a much more 
defensive and apologetic answer to the French Foreign Minister Michel Debré. Debré had 
written a letter of complaint to Rey in which he complained about a ‘political’ speech held by 
Vice-President of the Commission Sicco Mansholt. This speech had allegedly ‘attacked’ 
French policy towards the Community.406 President Rey’s response is evidence of the 
Commission’s cautiousness towards France in particular in the period following the empty 
chair crisis, as he all but dissociated the Commission from Mansholt’s statements and 
defended the political impartiality of the Commission. Rey went on to remark that Mansholt 
held a “combative political personality”, but due to the extent of his contributions to the 
European project, such expressions, although inconvenient, had to be borne patiently.407  
This episode illustrates the diverging views within the Commission on how to ‘behave’, 
particularly towards France. These diverging views can also be taken as evidence for a ‘split’ 
between the remnants of the first Commission, here represented by Mansholt, and the 
attempts to adapt or adjust the Commission, here represented by Rey as President.  
4.2.3 Franco Maria Malfatti – Commission President from 2 July 1970 to 21 March 1972 
As the first Commission President to leave the Commission before his term was up, the 
reputation of the Italian Franco-Maria Malfatti, who gave up his Presidency to stand for 
national elections, has been tarnished: 
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By common consent it was Italy’s turn to nominate a candidate for President in 1970 when 
Jean Rey stepped down. No prominent Italian wanted to go to Brussels. Eventually the 
government nominated Franco Malfatti, the minister for post and telegraphs. A good speaker, 
Malfatti liked to orate about the lamentable state of European integration. Beyond that he had 
little impact on the Community. He resigned as Commission President in 1972 to return to 
Italian politics.408 
There is more to the story of the period during which Malfatti was the Commission’s 
President than Dinan indicates here, not least the approach towards EPC that this thesis 
focuses on. The Commission under Malfatti continued to grapple with the effects of becoming 
a Single Commission, and it was reduced in size from 14 to 10 members. It also continued the 
long process towards enlarging the EC, a task not completed during Malfatti’s period as 
President. The initiatives taken at the Hague Summit of completing, deepening and widening 
the EC formed the Commission’s most prominent challenges in the Malfatti period. This was 
not least due to the fact that the decisions of these ambitions for the EC were taken in a forum 
that was not part of the EC structure. 
Malfatti held his first speech before the EP on 8 July 1970.409 This came after the EPC 
initiative had been taken in The Hague, but predated the Luxembourg Report that established 
EPC and the beginning of this cooperation in November 1970. Signalling the importance of 
the initiative that became EPC, Malfatti referred to the initiatives taken at the Hague Summit 
as reaffirmations of the political finalities upon which the EC was based and that were 
necessary for the EC to move forward and complete the political unification of Europe.410 
Malfatti considered the initiatives to be parts of processes of an eminently political nature, 
and ones that needed the cooperation of forces both at the national and supranational level.411  
Malfatti portrayed the Commission as a political actor, explicitly keeping the traditional 
legitimation aspects of the Treaty.412 However, Malfatti challenged the view of the 
Commission as an “unspecified Eurocracy”, as the unspecific sole keeper of “the grand idea 
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[of Europe]”.413 As noted in Chapter 3, Malfatti thus attempted to change the perception of 
the Commission into that of a less threatening actor, more useful and sensitive to national 
interests. Much in the same way as Rey, Malfatti used the Commission’s treaty-based right to 
be part of the process of political unification to support his argument that the Commission 
should have a political role in EPC if EPC was to amount to more than political 
cooperation.414 
In line with his attempts to change the perception of the Commission, Malfatti stated that the 
Commission was operating in a different period now, and called for more ambitious goals for 
the Community. These goals were related to the EC’s external elements: 
Today the Community has entered a qualitatively different phase and is living a moment of 
considerable renewal. The difficulties we encounter on our road (and there are many) are not 
caused by routine, administrative problems, but by the new dimension of the Community on 
the world scene.  
This new thrust forward in the construction of Europe means that our present phase is 
transitional. We live in an era characterized by the coexistence of the old with the new. The 
old realities have not yet been superseded. The new are asserting themselves and the results of 
this conflict of the past with the future are already becoming apparent.415 
Although the initiative was taken during Rey’s Presidency, Malfatti was the first Commission 
President to face an institutionalised cooperation between the Member States of the EC in 
which the Commission was deliberately placed on the sideline. Much of the problem was 
indeed that the Commission to an extent was connected to EPC, but in a manner that was 
unsatisfactory the Commission. As a supranational actor, the Commission under Malfatti had 
adjusted further, but as EPC was only in its early phase the Commission had yet to completely 
work out how to handle the existence of EPC as Malfatti left unexpectedly in March 1972. 
4.2.4 Sicco Mansholt – Commission President from 22 March 1972 to 5 January 1973 
Sicco Mansholt’s period as Commission President can be argued to constitute ‘a break’ with 
the Commission as an actor adjusting following the empty chair crisis. To an extent, the 
period of Mansholt’s Presidency can be seen as a return to the rhetoric of the first 
Commission. This is explained by the fact that Mansholt was one of the founding fathers of 
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the EEC/EC, part of the first Commission and the Commissioner responsible for the policy 
area, the CAP, over which the empty chair crisis had occurred.  
It can be argued that Mansholt had been ‘too political’ for the Commission as an institution to 
handle ever since the empty chair crisis, in addition to the abovementioned incident of 1968, 
where Rey nearly denounced him in front of the angered French Foreign Minister Débre. 
During the empty chair crisis, Mansholt stated publicly that the failure of the Common 
Market would be “the biggest disaster since Hitler”.416 The Commission was forced to take 
issue with this: 
The Commission considers that under the present circumstances, it would be wise to avoid 
public statements that might make it more difficult for the Commission to play the role it 
normally has to play in the interests of the Community itself. 417 
It has been noted of Mansholt’s role in the empty chair crisis that he suffered a major defeat, 
and that in part this was due to his confrontational style. He and the Commission might have 
fared better in 1965 if he had applied a “different, more cautious approach”, but this was not 
in his, or indeed in the first Commission’s nature.418  
As Mansholt’s Presidency of was interim and only lasted nine months, the effects on the 
Commission as an adjusting actor were limited. But were Mansholt’s nine months of 
President of the Commission merely those of a ‘lame duck’?419 It can be argued that they 
were, but also that the Mansholt period represented the ‘last throes’ of the influence of the 
first Commission. Prior to becoming the Commission’s President, Mansholt had been critical 
of EPC as it was initiated and established. As established in Chapter 3, Mansholt’s voice was 
not formative in the debate over the Commission’s response to EPC in 1971. His Presidency 
has been evaluated as being more ambitious and active than Malfatti’s, but also as 
characterised by ill-timed initiatives and flawed by his “hobby horse of development 
policy”.420  
Mansholt’s first speech before the EP on the 19 of April 1972 was much less optimistic than 
Malfatti’s two years previously. Mansholt referred to the developments taking place between 
the EC Member States outside the Treaty, such as the creation of EPC and summitry, as 
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having negative implications for the EC and the Commission.421 Echoing Hallstein and 
Spinelli, Mansholt claimed that these challenges and problems for the Community and the 
Commission would only be solved by new institutions.422 This federalist-like call for 
institution building was also accompanied by functionalist reasoning on the process of 
political unification. Mansholt ended on a more cautious note that was more in line with the 
adjusting Commissions of Rey and Malfatti than Hallstein’s:  
Starting from an economic union, we will have to work for political cooperation. I would like 
to talk about a political community. Of course one has to realise that this will not happen in 
one go. It will proceed in stages. This is a dynamic process. One should be aware of taking on 
too much.423 
But, there were still visible elements of the first generation Commission as Mansholt lashed 
out on how the EC was hampered by the development after the Luxembourg Compromise and 
the ‘rule’ of unanimity that followed. Regardless of the development of the EC following the 
crisis, Mansholt still seemed convinced of the political finality of the EC and of the 
Commission’s role in making this happen. 424  
Mansholt was critical of the development of EPC. He saw it as a clear challenge and 
demanded inclusion. Mansholt identified problems of procedure ensuing if EPC was to be 
seen as part of the progress towards political union: who would be in charge of such a union, 
what would it deal with and whom would it affect? Mansholt emphasised that the 
Commission intended to be associated with the discussions regarding a political union.425 
Whatever the organisation, institutions and bodies created in the future, they should be 
created to work with the existing Community.426 These various economic and political 
components of a political union were inseparable for Mansholt, as they had been for Rey and 
Malfatti, and again the Treaty of Rome was used to legitimate the Commission’s association 
with EPC.427  
                                                          
421 European Parliamentary Research Service. From Hallstein To Prodi – Statements of Presidents Of the 
European Commission Before The European Parliament, retrieved on 7 September 2015 from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/PE0_AP_DE!1972_DE19720419-030010FR.pdf. 
422 Ibid:107. 
423 Ibid: 106. My translation from the French.  
424 Ibid.  
425 Ibid.  
426 Ibid.  
427 Ibid.  
96 
 
 “The Mansholt jolt” has been used as a catchphrase for Mansholt’s time as President.428 In 
his first press conference he used critical language towards the Community, the Commission 
and (in effect) EPC: the EC was “sick” if it needed a hundred hours of meetings to reach a 
decision, the Paris Summit was needed as the Council of Ministers was to “feeble” to make 
important decisions, and contrary to French wishes there should be no EPC political 
secretariat in Paris.429 The press concluded that with Mansholt as President, the post-Hallstein 
period of a “weak and meek” Commission was now clearly over.430  
What effect did the ‘return’ of Mansholt’s limited Presidency have on the perceived 
adjustment of the Commission? In the Commission’s relationship with EPC, it served as a 
spark to reignite the conflict in which the Commission was seen as a nuisance. This explains 
the British plea to the Ortoli Commission that followed:  
It will be helpful if M. Ortoli can ensure that the Commission takes a sensible line. In the past 
the old Commission, by trying to get it’s [sic] oar in on all subjects where it could possibly be 
argued that there was any degree of Community competence, may have contributed to the 
differences between the French and other member states. We hope that this problem can now 
be resolved.431  
This plea sums up the conflicted relationship between the Commission and the Member 
States, France in particular. If the Commission ‘just behaved’ and did not cause any problems, 
EPC would function more efficiently.  
4.2.5 François-Xavier Ortoli – Commission President from 6 January 1973 to 5 January 
1977 
There were certain expectations of Ortoli as Commission President, both because he followed 
the ‘rhetorical jolt’ of Mansholt as President and because he was the first French Commission 
President. He was expected to take “a sensible line”, which he did by returning the 
Commission to an adjusted line of behaviour like Rey and Malfatti had before him.432 The 
fact that he was French, might be a reason why Ortoli had “never been thought of as one of 
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the ‘fathers’ of Europe, and yet he was one of the main players in the putting into practice of 
the European idea”.433  
Ortoli took on a different role as the Commission President than Mansholt had. The 
continuance of the pragmatism that had characterised Malfatti’s period was visible, and Ortoli 
took the adjustment of the Commission even further in this direction. Compared to his 
predecessors, Ortoli represented a compromise between the supranational and the 
intergovernmental, as “[h]e was not a militant supporter of the European cause [which hints at 
other Commission Presidents who had been], but that he was indeed a supporter was never in 
doubt.”434 The quote highlights that since he was the first French Commission President, his 
‘Europeanness’ was indeed doubted, but it also shows that he represented what amounted to a 
new character of the Commission: that of a mediator and forger of compromises.  
When Ortoli first spoke before the EP on 16 January, and again on 13 February 1973, the 
return to a more cautious Commission was evident. Compared to Mansholt’s speech, in which 
Mansholt was detailed and committed to specificities such as development policy, Ortoli was 
more declaratory and general and much less detailed. His aims regarding the political 
direction of the Commission were thus more vague. Ortoli stated that the Commission was 
not only a technocratic organ, but “by necessity and by nature an institution whose role is a 
political one.”435 As evidence of this role, Ortoli mentioned the power of initiative and 
institutional dialogue between the Commission and the EP, but the more pragmatic aspect of 
his Presidency came out in the conclusion, where he said: 
(…) the Commission is very ambitious for Europe. (…) passionately committed. We know 
what our responsibility is and we wish to exercise it to the full. This is why this Continent, with 
its own aspirations, can stand as something great which is, I repeat, not only an economic 
entity but something which goes much further. (…) At the same time, the political will of the 
States came out very clearly at the Summit.436 
According to Ortoli, the Commission should perform its role in accordance with the Treaty 
and not interpret it expansively, and the Commission needed to be wary of national interests 
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as they were expressed in the Summit. Without expressly highlighting the Commission’s role 
in these developments, Ortoli mentioned the direction of the development in European 
integration, pointing to the emergence of a European identity:   
If a European identity is to emerge, Europe’s place in the world must first be defined. Then 
Europe must be given a form of organization, a structure, which, through the interplay of 
economic, monetary, social, industrial, regional and other policies, would put it on the road 
towards irreversible union.437 
The failure to position the Commission as leading these developments can be interpreted as a 
lack of leadership ambition, or as a more pragmatic approach to reaching the same ends. 
Regarding the Community’s external relations, Ortoli stated that it should assume 
responsibilities commensurate with its weight in the world. Enlargement, which was the 
defining element of Ortoli’s period as President, gave a new dimension, both in economic and 
political terms, to the definition and conduct of the Community’s international relations: 
The Community itself is, of its very nature, a dynamic force and this, together with the 
Community achievements which cement together the Europe of the Nine, should enable it to 
make an original contribution, through dialogue and negotiation, to the establishment of a 
new international economic order.438  
Ortoli emphasised that as the programmes, technical details, and policies were many, it was 
difficult to make people understand that such vitally important work sometimes lacked lustre. 
“Alas, very often the impression people have of our joint endeavours is not one of 
imagination, boldness or political will, even though they are the underlying inspiration.”439 
Ortoli came to be seen as a ‘Member States’ man’, a new characteristic for a Commission 
President. Evidence for this characteristic can be found in Ortoli’s discussions with the British 
on how to proceed with EMU in close and confidential cooperation with the three major 
Member States of the UK, France and Germany.440 In this conversation, Ortoli suggested 
leaving out the rest of the Commission, even using terms such as “rats” to characterise his 
colleagues in the Commission, thus revealing a completely new set of tactics. However, as 
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this can be seen as mere camouflage, the defining keyword was definitely still that of 
adjustment, as Ortoli preached the Commission’s skill of “continuous flexibility”.441  
Ortoli’s period defined the Commission as a mediator and a go-between to ensure 
compromise between existing and formulated national interests without forcing its own views 
on the European interest. This echoes Dahrendorf’s argument that the Commission needed to 
recognise that the European interest should not be something that had to hurt to be good, but 
rather that it constituted an aggregate of national interests in which each got his own, securing 
forward movement in European integration. Did this approach mean that only crumbs were 
left for the Commission as a political actor? Contemporary press cuttings support this view of 
a pragmatic and influential mediator, as Ortoli had “shown a political flair by forging 
compromises between the nine governments on vital issues and inserting himself as an 
informal go-between among Europe’s top statesmen”.442 
Ortoli was described as having “high managerial skills” and acting as a “roving 
peacemaker”.443 These were skills in a Commission President that suited the EC Member 
States, especially France and the UK, just fine. In acting as a go-between by subduing its own 
interpretation of the European interest and by forging compromises between the Member 
States, the Commission ended up with a more manageable political role.  
One aspect that would come to define the Commission from this period onwards was the 
influx of ‘national’-oriented Commission members, as Commissioners now catered to the 
national interests of their state of origin more that had been the case previously.444 
Enlargement might be an explanatory factor here. The new Member States, such as the UK, 
merit special mention in this respect, not least due to the fact that Sir Christopher Soames, one 
out of the UK’s two Commissioners and responsible for the external relations in the 
Commission, kept close connections with home.445   
This characteristic of Ortoli’s Presidency was also seen in the manner in which he involved 
himself in EPC; an EPC meeting in Copenhagen of September 1973 proved a particularly 
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encouraging one, not least because of “the constructive and moderate role that Ortoli himself 
had played in in it.”446 The following analysis in Chapter 5 will highlight how this particular 
EPC meeting was important for the Commission’s role in the case of the CSCE, and how 
Ortoli played a part in this. The Commission’s more tangible entrance into EPC by 1973 can 
thus be argued to have been characterised by the preceding process of adjustment in the 
Commission, which had now earned the descriptions constructive and moderate, and was no 
longer seen as a supranational obstacle driven by illusions.  
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5. A relentless pragmatist – the 
Commission and the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
This chapter establishes how the Commission acquired a role in the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe.447 The fact that the Eastern Bloc was not ready to recognise the 
EC was not the main problem encountered by the Commission in its attempt to include both 
the EC and itself in the CSCE. The real challenge was how to reach agreement within the 
Europeans’ own machineries of the EC and EPC. 
The CSCE opened in Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and continued in Geneva from 18 September 
1973 to 21 July 1975. The conference was concluded in Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the 
signing of its Final Act by 35 states.448 According to the European Council, the Nine’s 
performance at the CSCE was a “shining example of constructive cooperation.”449 This 
acclaimed unity among the Member States and the European Community concealed 
considerable internal division between the Member States and the Commission, however. The 
Commission fought for the interests of the EC and its own interests in the CSCE until the very 
last days before the signing of the CSCE’s Final Act. The subject of the ‘unity of the 
Europeans’ at the CSCE has been intensively studied, but the aspects of tension between the 
EC and the EPC spheres in the CSCE have largely been paid little attention.450 
The chapter’s main argument is that it was the Commission’s pragmatic ability to balance the 
demands of the Treaty with the opposition of the Member States, forging acceptable 
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compromises, that resulted in a role for the Commission. This role entailed both the inclusion 
of the EC in the CSCE and the participation of the Commission as the EC’s representative. 
The chapter tracks how the Commission managed to acquire this role by participating in the 
national delegation of the country holding the Presidency of the EC and EPC. It was thus able 
to contribute actively on behalf of the EC and protected the Community’s interests in the 
CSCE. Aldo Moro signed the CSCE’s Final Act in his dual capacity as Italian Foreign 
Minister and on behalf of the EC. The chapter tracks how the Commission shaped the Moro 
declaration made when signing the CSCE’s Final Act. This declaration underlined the 
importance of integration and the EC’s participation in the CSCE. The Moro declaration 
successfully merged the two spheres of the EC and the EPC, as both machineries had 
contributed to its formulation.  
5.1 The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe – a test case for 
the Member States’ commitment to the EC  
Prior to EPC’s existence, the Commission had emphasised that political integration had to 
facilitate détente and cooperation between East and West.451 The initiative for a pan-European 
conference on security emanated from the Warsaw Pact, and was accepted by NATO in 
December 1969.452 Thus, as EPC was launched, the potential for such a conference had 
already been tabled and needed to be considered by the nine Member States. In the 
declaration from the 1969 Hague Summit at which EPC was initiated, Europe’s division into 
East and West and international détente were expressly mentioned.453  
From the beginning, the initiative to form the CSCE was a case where the Six were resolved 
to work together within the newly formed context of EPC. The potential for détente was taken 
up in the first EPC meeting in November 1970, which had the planned Conference on 
European Security as one of its main issues.454 Economically, it was important for the EC that 
national trade policies towards the countries of Eastern Europe had been allowed to continue, 
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but, as specified by the Treaty of Rome’s timetable, powers over trade policy would be 
transferred to the EC on 31 December 1972.455 As a result, the Commission represented by 
President Malfatti was present for the relatively short session (of one hour) that dealt with the 
Community matters the proposed Conference would have an effect on.456 From the very 
beginning, the EPC Member States thus acknowledged that there would have to be some sort 
of relationship and inclusion of the EC in the CSCE. However, this acknowledgement did not 
remove the potential for conflict over how, when and by whom such a relationship between 
EPC and the EC in the case of the CSCE would be formed, and how it would function.  
The conflict over EC and Commission participation in the CSCE epitomised the traditional 
lines of division between EPC and EC, where France continued to oppose any movement of 
the EC sphere that brought it closer to the EPC sphere. In addition, there was an external 
element to the conflict over EC and Commission participation in the CSCE. The Soviet Union 
and the Communist Eastern European countries did not recognise the EC, and from the 
beginning France in particular argued that this would be an obstacle to the inclusion of the EC 
in the CSCE. Commission President Malfatti raised the issue of the participation of the EC 
and the Commission in any form of European Security Conference in the first EPC meeting, 
which was met with 
(…) moderately welcoming noises by the Five: only France had expressed reservations (…) 
Malfatti’s proposal had considerable political implications. It was not clear that the presence 
of a Commission representative would be welcome to the eastern countries or to the Soviet 
Union. It might, therefore, prove a complicating factor in the preparatory work before any 
conference.457  
Introduced in the first EPC meeting in November 1970, the preparation for the CSCE was to 
take up more or less the all EPC capacity for the next two years.458 The first CSCE question 
the Member States approached that included the Commission was how to devise a link 
between the EC and EPC. The EPC representatives proposed establishing an EPC “sub-
group” for this purpose, which would be made up of Commission representatives and other 
experts and be subordinate to the EPC sub-committee for the CSCE, which the Commission 
would not participate in. The Commission responded to this with mild protest, which 
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achieved results and as such is evidence of the pragmatic approach the Commission was to 
take in the case of the CSCE.  
Emile Nöel noted in a letter to the French Political Director Jacques de Beaumarchais that 
attempting to limit the Commission’s presence in EPC work on the planned CSCE to “a 
simple sub-group” would cause problems.459 The pragmatic solution suggested by the 
Commission and agreed to by de Beaumarchais was simply to change the name of the group 
to either an “ad hoc group” or a “special group”, thus making its hierarchical status more 
neutral.460 And thus the Commission made its first non-offensive footprint in EPC work on 
the CSCE. The resulting ad hoc Group became the first link between the EC and EPC, which 
provided for the Commission’s entry through its representatives from the Secretariat-General. 
Admittedly, the Commission had wanted to be represented on the Political Committee and the 
CSCE sub-committee for all Community matters, but the solution of the ad hoc Group was 
acceptable to both Member States and the Commission. In time, the ad hoc Group would 
increase its importance as it and the EPC sub-committee for the CSCE grew closer 
together.461 
The creation of the ad hoc Group meant that the Commission was included in the EPC’s 
preparation for the CSCE to a certain extent, and it then turned its attention to how it could 
contribute. The Commission’s approach to EPC work on the CSCE was to frame the CSCE as 
a test case for the Member States’ commitment to the European Community. Early drafts 
from the Commission’s preparation for the CSCE reveal its initial stance and ideal 
solutions.462 From the beginning, the crystal-clear demand was that the EC be included as a 
participant in the CSCE, or else that aspects touching the EC’s competences and spheres be 
left out of the conference agenda altogether.463  
The point of departure for the Commission’s deliberations over a Conference was that the 
area of economic cooperation held great promise for improving the relationship between East 
and West. Economic cooperation could thus prove vital for the Conference’s wider goals of 
détente and cooperation. It could also work towards ending what the Commission labelled the 
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“abnormal situation” of the Eastern Bloc not recognising the EC. Regardless of this situation, 
there were already several areas of contact between the Eastern Bloc and the Western 
Europeans, and these areas also involved the Commission.464 For instance, there were 
technical agreements between the EC and several of the countries making up the Eastern Bloc 
as well as co-existence on several international arenas.465  
The Commission highlighted the EC’s Common Commercial Policy as an area that most 
definitely lay within the EC sphere. In the Commission’s view, if or when aspects touching 
these EC competences under the CCP were included in the CSCE, the participation of the EC 
would be a given. The Commission emphasised the potential of EC participation in terms of 
facilitating economic cooperation. The Commission also claimed that the inclusion of the EC 
could render the Conference more efficient. It argued that the formula for ‘success’ that the 
Commission had provided for the EC’s framework by successfully harmonising diverging 
views between the EC’s Member States could and should be used in the CSCE.466 This 
transfer of the “Community experience” would be beneficial for the efficiency of the position 
of the European Member States in the Conference, and indeed for the Conference’s overall 
efficiency.467   
The Commission argued that the CSCE was a case where the Member States had to defend 
their EC creation or face the consequences. Failing to do so could potentially harm the EC’s 
progress and aims of political unification.468 The Member States had to stand firm in their 
defence of the EC and its legitimate right to participate in the CSCE. In a period during which 
the Community was expanding and growing stronger, the CSCE would serve as a test to 
prove the Member States’ commitment to the integration project in the face of external 
opposition.469  
Initially the Commission argued that only some of the issues to be treated at the Conference 
necessitated the EC’s participation. It accepted that other areas (Basket 1 and 3 of the CSCE) 
would not require EC participation.470 In the final phase of the CSCE, however, the 
Commission also turned its interest towards the effects of the entire scope of the CSCE on 
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European unification, all baskets included.471 The Commission argued that where the EC’s 
competences were directly affected by the aspects raised by the CSCE, the Community should 
be involved at all levels by way of the existing Community procedure. In the Commission’s 
view, there should be no need to modify the EC’s existence or mode of work to comply with 
demands, neither from its own Member States nor external actors such as the Eastern Bloc.472 
The Commission would work to ensure that the first steps taken by the Member States in EPC 
constituted a thorough examination of the aspects falling under the EC’s competences.473 
Aiming to protect the EC, the Commission insisted that aspects under the EC’s competence in 
the CSCE should be dealt with by both EPC and Community institutions in a manner 
respecting the rules laid down by the Treaty.474 The Commission presented itself as providing 
the most competent link between EPC and the EC by assisting its Member States in forming 
their political direction for the CSCE.475 It offered its expertise in order to clarify and 
facilitate the Member States’ EPC discussions.476 The Commission presented its role of 
linking the EC to the EPC as ‘natural’ in the CSCE case, given the expertise it already held as 
a result of its work within the EC and the role it held in the existing relationship (albeit 
limited) between the EC and the Eastern Bloc.  
As the first priority of the Commission was to facilitate the EC’s inclusion in the CSCE, the 
question of whether this inclusion necessitated the Commission’s presence was not expressly 
stated in the early draft, although it was implied.477 The Commission adopted a long-term 
approach to the CSCE. In demanding that the commitment of the Member States to the EC be 
made visible, the Commission stated that the principle of a Community presence and 
participation in the CSCE also would have to be extended to any aftermath of the Conference. 
The Commission highlighted the need for the EC’s presence in any committees, sub-groups or 
studies launched by the Conference. It also emphasised the need to improve the EC’s present 
and future standing in the international arena.478 
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The differentiation between the EC and the Comecon constituted another element in the 
Commission’s approach to the CSCE.479 A speech given in 1970 by the Commissioner for 
external relations and trade, Ralph Dahrendorf, provides evidence of how the Commission 
foresaw the possibility that the EC might become aligned to the Comecon.480 The 
Commission distinguished the EC from the Comecon, insisting upon the fact that it 
considered both the EC and itself to be completely different and much more comprehensive 
than Comecon in every relevant aspect.481 The reason why expressing this distinction was 
important for the Commission was the possibility that both the EC and the Comecon would be 
labelled ‘international organisations’ and as such be excluded from the CSCE, which was to 
be concluded between nation states solely. Another reason was the possibility that pushing for 
EC inclusion would lead to the Eastern Bloc demanding equal participation for the Comecon. 
Although the Commission was determined in its demands on the EC’s behalf, it was also 
cautious, and not blind to the fact that pushing for EC participation might lead to retaliatory 
pushing from the other side. If the result was a strengthened Comecon, this might have the 
adverse effect of imposing less room for manoeuvre in the external sphere than had been the 
case before the CSCE on the Eastern Bloc. However, the Commission was clear on the fact 
that such negative effects would not be the result solely of demanding EC participation in the 
CSCE, but of a far more complex situation.  
The Commission’s approach developed gradually. The Commission’s initial and rather 
doctrinal formulation, stating that in the CSCE, “on Community matters only the Community 
as such can take the word”, was adjusted.482 A more moderate and pragmatic formulation 
entered into a later draft of the EC’s contribution to EPC work on the CSCE, stating that the 
procedure for participation by the Community “will be set at the appropriate time”, creating 
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room for negotiation.483 The essence of the Commission’s approach remained, however, that 
the Community had to participate in the CSCE on all EC matters, not only because of the 
legal obligations under the Treaty of Rome, but also to render the Member States’ integration 
policy convincing and credible.484 The Commission’s approach of framing the CSCE as a test 
case for the EC Member States thus continued to develop. 
5.2 Legitimating the case for the Community in the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe 
The Commission developed a distinct way of legitimising its approach. Pragmatically and 
deliberately, it also chose to legitimate EC participation by other texts than the Treaty, such as 
EPC reports and the Declaration from the Paris Summit.485 In addition, the Commission 
worked in a deliberately non-offensive manner devised not to provoke any reactions from the 
Member States.486 The process of planning the CSCE coincided chronologically with the 
planning of the EC’s Summit, which was to take place in Paris in October 1972. The 
Commission argued that the EC had a legitimate right to participate in the Summit, in EPC 
and in the CSCE.487 The Commission perceived these three arenas as parts that could 
eventually form a common foreign policy that would include “economic as well as political 
considerations of general concern to the Community and thus to the Commission.”488 Prior to 
the Paris Summit, Commission President Mansholt claimed that the Commission contribution 
had the potential to form the basis for a common EC position in the CSCE.489 
Following the Paris Summit and as the CSCE’s Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) were 
about to begin, the Commission went beyond the Treaty, basing the claim for EC participation 
in the Conference on texts formulated by the Member States outside the Community structure. 
In the Commission’s view, these texts could and indeed should be used to legitimate the EC 
and the Commission’s participation in the CSCE.490 The Commission even reached for 
legitimation within EPC itself: a report by the Political Committee of 3 October 1972 stated 
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that if Community matters were to be raised during the MPT phase of the CSCE, they would 
be discussed by the representative of the Member State holding the Presidency of the EC 
Council.491 The need to maintain a coordinated position and to reserve for the Community the 
role it required would continue during the MPT and in the conference itself. The coordination 
would be performed on the initiative of the Presidency and with Commission participation 
whenever points were raised that were unanimously deemed Community matters by the 
Member States.492 
The Commission also used point 13 of the Paris Summit Declaration to legitimise the EC’s 
right to participate in the planned CSCE: 
13. In order to promote détente in Europe, the Conference reaffirmed its determination to 
follow a common commercial policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe with effect from 
1 January, 1973; Member States declared their determination to promote a policy of co-
operation, founded on reciprocity, with these countries.  
This policy of co-operation is, at the present stage, closely linked with the preparation and 
progress of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to which the enlarged 
Community and its Member States are called upon to make a concerted and constructive 
contribution.493 
I argue that in applying the EPC Report alongside the Summit Declaration, Klaus Meyer and 
the Commission tried to offer an acceptable compromise for the manner in which the EC and 
the Commission could contribute to the CSCE. The Commission’s attempt to both make a 
compromise between national and European interests but also secure participation for the EC 
and the Commission in the CSCE shows the Commission making deliberate pragmatic 
choices. The Commission interpreted these texts as concessions made by the Member States 
conferring the legitimate right to participate in the CSCE upon the EC. Based on these 
concessions, the Commission thus found it “natural” that the Member States should publicly 
announce EC participation in the CSCE MPT, as well as indicate the areas of the Conference 
in which the EC should play a role.494  
By October 1972, the Commission was more satisfied with the manner in which it was 
included in the CSCE than it was with the general relationship between the EC and EPC. In 
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the case of the CSCE, Mansholt was quite direct in his characterisation, using the CSCE as a 
case in point for how the Commission should be included: 
(…) the Commission is not satisfied and cannot be satisfied with trailing the movement of 
political cooperation between the Member States. It must also intervene and bring in the 
required procedure whenever the Community as such is at stake. I am pleased to record that 
the Council of Foreign Ministers has always enabled the Commission to do this as is the case 
for instance over the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.495  
I argue that the Commission could not afford to take what it had achieved in the case of the 
CSCE for granted; it needed to keep on fighting to ensure that this would always be the case 
and that such a relationship would become permanent between EPC and the EC in general.  
While the Commission had clearly established what it viewed as the EC’s legitimate claim for 
representation in the CSCE, a distinct manner in which it made good this claim was also 
evident. Two examples serve to illustrate this. The first example was when the Commission 
was praised by the British in February 1972 for not “dramatizing” the Commission’s situation 
and pleas for inclusion. This implies that “drama” on the Commission’s part could have been 
expected to an extent. At the same time, a form of strategy can be deduced from this: instead 
of “dramatizing” non-inclusion at the risk of open conflict with “certain members of the 
Community” (that is, France) and the eventual conflict between Member States that might 
arise as a result, the Commission employed a “variety of ways of making its views known and 
of influencing discussion (…) without making unnecessary trouble.”496 The Commission 
stated that it was not arguing for inclusion for its own sake; the concern was that the 
Community should organise itself in such a way that it could take decisions and act as a 
community and not simply as a group of individual nations in all appropriate fields. To the 
extent that the Commission had a responsibility to work towards this end, it was felt that it 
could also claim the right to be associated as closely as possible with the necessary 
discussions and consultations.497  
The second example also reflects that the Commission’s overarching aim was the EC’s 
participation in the CSCE, and that it made sure to portray its own role in the CSCE as 
secondary. Just as the MPT phase of the CSCE was about to begin, the Commission was 
accused of behaving along more ‘traditional’ lines, meddling and pushing for inclusion just 
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for inclusion’s sake, and catering to formalistic and prestige-related considerations.498 Klaus 
Meyer defended the Commission by claiming that this was certainly not the case; rather, the 
Commission held politically legitimate concerns in the CSCE. In addition, he highlighted the 
Commission’s intentions to express these concerns in a discreet and low-key manner.499 
These two illustrations serve as evidence of the Commission’s pragmatism, in an expressed 
form which shows the deliberation behind. They illustrate that at the time of the CSCE’s 
beginnings, the Commission was perceived both in a traditional, dogmatic, and negative “old” 
manner and a pragmatic and positive “new” manner. They also provide evidence that the 
Commission wanted to be perceived as a valuable actor. According to Meyer, the elements 
that would make the EPC Member States want to include the Commission in the CSCE and in 
EPC would be its technical and economic expertise.500 
5.3 Securing a place for the Community in the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe 
The claim that the EC’s and the Commission’s participation in the CSCE had been “taken for 
granted” by February 1972 is refuted by the following analysis of the Commission’s 
continuous effort to secure a role in the CSCE for the EC and itself.501 The fact that the 
Commission participated in the EPC ad hoc group on the CSCE and met in the EPC Political 
Committee meetings when Community matters were discussed in no way ended the 
Commission’s struggle for a closer, formal association of the EC and the Commission with 
EPC work on the CSCE. As the (MPT) of the CSCE were about to begin on 22 November 
1972, the Commission continued its work on getting the EC “in”. By which formula could the 
EC be represented within the CSCE, as it was neither a state, nor a recognised actor that the 
Soviet Union would negotiate with? In the literature on the CSCE, the events of 1973 have 
more often than not been presented as both start and endpoint of the discussion and 
establishment of both the EC and the Commission in the CSCE.502 This analysis shows that a 
more nuanced picture appears if the period is extended, and the motives for and the results of 
the Commission’s approach and actions become apparent. 
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The EPC Member States valued the Commission’s contribution to keeping the Nine’s position 
coordinated from early on. This led to an indirect invitation to include a Community 
representative in the CSCE preparatory talks, even though this individual would not formally 
be attached to any delegation represented in the MPT.503 This came at a price for the Member 
States, however; the Commission’s inclusion brought the EC and EPC closer together. As a 
result of the EPC members’ invitation, on 5 January 1973 the Commission decided to send 
Maurice Schaeffer to the MPT in Helsinki as a representative of the Commission.504 This 
decision was based on the EPC (FM) meeting in The Hague of 21 November 1972, at which 
the Ministers stated that “the presence of a representative of the Community in Helsinki 
would be desirable.”505  
By January 1973, the Commission was thus somewhat reassured that the EC’s interests would 
be protected by referring to prior EPC statements.506 Although satisfactory in theory, two 
challenges still kept the Commission on guard. The first was that the inclusion of the 
Community would be up to a unanimous decision by the Member States, which meant that the 
power of defining Community competence lay in their hands.507 The second, related challenge 
was the lack of certainty of a defined and formalised role, if any, for the Commission, who as 
the guardian of the Treaty considered itself the most prominent judge of what came under 
Community competence.  
Thus the Commission took it upon itself to define what it viewed as coming under the 
Community competence, and as this definition was wide and expansionist, it shows the 
ambitions the Commission held for the EC. The Commission’s saw the Community’s 
competences that would be touched by the CSCE as falling into three categories. The first 
category encompassed issues already defined by the Treaty as Community policy, for instance 
the CCP. The second, more complex category included areas where the Community’s and the 
Member States’ competences were mixed, and the third and even more complex category was 
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the policy areas envisaged for the future of the EC in the Paris Summit.508 Here, the 
Commission was on the offensive.509 
However, when it came to considering its own role the Commission proved more pragmatic 
and less offensive than in the question of the definition of the Community’s competences. It 
sympathised with the fact that the Commission’s participation could cause problems with the 
East, and expressed its acceptance that non-participation of the Commission in the MPT was 
likely.510 However, it remained adamant in its claim that when the inclusion of the EC as such 
was secured, there had to be a place for the Commission in the work concerning Community 
matters. 
The Commission interpreted the call for a Community representative to attend the MPT as an 
offer to instate an appropriate relationship between EPC and the Commission; it simply 
assumed that what EPC defined as “a representative of the European Community” would 
equal a representative of the Commission for both Member States and the Commission. This 
was not questioned by the Member States.511 The Commission considered this moment in the 
preparatory phase for the CSCE to be opportune for sending a Commission representative, as 
the preliminary discussion up until then had covered mostly general questions concerning the 
Conference’s design; as of yet, there had been no reason for the Nine or the Commission to 
call for the use of the ‘Community’s voice’ that would be expressed by the Member State 
holding the Presidency of the Council. 512  
Thus the Commission responded pragmatically in sending Schaeffer to Helsinki and not 
pushing for more at that time. It used this as ‘leeway’ and entered the CSCE by invitation, not 
by ‘force’, even though its participation remained indirect and only half-formalised, using the 
argumentation of a test case for the EC. This is illustrated by Klaus Meyer’s emphasis on how 
The representative of the Commission is not allowed, at least for the moment, to participate in 
the Conference itself, it is essentially an effort by personal relationships that Mr. Schaeffer 
will try to obtain the information necessary to conduct his mission.513 
In Meyer’s view, Schaeffer would provide an indispensable link between the Member States 
and the Community machinery in Brussels.514 Schaeffer was selected due to his expertise: 
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fifteen years in the Commission with first-hand knowledge of all aspects of the “European 
construction”. He was described by Meyer as someone with concrete experience of the EC’s 
problems, which seemed “essential for the accomplishment of a mission where a lot of 
flexibility and pragmatism will certainly be needed.”515 During Schaeffer’s first days in 
Helsinki, he met with all of the Member States’ delegations. He also participated in a 
European coordination meeting, which meant that the Commission’s representative was de 
facto included, albeit without a formal role.516 
Nevertheless, the Member States’ intention of keeping the EC separate to EPC was not 
satisfactory in the Commission’s view.517 Based on the non-existent, or at least hesitant 
movement forward in discussions, Klaus Meyer asked the Belgian Presidency in an EPC 
Political Committee meeting on 16 January 1973 what the Presidency’s intentions were 
concerning the division of work between EPC and the Community.518 The answer was that 
the CSCE workload would remain within EPC at least for the ongoing preparatory phase to 
avoid confusion. Meyer accepted Davignon’s answer, but the situation was not considered 
satisfactory, so while it had managed to secure a foot in the door, the Commission still wanted 
more.519 
The Commission’s first priority was to find acceptable formulas for the EC’s inclusion in the 
CSCE; its second priority was to devise a formula for the Commission’s own participation in 
the CSCE. Here, the Commission flagged suggestions of its ideal solutions alongside 
suggestions that would be acceptable for the Member States.520 In doing so, it acted in line 
with its pragmatic approach to the CSCE and EPC, and at the same time managed to highlight 
the Commission’s treaty-based claims as stated by the Commission’s Legal Service without 
spurring further conflict.521 The Commission demanded an “adequate status” for the 
Commission in the CSCE, which was in line with the primary aim of securing a place for the 
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EC.522 The Commission argued that acceptable solutions existed and that there were 
precedents for formulas for participation, for instance in the UN’s ECOSOC, and if EC 
participation was acceptable in the UN, it should be acceptable in the CSCE.523   
The Commission’s approach ‘matured’ quite rapidly in the early period of 1973. Klaus Meyer 
and Emile Nöel of the SG proved vital in this process, as they balanced the more offensive 
approach of the Commission’s Legal Service with the opposition of the Member States in 
their work in the SG and EPC. In a note to the Commission President written during a pause 
in the MPT between 9 and 27 February, Klaus Meyer stated that the EC and the 
Commission’s participation now needed to be settled.524 To that end, the EPC Political 
Committee invited the Commission’s view on the subject. At this point, the Commission had 
given up upon its most favoured and ideal solution, namely that the EC would participate 
alongside and with approximately the same status as a state with its own delegation. Two 
alternative formulas remained. The first was that for the areas under Community 
competences, the EC should be represented by a Community delegation composed of the 
President of the Council and the President of the Commission, with where one of them by 
internal agreement would declare the Community’s view.525 
As it was likely that suggesting this formula would cause conflict, Klaus Meyer also provided 
a pro-et-con list for these suggestions, and the contras merit particular notice. Klaus Meyer’s 
and the Commission’s arguments against this first alternative were threefold: first, debating 
this with the Member States would prove disagreeable and unpleasant. Certain Member 
States, France in particular, would probably refuse to endorse this using the formation of 
blocs as a pretext. The Commission’s second concern was that the results of discussing this 
formula with the Eastern Bloc would be highly uncertain. If results were negative, this would 
harm the Commission’s prestige. The third argument against this formula was the 
Commission’s consideration of the possibility that it might lead to a demand for the Comecon 
to enter the CSCE in the same manner. Even though France had exaggerated the effects of 
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this, it would be counter to the Commission’s interest if demands for Comecon participation 
came as a result of a Commission proposal.526    
For the first formula, the pros were also threefold. First, in a Community delegation the EC 
would be represented approximately as required by the Treaty, even though the Legal Service 
later objected that even this was too minimalist.527 The second argument was that as a 
Community delegation would be instated on the highest level of the CSCE, this should also be 
applicable on the lower levels, and would indeed give the Commission the role of speaking 
for the Community in all subsequent CSCE work and, importantly, in the realm of the EC’s 
CCP. The third argument in favour was that this formula would contribute to the 
normalisation the relationship between the East and the EC.  
The second formula, which was not ideal but still acceptable to the Commission, was that the 
declarations proposed in the name of the Community would be made by a representative of 
the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council, dropping the Commission’s 
President, but still made expressly in the name of the EC. This formula could be applied on a 
unilateral basis, so that there would be no demands for agreement with the East, which would 
be necessary if the Commission was present.528  
For this proposal, too, there was a pro-et-con list. At the top of the list in favour of this second 
alternative was the fact that this would evade any discussion with the Member States on the 
“role of the Commission” at the highest level of the CSCE. Traces of the Commission’s non-
offensive approach are also evident here. Second was the fact that this formula would require 
no agreement with the East. Third, it would give Comecon no ammunition for its demands, 
and fourth, it would enable the Commission to focus its work upon facilitating the 
negotiations between the Nine to forge common positions.529 As a reason against the second 
alternative, the Commission argued that if this formula were followed it would be applied on 
all levels, and the Commission would thus find itself excluded from the entire Conference, 
including for elements relevant to the EC’s CCP. This alternative would thus go against the 
Treaty. As such, following this formula would set a very visible and dangerous precedent for 
the external representation of the Community, to the extent that the Commission would risk 
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exclusion in in the EC sphere from what by now seemed a set external role for the 
Commission.530  
While the Commission accepted the second alternative, which the EPC meeting of Foreign 
Ministers had already spoken in favour of, it now turned its energy to combat some of the 
potentially detrimental effects of this formula. The Commission had contributed to finding an 
acceptable solution for the inclusion of the EC in the CSCE, but continued to demand 
Commission presence to keep this inclusion in line with the Treaty.531 In a Political 
Committee meeting in March 1973, an exchange between the Commission’s representative 
Emile Nöel and the French Political Director François Puaux was illustrative of the 
Commission’s approach.532 This discussion is also a good example of how the Commission 
participated in the EPC Political Committee. It engaged in discussions and presented its views 
alongside and in opposition to the Member States, which gives evidence of the Commission 
making use of the EPC Political Committee as a place where the EC and the EPC machineries 
met.  
In this meeting, the discussion focused on the formula for EC inclusion in the CSCE. The 
Commission differentiated between what it saw as an acceptable formula for the MPT and a 
formula for the following phases of the CSCE, including whether or not a declaration would 
be made expressly in the name of the EC.533 France continued to oppose the Commission, 
claiming that the formula adopted for the MPT was sufficient and no changes or even new 
deliberations were necessary. This discussion shows both the continuing French opposition, 
the relentless manner in which the Commission still pursued this issue, as well as the 
Commission’s continuing pragmatism in not wanting to enter into a ‘full-blown’ 
confrontation over this. The French Political Director opposed the Commission’s proposal of 
a declaration made in the name of the Community during the upcoming first phase of the 
CSCE, claiming that it would only provoke a reaction on the part of the Soviet Union to the 
effect that it would call for the participation of the Comecon.534 The French also claimed that 
it was unnecessary to take up the question of which formula the Community’s participation in 
the CSCE would follow yet again, as the formula in which the EC’s presence would be stated 
by the country holding the EC Presidency had already been decided by the Ministers in 
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November 1972. The Italian Political Director objected to the first point in line with the 
Commission’s view: it was unlikely that actions on the part of the Nine declaring the 
Community’s interest in the CSCE would tip the scales and reinforce the status of the 
Comecon.  
Emile Nöel first protested that the Commission had been excluded from the examination of 
this question, contrary to the EPC Political Committee’s express decision, as its note of 13 
February had been discussed in the CSCE subgroup and not the CSCE ad hoc group. For the 
Commission, it was important to emphasise that a potential declaration made in the name of 
the EC would not state merely that the Community existed and that it held certain 
competences. The declaration would rather emphasise the EC’s contribution in the CSCE as 
stated in the Paris Summit’s Declaration point 13, in order to build constructive relationships 
between East and West. In the Commission’s view, a simple declaration of procedure would 
thus not be sufficient, as this would correspond neither with political reality nor the political 
role of the EC.535 As for the potential for provoking calls for Comecon participation, the 
Commission, while not dismissing this potential, urged for political courage on the part of the 
Member States. Their commitment to the EC demanded that they should not be silent or 
refrain from mentioning the existence of the Community for fear of the consequences.  
On the question of representation, the Commission argued that the Community should be 
represented as outlined in the Treaty’s articles 113 and 228. This would mean that for some 
sessions the Nine would act as the EC as such and that the EC would speak with one voice: 
the Commission’s. The Commission had already accepted that that the EC would not speak 
with the Commission’s voice on the highest level of the CSCE. By doing so, the Commission 
had removed the aspect of potential calls for Comecon participation used as a pretext by the 
French. In the following work in the CSCE’s sub-committees, however, the Commission 
demanded that the formula of Community representation through the Commission as its 
single voice should apply in order to conform to the Treaty.536 
Launching yet another French pretext for not including the Commission, Political Director 
Puaux retorted that this work in the CSCE would not include negotiations, which were 
explicitly mentioned in the Treaty’s Articles 113 and 228, but simply discussions to define 
new directions within the economic relations between the East and the West. Nöel responded 
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that the Community procedures were not limited to negotiations, but also, by interpreting the 
Treaty more extensively, applicable in exploratory conversations and preparatory talks, and 
thus the entire remit of the CSCE.537 As the Commission was the Guardian of the Treaty, in 
its interpretation the Community must be represented as such with the Commission as its 
spokesman. This continued insistence angered the EPC Member States, not only the 
French.538 The result was a compromise: for the CSCE MPT phase, the second alternative of a 
declaration made on behalf of the Community by the representative of the Member State 
holding the EC Presidency was chosen, while the matter of the formulas for the following 
phases of the CSCE was postponed to be agreed later.539 
As a result of this compromise, on 7 June 1973, in the last days of the preparations for the 
CSCE, the very first declaration on behalf of the Community establishing the EC’s legitimate 
involvement in the CSCE was made by the Belgian Representative in Helsinki:   
The draft mandate for the Economic Committee embraces matters which come under the 
EEC’s [sic] jurisdiction to which belong the nine countries sharing in the preliminary 
discussion proceedings of the Conference. The Community will be involved according to its 
authority and both the negotiation procedure itself and the possible outcome will hinge on the 
Community agreement.540 
Although the compromise that constituted this Belgian declaration had been agreed upon, the 
French still voiced their discontent and continuous opposition to interference between the 
EPC and the EC spheres, stating that no one could or should “speak on behalf of Europe”.541 
As such, French opposition continued and even though the declaration was made, the EC’s 
position in relation to EPC and the CSCE continued to be less than certain. This shows that 
the French approach was becoming increasingly reluctant, as France initially had agreed to 
the Belgian declaration but later continued to complain. Nevertheless, this declaration marked 
the beginning of the EC’s participation in the CSCE. Admittedly, the role for the Commission 
in the CSCE was still pending a decision.   
The chosen formula for including the EC in the CSCE reappeared in the opening statements 
of the first phase of the CSCE conference in Helsinki on the 3 July 1973 where, following the 
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institutionalised change of presidency every six months, Denmark now held the Presidency. 
On behalf of the Community, the Danish Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Council 
declared:  
As was indicated by the Belgian delegate at the end of the preliminary multinational 
discussions, the draft mandate for the economic Committee comprises subjects which are 
within the competence of the European Economic Community, to which nine of the States 
taking part in this conference belong. This relates more especially to questions of trade, in 
relation to which the Community conducts a common policy.  
These nine States have therefore also examined the mandate in relation to trade 
matters in their capacities as members of the European Economic Community. I am in a 
position to confirm the agreement regarding this mandate in the name of the Community.  
At the same time, I wish to draw the attention of participants to the fact that, 
depending on the subjects concerned, the Community may be implicated as such in the future 
work of the conference, in conformity with its own procedures and competences; and that the 
possible results flowing from negotiations on these subjects will depend on agreement with the 
Community.  
I would also recall the intention of the Community and its member States, expressed 
by the heads of State or government of these States, at the conference held in Paris last 
October, to make a concerted and constructive contribution to the conduct of the 
conference.542 
5.4 Fighting to gain entrance for the Commission in the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe 
The question of the Commission’s status in the CSCE resurfaced with full force after 3 July 
1973. The Commission’s stance was by now formulated in a manner conducive to 
compromise with the Member States. The second phase of the Conference, in which several 
diverse Committees and sub-committees would begin their work on preparing the final 
documents for the Conference, was about to begin in September 1973. The work in these sub-
committees would touch on areas within Community competence as a result of their mandate. 
It was recognised early on that this was particularly the case for the sub-committee of 
“Commercial exchanges”. Here EC competence was most evident due to the EC’s CCP. This 
was also where the Commission’s efforts on applying a Community procedure had been 
focused, although it never excluded that the same could be applicable for other sub-
committees of the CSCE.  
The Commission was satisfied with what it already had achieved in the declarations in the 
name of the EC at the CSCE. This flexible method of the Nine acting both as nation-states but 
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also able to “transform into the EC” when necessary had multiple advantages and should be 
retained for the future in the Commission’s view.543 However, in the case of the CSCE areas 
that touched on the CCP, the Commission demanded that a Community procedure be applied. 
This would require a representative of the Commission participating in the work of the 
CSCE’s sub-committee “Commercial exchanges”, able to intervene in the name of the 
Community.544 The Commission’s insistence on this had angered and continued to anger the 
Member States, and an acceptable solution needed to be found.  
How could the Commission’s representative, who was not formally included in the CSCE as a 
participant, take the floor in the Conference? A balance needed to be struck between what the 
Commission viewed as acceptable in line with the Treaty and a solution acceptable to the 
Member States, some of whom continued to have misgivings concerning the Commission’s 
inclusion and feared reactions from the Eastern Bloc. The Commission justified its demands 
by claiming that its approach would facilitate a normalisation of the relationship between the 
EC and the Eastern Bloc/Soviet Union. In the Commission’s view, since no participants in the 
CSCE had objected to the Belgian or Danish statement on the legitimate involvement of the 
EC based on the competences it held, this would be a safe road to take.  
Accordingly, the Commission outlined a practical solution where the Commission’s 
representative could be present at the discussion table of the sub-committee “Commercial 
exchanges”. The Commission’s representative should be seated next to the Member State 
representative holding the Presidency of the Council. When the Commission had something 
to say for the Community, the delegate of the state holding the Presidency would announce 
that the Commission’s representative would speak on behalf of the Community. This formula 
was accepted; the national delegation holding the EC Presidency spoke, briefly introduced the 
subject, and invited the Commission’s representative to speak, who provided for the 
substance.545 This solution respected the Treaty provisions on Community procedures for 
negotiations, particularly Article 113, which covered the possibility of the Commission 
intervening as the spokesperson for the Community. Thus the question of whether or not the 
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Commission would be included was settled, although the issue of exactly how this could be 
managed remained.546 
The decision on the Commission’s presence was taken by the EPC meeting of Foreign 
Ministers on 10-11 September 1973. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, Commission 
President Ortoli played a decisive role in this meeting in devising the final solution that was in 
line with the Commission’s stated interest.547 When it came to the case of Community 
competences, the Member States, referring to the Danish statement of 3 July 1973, judged the 
participation of a representative of the Commission in the meetings of the CSCE’s second 
basket to be appropriate. This participation was particularly important for but not limited to 
the sub-committee on “Commercial exchange”.548  
The solution that proved acceptable for both the Commission and the Member States and that 
rendered potential repercussions from the Eastern Bloc unlikely was that of including the 
Commission’s representatives in the delegation list of the country holding the Presidency. The 
Commission representatives would thus be able to express Community viewpoints insofar as 
Community powers and procedures required it. These provisions were also officially 
recognised by the Council of the Communities and quickly applied in the CSCE’s work in 
Geneva.549 And so the meticulous, detailed and difficult work in the CSCE’s sub-committees 
could begin with the EC participating through the Commission.550  
The other parties to the CSCE duly accepted this formula and it did not lead to increased 
demands for Comecon participation.551 However, what Klaus Meyer referred to as a small 
“guerre des nerfs” took place.552 When the Danish representatives were questioned about the 
list of representatives in its national delegation that were not Danish but from the 
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Commission, they defended the Commission and the EC.553 This was very much to the 
Commission’s satisfaction and serves as evidence that the framing of the CSCE as a test case 
for the commitment of the Member States to the EC had very much succeeded in spite of 
initial and to a certain degree continuing opposition from the French. This is seen not least in 
the unproblematic manner in which the Commission’s representatives became part of the 
French delegation when the French held the Presidency in the second half of 1974.554  
And thus the more detailed work of the CSCE’s second phase commenced, with the explicit 
presence of the Commission defended by its Member States. Both the Commission itself and 
the Member States saw the workings of the formula positively as it increased the coordination 
between the Nine and strengthened the EC.555 Soon after the decisions of September 1973 and 
the start of the second phase of the CSCE, the Commission had come to see its own presence 
in the CSCE meetings as just like that of any other delegate; interventions made by the 
Commission’s representatives on behalf of the Community were commonplace and happened 
“every day”.556  
In addition, the Commission was satisfied as the formula for sub-committee “Commercial 
exchanges” also expanded to other sub-committees.557 This was positive for the 
Commission’s wider aims of EPC participation, protecting the EC, linking the EC to EPC and 
shaping EPC, and presents evidence of two aspects. The Commission’s attempts to be 
included had worked in practice, and in addition the Member States saw the usefulness of the 
Commission’s expertise; it was thus included in other sub-committees and other EPC bodies 
it previously had been excluded from. The first time this happened was when the Commission 
representative spoke in the “Environment” sub-committee.558 Klaus Meyer promptly and 
proudly remarked that the Commission now had had left the “ghetto of commercial policy” 
and expanded its scope to other policy areas in which it held expertise, speaking on behalf of 
the EC.559 In all the sub-committees where the Commission was represented, its 
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representatives had spoken and contributed in a constructive manner by May 1974, except in 
the sub-committee of “Energy”, which in the Commission’s own view was regrettable.560  
Nevertheless, by May 1974 the overall atmosphere in the Political Committee was not the 
best due to the overall status of the work on the CSCE, the EAD and the problems with the 
Americans. Klaus Meyer noted that EPC “discussions were long, muddy [vaseuses] and 
sometimes irritated.”561 In contrast to this bleak picture of EPC in general, the work in the 
CSCE’s Second Basket was successful. To a certain degree this was facilitated by the 
contribution of the Commission and the Nine.562 The success was so great that in May 1974, 
as work in the other CSCE areas neared total stagnation, a Commission representative to the 
CSCE remarked that if necessary, they could work a bit more slowly.563 
5.5 Successfully protecting the Community – the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe’s Final Act 
Despite the participation in the CSCE it had achieved by 1974 the Commission was relentless 
in its work at ‘keeping its foot in the door’, and never took its own presence or that of the EC 
for granted. This was seen not least as the Nine were about to begin examining the questions 
of the Final Act of the CSCE, finding an approach to the follow-up to the CSCE. The 
Commission continued to insist that both these elements were essential to the EC’s interest.  
The Commission was proactive and showed its capability to plan long term both in the 
insertion of the EC in the CSCE’s Final Act and in its consideration of the implications the 
Conference’s “suites” might have.564 However, it did not manage to be formally included in 
EPC work on the CSCE’s ‘suites’. The Commission envisaged that the Community’s 
competences could change and encompass more than they already did, and that for this reason 
also the EC should be included in the Final Act. 565 This is evidence of the Commission being 
pre-emptive rather than reactionary. In the Commission’s view, the EC as such had to mark 
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its agreement with the CSCE’s conclusions that concerned the EC due to its competences in 
addition to its Member States participating in the Conference.566 For the Commission it was 
thus of the utmost importance that the Community was included expressly in the Final Act of 
the CSCE and not just by implication.567 If the Final Act only mentioned National States, this 
could create a gap in the rights and commitments that already came or would in future come 
under the Community’s competences.568 Indeed, such an exclusion of the EC might lead to an 
impingement of the development of the EC, as external agreements could have an adverse 
effect on the EC and its relationship with its Member States in the future.569 In December 
1974, the Commission continued to stress the importance of having the EC inserted in the 
final documents in an appropriate manner in order to safeguard the policy-specific aspects of 
the Common Commercial Policy that were also dealt with by the CSCE.570 In addition, the 
Commission wanted to safeguard the ongoing and (in the Commission’s view) ever-
expanding political unification of the EC.571  
The work on the ‘suites’ of the Conference was gathering momentum by March 1975. Klaus 
Meyer sought the Commission’s inclusion in this ongoing work on the basis of the EC’s 
interests:  
It will of course only be possible for the Commission to bring out properly all considerations 
relating to the Community and to slot them properly into the overall context given regular 
participation in the relevant deliberations of the Nine.572 
As had been the case before, the French continued to create problems for the Commission, 
more along the lines of dragging their feet than actually terminating the proposals. The 
Commission continued to fight the French and at this instance the Commission was supported 
by the Italians.573 The Commission’s Klaus Meyer intervened in the EPC’s Political 
Committee to make sure that the discussion on the ‘suites’ would take into account the pros 
and cons of the alternatives to the ‘suites’ presented for “European unification”.574 In the 
Commission’s view, by this point certain questions discussed in the First Basket could also 
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have repercussions for the European unification and the creation of a European Union. As the 
Commission was not represented in these discussions, it leaned on the Italian Political 
Director in the Political Committee to make suggestions for some sort of a general 
‘disclaimer’ for European unification.575  
By May 1975, the discussions on the process of inserting the EC into the Final Act of the 
CSCE had been limited to “bits and pieces” in the EPC CSCE group and in COREPER, and 
following this slow progress, Meyer asserted that it would be useful for President Ortoli to 
emphasise this matter, which the Commission already had discussed at length with the EPC 
Foreign Ministers.576 This proved an efficient approach, and Meyer provided Ortoli with 
everything he needed for the argument and thus contributing to the final formulation of what 
became the first part of the Moro declaration.577 President Ortoli thus went on to reaffirm the 
Commission’s longstanding request for including the EC in the Final Act of the CSCE based 
on previous work done by the Commission in the EPC Foreign Ministers’ meeting.578  
Ortoli focused particularly on the subject of the declaration to be made in the EC’s name by 
the representative of the Member State holding the EC Presidency. Although to Klaus 
Meyer’s surprise these points initially were approved without question by the Foreign 
Ministers, a second round of deliberations in which certain Member States stated their 
discontent was necessary. Meyer himself attributed the initial acceptance to “absent- 
mindedness and the absence of experts” in the meeting, and with good reason questioned 
whether this decision would stand.579 Notwithstanding these problems, in Moro’s declaration 
the Commission’s formulations were evident in three points: firstly and most importantly, a 
statement that the EC’s competences necessitated the Community’s acceptance of the final 
conclusions of the CSCE; this acceptance duly was given. Secondly, a clarification of the 
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June, 1975. For the Commission’s longstanding previous work for inclusion see HAEU, KM-50, Document du 
travail, Document final de la CSCE (implications pour la Communauté Européenne), 13 May 1974; HAEU, 
KM-50, Insertion de la Communauté Européenne dans la phase finale de la CSCE, 16 December; HAEU, KM-
51, Insertion de la Communauté Européenne dans la phase finale de la CSCE, 13 January, 1975. 
579 HAEU, KM-51, KSZE, 27 May, 1975. 
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term “Participating State”, which should also apply to the EC. Thirdly and lastly, the 
inclusion of a disclaimer that the CSCE’s Final Act in no way should hinder present or future 
European integration.580  
The fact that some of the CSCE work had been moved to the Community machinery did not 
end the conflict between the EC and EPC completely, as Klaus Meyer noted on 7 July 1975 
when agreement over the text of the declaration to be made in the EC’s name in the CSCE’s 
final phase finally was reached. Meyer had endured long and difficult negotiations over this, 
amounting to over 24 hours in total.581 The Moro declaration formulated for the signing of the 
CSCE’s Final Act on 1 August 1975 consisted of two parts. The first part of the declaration 
was a statement of the EC’s agreement to the conclusions of the CSCE, which the double 
signature of Aldo Moro would represent. The second part of the declaration consisted of a 
‘disclaimer’ made in order to protect the EC and future integration from the effects of the 
CSCE.  
The Commission considered it “appropriate” that the work on the Final Act concerning the 
participation of the EC in the CSCE was treated in the EC machinery, as the EPC machinery 
held no jurisdiction over this area.582 There are indications that certain EPC Member States 
were not satisfied with this; however, they had to go along with it and finally came to an 
agreement.583 Still, evidence of movement in EPC’s relationship towards the EC can be seen 
in the fact that the EPC Political Committee even went to the lengths of strengthening the 
formulations to protect the EC in the ‘disclaimer’ that formed the last part of the Moro 
declaration. Here the formulation on how the results of the CSCE changed from should “not 
affect” to “not impede” on European unification.584 The Commission had thus acted to 
influence the disclaimer also, although it was not formally included in the work concerning 
this area.585 In the end, the result was satisfactory to the Commission.586 
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The declaration made by Aldo Moro upon signing the CSCE’s Final Act on 1 August 1975 is 
an important piece of evidence of how the EC machinery succeeded in coming closer to the 
EPC machinery through the relentless work of the Commission. The Moro declaration 
consisted of formulations that bore the marks of Community institutions such as the 
Commission and COREPER, as well as of the EPC Political Committee. Nevertheless, 
opposition towards moving the EPC and the EC spheres closer together was not eliminated 
completely. By the time of the Moro declaration, however, this opposition been reduced to 
mere foot dragging, and closer cooperation between the EC and EPC had been facilitated.  
One feature that became evident was that the Commission’s battle for EC and Commission 
inclusion in the CSCE amounted to a deliberate and pragmatic ‘two-step’ process. The 
Commission thus ‘put first things first’: it secured agreement for some form of inclusion, and 
then turned to hammering out the detailed formulas acceptable to all parties. In this work it is 
evident that the Commission’s SG performed the difficult balancing act of keeping within the 
treaty-based provisions as insisted upon dogmatically by the Commission’s own Legal 
Service, while at the same time pragmatically inserting acceptable versions of this into the 
Commission’s discussions with the EPC Member States.  
An explanation of the CSCE in terms of the Conference developing into a bureaucratic project 
can also be used to explain the successful work of the Commission.587 The main strengths and 
assets that the Commission could contribute to EPC were its administrative and technical 
expertise related to EC matters and its experience from the EC sphere of negotiating with the 
Member States and arriving at acceptable compromises. But here, too, personal experience 
and efforts must also be highlighted. The ‘collective memory’ of the European side resided in 
a few individuals from the Commission who worked with these cases throughout, unlike the 
national representatives. Here, the names of Nöel and Meyer stand out as vital in resolving the 
Commission’s claim for EC and Commission participation in the CSCE.  
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6. Finally bridging the divide? The 
Commission and the Euro-Arab Dialogue 
This chapter establishes how the Commission successfully claimed a role for the EC in the 
Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) and managed to make the Dialogue a joint venture between the 
EC and EPC. The basis for this result was the expertise the Commission had gained through 
its treaty-based mandate and a range of previous EC initiatives. This expertise made the 
Commission’s contribution to the functioning of the EAD extremely valuable, and the 
Commission became an important actor in the EAD as a result. This chapter’s main argument 
is that in the case of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Commission managed to bridge the divide 
between the EC and EPC.  
From its inception in December 1973, the EAD was a highly political initiative aimed at 
establishing comprehensive relations between the Nine and Arab states. Over time and as the 
result of external pressure from the US, the EAD became less political and turned into a 
regional dialogue between the Nine and the Arab region that consisted mostly of economic 
cooperation. Still, the EAD represented an unprecedented achievement of EPC. This was the 
first time the EPC Members had spoken with one voice about the Middle East on the 
international scene.588 
By 1975, the Commission led the European delegation in two out of seven EAD Working 
Groups: trade and agricultural and rural development.589 The present chapter establishes how 
the Commission maintained a secure position for the European delegation in the EAD within 
the EPC formula, representing the EC on the highest level of the EAD side by side with the 
EPC Presidency representative. In addition to participating in the EAD and protecting the EC 
and its policies, the Commission also managed to shape the content and results of the EAD. 
By 1976, as the Commission co-chaired the first meeting on the EAD’s highest level, the 
important role of the Commission in the EAD brought the EPC sphere closer to the EC 
sphere.  
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6.1 The basis for the Commission’s role in the Euro-Arab Dialogue – 
previous initiatives and expertise acquired in the Community sphere  
Prior to the EAD, the Commission had established relations with the region that the EAD 
would encompass. These relations were based on balancing the two sides in the Middle East 
conflict, Israel and the Arabs.590 A commercial trade agreement had existed between the EEC 
and Israel since 1964.591 The first initiative to establish formal relations between the Arab 
League and the Commission came from the Arab side as early as 1962.592 Prior to this, most 
of the Arab League countries had been hostile towards the EEC and seen it as a Western “néo-
colonialiste” instrument.593 Since 1962 however, the Arab League countries’ economic 
interests led them to shift to a more positive view, and the Arab League itself encouraged a 
change in its member states’ attitude towards the Community.594 During the 1960s the 
Commission had evaluated the Arab League, and by 1969 had concluded that the League 
constituted an international organisation which it was the Commission’s job to maintain 
relations with along the lines covered by the Rome Treaty’s Article 229.595   
The basis for the role of the Commission in the EAD lay in its treaty-based mandate as 
established in Chapter two, as well as in the Commission’s previous work in the sphere of the 
EC, where it had initiated development aid, refugee aid, a comprehensive common policy 
towards the region of the Mediterranean and a common energy policy. 
6.1.1 The Commission as an actor in Community development cooperation policy  
Development and cooperation with third countries as a developing policy area fell under the 
Commission’s treaty-based competences, as it was characterised by commercial and 
economic ties between countries. As such, it was an area that, as it expanded, could offer the 
Commission a greater role in the EC’s external relations. The Commission played a vital role 
by initiating an EC development and cooperation policy in 1971 to replace the incoherent 
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development instruments that already were in use on the EC level.596 The regions of the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East among others were areas at which the EC’s instruments 
for aid, development and cooperation would be directed.  
Participants have emphasised that the Commission’s role in the field of development policy 
was conventional in the sense that it held the right to launch initiatives, issued proposals and 
implemented the decisions made.597 The Commission’s role was also entrepreneurial as it 
built the EC’s development policy through perseverance and pragmatism, launching 
“intelligent and courageous initiatives at the politically opportune moment”.598 The 
establishment of an EC development policy would, in the Commission’s words, “enable the 
Community to shoulder its responsibilities with greater coherence and efficiency as a large 
economic entity with a political role to play”.599 This resembles the Commission’s approach 
to EPC. 
Food aid was the first instance of Community aid that was not linked to specific countries. 
This food aid was related to the EC having signed the International Food Aid Convention 
(IFAC), which implied commitments on the part of the Community. This instrument 
facilitated aid to countries with which the EC had no cooperation agreements, as was the case 
for many of the countries in the region the EAD would encompass. The early Palestinian 
refugee aid and aid to Egypt before 1972 was founded on this instrument, and constituted an 
early instance of EPC reaching out to the Commission so it could contribute its expertise.600 
This aid was based on the Deniau plan of May 1972. 
6.1.2 Aid to Palestinian Refugees – The Deniau plan of May 1972 
Through the existing development policy instrument of food aid, the EC began its aid to the 
Palestinians through the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine 
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refugees in the near East) in 1971.601 In November 1971, the EPC foreign ministers instructed 
the EPC Political Committee to continue the work on aiding Palestinian refugees. The 
Commission was asked to propose details on this issue.602 Commissioner Jean-François 
Deniau presented the plan for the EPC Nine Foreign Ministers on 27 May 1972.603 Deniau 
aimed at a limited response, a plan that was “real, possible and useful”.604 The plan was meant 
to be neutral, and was not bound up with a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The Deniau plan was seen as having “a symbolic impact in the humanitarian field, and would 
establish a Community presence.”605  
Following Deniau’s presentation of the plan, the reactions of the EPC foreign ministers were 
related to the issues of how to finance the measures, whether this should be an EC or an EPC 
venture, and that these matters needed to be treated with care and the utmost discretion. More 
surprising was the fact that there were also calls for more comprehensive efforts, claiming 
that Deniau’s plan was not wide-ranging enough. Deniau was asked whether there were any 
proposals for a wider peace plan that the Ministers could discuss, more along the lines of 
previous proposals from Munich in November 1970.606 These calls for more comprehensive 
efforts are rather interesting, as there was nothing else to indicate that the Commission could 
or would be allowed to initiate peace plans for the Middle East at this time, a task quite far 
removed from the Commission’s role in EPC. Deniau pointed out that a more comprehensive 
approach would be dependent on a peace settlement and was thus not possible for the time 
being.607 
The meeting settled without any objections that, with the help of the Commission, proposals 
for action on urgent aid should be presented by July 1972. The Luxembourg Presidency 
represented by foreign minister Gaston Thorn who led this meeting repeatedly emphasised 
discretion; nothing should be said either to the press or the public, EPC should “do good by 
stealth”.608 However, Deniau spoke to the press during a break in the meeting, revealing what 
had been discussed and thus breaching the EPC confidential code of conduct. This fuelled 
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EPC hostility towards the Commission. Deniau was strongly criticised by the EPC Foreign 
Ministers and was made to apologise.609 The incident also served as ammunition to continue 
to keep EPC separate from the EC sphere.610 
Nevertheless, in contributing its expertise in the field of development policy through the 
Deniau plan, the Commission gained a position in which it was allowed partial participation 
in the EPC meetings of the Political Committee and the Working Groups assigned to these 
questions.611 In the EC sphere, the Deniau-plan resulted in the agreement of a “Special 
Action” between the EC and the UNRWA signed on 18 December 1972, to last three years, 
aimed at supplying both foodstuff and money.612 In time the Deniau plan would be 
encompassed by the EC Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), which formed the most 
substantial part of the EC and the Commission’s legitimation as participants in the EAD.613 
6.1.3 The Global Mediterranean Policy of September 1972  
The Global Mediterranean Policy that was adopted by the EC Council of Ministers in 
November 1972 was designed to provide the EC with a framework for bilateral trade as well 
as financial and technical agreements with a range of Mediterranean countries. The GMP had 
been adopted on the basis of a proposal from the Commission from 27 September 1972 in 
keeping with the Community method.614 The concrete proposals for each country were to be 
prepared at a later stage; the Commission had set January 1974 as the point where new 
agreements should be put into effect, by which time the planning for the EAD was 
underway.615 The legal basis for the GMP agreements was the Treaty of Rome’s Article 238 
on Community association with third countries. By contrast, the EAD initiative entailed wide-
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ranging cooperation in the form of a dialogue of two regions: the EPC/EC Nine and the Arab 
states organised through the Arab League.616  
During the 1960s, a range of agreements between the EC and several Mediterranean states 
had been concluded to the extent that by the end of 1972, the EC already had associations or 
commercial agreements with some of the countries that the GMP and the EAD would come to 
encompass.617 The diversity of these existing agreements and dissatisfaction with the EC’s 
incoherent approach to the region formed the background for the Commission’s initiative for 
the GMP. The GMP was initially directed towards 17 Mediterranean countries: Albania, 
Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, 
Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Some were not interested in cooperation with 
the EC, which resulted in the GMP being directed mostly at the Arab states of the 
Mediterranean region.618  
The commercial interests of the European countries constituted an important motive, as the 
Mediterranean region represented a very important outlet for the EC in terms of exports, equal 
to the US and Japanese market added together.619 A more coherent Mediterranean policy was 
considered in the interest of several of the EC’s Member States, especially France and Italy, 
due to their agricultural competition with many of these states. Energy and the European 
states’ dependence on oil was an indirect factor that can explain the emergence of the GMP, 
since the European countries imported oil from the producers in the area. This factor only 
became more important as the 1970s wore on, as did the aim of securing the Mediterranean – 
the shipping route from the oil producers in the Middle East to Europe.620 
The GMP as proposed by the Commission had three main targets. The first was to establish a 
free trade area in industrialised goods between the EC and each of the GMP countries. The 
second target, in line with the existence of the CAP that made an agricultural free trade area 
impossible, was that agricultural trade between the EC and the Mediterranean countries would 
see some concessions on the part of the EC through a reduction in custom duties. The third 
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target of the GMP was to initiate cooperation the fields of technical and industrial areas in 
addition to aid given to the less developed countries.621 
The intention to extend EC presence in the region was undisputable from 1972, and the 
political and economic rationales for the GMP that this presence was based on were placed 
under Community competences.622 The potentiality for overlaps between the GMP and any 
EPC initiative towards the region was noted within the EC machinery quite early on, and 
notably so before the move towards initiating an EAD in December 1973:  
(…) we are dealing here with a question with which – at least in regard to the economic 
aspects – the Community has had to deal under its own terms of reference even before the 
Member States decided to consider it under the Davignon procedure.  
From the foregoing it is clear to what extent Community activities and intra-governmental 
political consultation not only overlap: in terms of content they are inextricably linked (albeit 
not formally speaking).623 
6.1.4 Necessary Progress in Community Energy Policy, October 1972  
Before the oil crisis of 1973 occurred, the Commission proposed several initiatives for 
creating a new form of relationship between the Mediterranean and Arab region in order to 
protect European energy-related interests.624 Prior to the Paris Summit, on 4 October 1972 the 
Commission initiative of “Necessary progress in community energy policy” was released. 
This initiative was based the work on agreements for a Community energy policy that had 
been ongoing since 1964.625 The Commission claimed that the energy policy context had 
altered considerably since 1969, which made a new strategy necessary.626 This 1972 initiative 
contained aspects that resembled the later Euro-Arab Dialogue, including consultation with 
the oil-exporting countries and economic assistance for the purpose of social development.627 
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The gain on the European side lay of course in the potential for guaranteed oil supplies at 
stable prices.  
Through the new energy strategy, the Commission also set out its vision for a Community 
foreign policy based on commercial, economic and cooperative elements. A Community 
foreign policy “had to pay more regard than hitherto to its increasing dependence on energy 
imports”. It should have as its guiding principles the regularisation of relationships, and the 
securing of maximum cooperation with both third countries and regions.628 By this time, the 
Community had become increasingly dependent on supplies of energy from non-member 
states. The Commission considered the increasing import of oil as the main reason why 
progress in the field of Community energy policy was necessary: the export of hydrocarbons 
from the Arab League countries to the EC constituted 85.6% of their total export in 1970, and 
rose to 93.9% in 1976.629 
The interdependence of the two regions necessitated economic cooperation in many areas. 
The Commission’s choice of instruments for these challenges encompassed not only the 
energy sector as its aim was to help the oil exporters’ economies “get on their feet”.630 
Framed as ‘necessary progress’ towards a Community energy policy, the Commission 
believed this economic cooperation should take the form of a consultative procedure. By 
sending groups of industrialists from the Community to the exporting countries and vice 
versa, both sides would contribute to identifying practical ways of economic cooperation.631 
In addition, the EC should negotiate cooperation agreements through which the Community 
would promote the economic and social development of the exporting countries by providing 
of technical and financial assistance, also opening up markets for these countries’ industrial 
and agricultural products.632 According to the Commission, the exporting countries and the 
EC should aim to agree to rules and guarantees for their mutual economic relations.633 
It seems that in 1972 the Commission foresaw the possibility of oil being used as a weapon 
against Europe, as reference was made to the potential for the exporting countries to “exploit 
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the situation by limiting output and raising prices”.634 This was exactly what happened in the 
oil shock of 1973, which followed the events of the war in the Middle East in October 1973 
and the European response to this, which was made within the EPC framework. The energy 
initiative continued to be framed within the EC machinery, unlike to the oil shock and the 
conflict in the Middle East that the EPC machinery attempted to handle.635  
6.2 European Political Cooperation and the Middle East – the long and 
winding road to a Euro-Arab Dialogue  
The EPC approach to the Middle East went from political to economic, while the Arabs 
increasingly wanted to politicise the relationship.636 Eventually, the Euro-Arab Dialogue 
ended up somewhere in between.  
The period of the late 1960s and early 1970s had seen some important “shifts” in allegiance 
towards the parties in the Middle East conflict, which added to an already complex situation 
that also affected the relations between the Europeans and the US.637 The French feared that a 
global war might erupt in the Middle East; in any event, the Middle Eastern conflict 
threatened French interests such as the Maghreb.638 Following the Six Day War in 1967, 
France announced its neutrality, but in effect acted to support the more pro-Arab position that 
dominated the UN.639 President de Gaulle shifted from the traditional French support for 
Israel and offered more allegiance the Arab side than had been the case during the Fourth 
Republic. The new line in French policy was continued with President Pompidou.640 On the 
other side of the Middle East conflict, the Netherlands supported Israel (which in turn led to a 
cut of oil supplies from the Arabs), along with the traditional German pro-Israeli stance based 
on what has been termed “moral debt”.641 
The newly formed EPC framework set out to discuss the Middle East with the intention of 
forming a common European position - an attempt that was successful quite early. This 
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position came as a result of the discussion in the first EPC meeting in November 1970, where 
the Member States discussed the Middle East without the Commission present.642 This 
meeting resulted in an instruction for the EPC Political Committee to produce a joint paper, 
which became known as the Schumann paper after the French Foreign Minister Maurice 
Schumann.643 The paper intended to form a concerted position for the EPC Members on the 
Middle East. Thus, in spite of the complexities of the relationships that defined the area, past 
divergences between the European Six had been ironed out by May 1971.644 The Schumann 
paper represented a common position for the Six, and meant that EPC was the forum in which 
the first concerted European stance on the situation in the Middle East was defined.645  
The Schumann Paper leaned towards the French pro-Arab view, which aggravated Israel and 
supported its fear that a concerted European view would mean a weakening in the support for 
Israel. The Schumann paper did call for a withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, 
some minor border changes, the internationalisation of Jerusalem, the establishment of 
demilitarised zones, and introduced an approach towards refugees of the area. Reactions to the 
paper were critical, especially in Germany, due to the paper’s perceived effects on the 
relationship with Israel. This led Foreign Minister Scheel to declare that the Schumann paper 
was nothing but a work in progress, ‘a working paper’, and this move to diminish the paper’s 
status in turn angered the French. The Schumann paper thus did not succeed in completely 
erasing the differences between the Member States on the subject of the Middle East.646  
The next move in the EPC framework following the Schumann paper was the “Appeal for a 
Suspension of Hostilities in the Middle East of the Nine Foreign Ministers” which came on 13 
October 1973, following the onset of the Yom Kippur War on 6 October.647 The Appeal was 
for a cease-fire en route to proper peace negotiations and a solution to the conflict; the 
solution was to follow the UN Security Council’s Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 in all 
of its provisions.648 
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The “Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers on 6 November 1973, in Brussels on the 
Situation in the Middle East” went into more detail than the October Appeal. It marked the 
Europeans’ first contribution in the search for a “comprehensive solution” to the situation in 
the Middle East. The aim was that such a comprehensive solution should entail lasting peace 
following the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242, with negotiations in the UN 
framework.649 The need for Israel to end its territorial occupation since 1967 was mentioned 
in particular, alongside a formulation of the need to recognise the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinians.650 In addition, the Nine Foreign Ministers linked the EPC declaration to already 
existing EC policy by referring to the close relationship between the two regions and the fact 
that the EC had announced its aim to establish a Global Mediterranean Policy, an initiative 
expanded on above.651  
The three outcomes that constituted the EPC Middle East policy in 1973 – the Schumann 
Paper, the Appeal of October 1973 and the Brussels Declaration of 6 November 1973 – had 
some features in common. They were primarily declaratory, somewhat vague but leaning 
towards a pro-Arab stance, and they dealt with the Middle East conflict or specific events 
such as the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. Importantly, none of these declarations resulted 
in actual actions or new policies on the part of the Europeans as their main contribution was 
to represent a common stance. Now the EPC Nine spoke with one voice on the subject of the 
Middle East. This voice challenged the American diplomatic efforts in the Middle East, and 
caused problems for the relationship between EPC and the US.652 Israel stated that this 
European voice cried “oil for Europe!” and not “peace for the Middle East!”, and was duly 
critical.653 
The initiation of what became the EAD began immediately following the EPC Declaration of 
6 November 1973. The EPC Nine engaged in concerted diplomatic efforts towards the Arabs. 
The aim was to establish a new form of relationship between the Nine and the Arab States.654 
These European overtures were welcomed by the Arabs, as a Summit of the Arab League on 
26-28 November opened up the possibility of entering into a form of cooperation between the 
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two regions as long as it represented a “trustful and mutually beneficial cooperation”.655 Four 
Arab Foreign Ministers arrived at the Summit in Copenhagen in December 1973, further 
expressing the Arab side’s wish for strengthened Euro-Arab relations.656 And thus French 
initiatives for how such a relationship could be formed were formulated in a report at the very 
end of 1973 and discussed at the EPC meetings of 10 January 1974 and 7 February 1974. The 
agreement between the EPC Nine to move forward in creating a comprehensively new 
relationship with the Arab states aimed at strengthening European influence in the region.657  
By 4 March 1974, the EPC Committee was ready to publicly announce the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue. By this time, the field of oil had been removed from the cooperation, as had any 
explicit mention of political issues; both remained indirect aspects of the Dialogue, 
however.658 This announcement was followed by an American outburst; Henry Kissinger was 
unsatisfied both with the initiative for a Dialogue and with the fact that EPC had failed to 
consult the US prior to announcing the EAD.659 As a result, the preparations for the EAD 
were stalled until an agreement between the Europeans and the US had been reached based on 
the informal EPC meeting in Gymnich of 20-21 April 1974.660 At this meeting, the parties 
agreed to accommodate the US on prior consultation concerning EPC activities, paving the 
way for the EAD’s continuance, albeit now in a form where oil was left out and the 
relationship to the US played a much greater role.  
There were other aspects internal to the EAD that caused further delay to developments in the 
EAD but that did not shape its content. From November 1975 onwards, the potential inclusion 
of the PLO in the EAD halted progress; this was solved through the Dublin formula in 
February 1975, providing for a single European Delegation and a single Arab Delegation 
without defining the national affiliation of the individual representatives.661 Finally, one last 
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hurdle in the path towards the EAD was solved by diplomatic efforts: the discontent on the 
Arab side when the EC signed a GMP agreement with Israel in May 1975.662   
6.3 The Commission’s role in the development of the Euro-Arab Dialogue as 
a joint Community and European Political Cooperation venture 
Of course, the long and winding road towards a Euro-Arab Dialogue cannot be explained 
without reference to the external elements briefly discussed above. However, since this thesis 
focuses on the Commission’s role in EPC, the following section of this chapter aims to retain 
this focus in the chronological analysis of the EAD. The relationship between EPC and the 
EC and the Commission was initially formed in the traditional manner, with the French 
attempting to exclude the Commission from the EAD. From the early phase of the EAD 
initiative in December 1973 onwards, although never denying the Community’s competences 
or the fact that these must be respected, the French quite harshly dismissed the Commission’s 
ability to play a competent part in the initiative that was to become the EAD. France stated 
that as the “general direction” of the EAD initiative was and should remain political, the 
institutions in Brussels (that is, the Commission) were not sufficiently equipped or informed 
of the particular political conditions that prevailed in the Middle East.663 This initial stance 
seems striking when compared to that of not even two years later: in December 1975, the 
French (albeit with some reservations) hailed the Commission’s Klaus Meyer as “l’homme 
indispensable” for the EAD.664 
EPC began the work on the EAD in January 1974 by attempting to agree on the French report 
on what a Dialogue between the Europeans and the Arabs would entail.665 The Commission 
was present in the EPC work from the beginning and was called into the Middle East EPC 
expert group when was required.666 The Commission started its preparatory work for what 
would become the EAD in a non-confrontational manner. It stated that before making its 
proposals to EPC, the Commission’s representative should make sure there was “a favourable 
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climate and atmosphere” for its contribution, deliberately seeking not to cause conflict.667 As 
the Commission was invited to make its views known, it commenced by emphasising that 
there was an obvious overlap between existing and proposed EC policies and the EPC 
initiation of a cooperation with the Arab states.668 The Commission’s proposals initiated 
within the EC’s GMP towards the energy-producing countries of the region were emphasised 
in particular.669 The Commission ventured as far as pressuring the Member States of the EC to 
keeping their commitments made within the EC machinery before venturing into new 
initiatives directed towards the same aims under EPC machinery.670 Duplication would serve 
only to damage the credibility of Europe, whichever hat it was wearing at the time. The 
starting point of the Commission’s work towards the EAD was thus characterised by the aim 
to protect the EC’s existing policies by demanding that the EAD be a joint EC-EPC venture. 
Initially the French protested at the Commission’s demands that the EAD amount to a joint 
action between the EC and EPC. However, France did not completely rule out that this might 
in fact be the result.671 Klaus Meyer, one of the Commission’s representatives in the EPC 
discussions on the status and role of the EC in the Dialogue, noted that the Member States’ 
delegations did not seem completely opposed to the Commission’s insistence on the 
importance of the potential overlap between the GMP and the EAD. The national delegations 
seemed impressed by the precision of the EC’s and thus the Commission’s work in the GMP 
area, albeit expressing only limited knowledge of the policy area according to Meyer. This 
can be seen as the Commission mirroring the earlier French misgivings concerning the EC’s 
non-competence in the political sphere, with the Commission having some misgivings about 
the Member States’ lack of competence in the economic EC sphere.672 
The Community was “associated” with the initiative of the EAD due to the existing GMP, and 
was included in the work on the EAD from the beginning. But the Commission wanted more. 
In the Commission’s view, the GMP should never be threatened by the EAD initiative; the 
only acceptable solution was that the EAD complement the GMP. In response to the French 
opposition, the Commission continued its approach by lamenting what in its view amounted 
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to a delay and French reluctance towards the declaration of EAD initiative as a joint EC and 
EPC venture.673  
In a “series of clarifications” in a discussion on 1 February 1974, the Commission was further 
reassured that the EAD was indeed treated as a joint venture even though it was not declared 
as one.674 These clarifications detailed how the EAD initiative would be linked to the EC 
machinery. The Member States agreed that once EPC had agreed to the principles of the 
EAD, the Council of the EC would do the same. Along the same reassuring lines, EPC 
decided that the term of “the Nine” that was being used in the ongoing discussions with the 
Arabs would denote “Member States of the EC”, further linking the EC to the EAD.675 
Finally, it was unequivocally declared that the EPC and EC Presidency at all times would act 
in its double quality as both EC and EPC representative.676 The results of these clarifications 
were attributed to the contributions made by the Commission’s representatives in the 
discussions in the Political Committee.677 Prior to the EPC Foreign Ministers’ meeting of 14 
February 1974, Meyer was satisfied; he was sure that this formula of the EAD as a joint 
venture would be the reality, and that acceptable compromise would follow.678 This indicates 
that the Commission perceived that the French position was changing, and now amounted to 
reluctance rather than overt hostility.  
However, French misgivings towards the growing closeness of the two spheres and towards 
the Commission resurfaced, as at the last minute the French inserted the phrase that in the 
case of the Dialogue the EC Presidency would act “in concert with the Commission.679 Ever 
pragmatic and un-confrontational, Klaus Meyer urged President Ortoli to consider suggesting, 
but only if the atmosphere in the next EPC Foreign Minister meeting would allow it, that this 
phrase could be replaced simply by stating that the EC/EPC Presidency would act together 
with the Commission, removing all doubts of its status.680 As it turned out, this delay over the 
formulation continued, and in June 1974 the French still refused to change this phrase.681 In 
practice however, as the Dialogue commenced, the Commission’s role of working together 
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with the EC/EPC Presidency was carried out without question. The Commission’s work with 
the EC/EPC Presidency turned out to be very important, as the Commission was the ‘longest-
lived’ actor on the European side; by contrast, the EC/EPC Presidencies rotated every six 
months. 
As the Commission had come to expect, in the EPC meeting of 4 March 1974 the EAD 
initiative was indeed framed as a joint EC/EPC venture. Although the preferred formulation 
of the Commission’s role in this joint venture was not granted, in practice this role was 
assured.682 The German Presidency in particular asserted that the Commission was the only 
actor that could provide the EAD with real content.683 During the discussions, the German 
Presidency made it clear that it considered the Commission’s participation natural in the 
discussions on all levels of Euro-Arab cooperation.684  
Having secured the EAD as a joint venture, the Commission continued its work. Its first goal 
was to protect the existing EC policies from the challenge still posed by the EAD. In the EPC 
Political Committee meeting of 27-28 May 1974, the Commission presented the EC’s GMP to 
the Political Directors of the EPC Nine with a view to how it would relate to the planned 
EAD. The Commission emphasised that the EC’s policy was to keep a balanced relationship 
between the countries in the Mediterranean, in particular between Israel and the Arab 
countries.685 The Commission highlighted the treatment of the interlinked issues of the GMP 
and the EAD and the question of which framework they belonged to, the EC or EPC. The 
Commission requested that the Member States respect the Commission’s competences held 
by the Treaty, particularly the ones related to relations between the EC and third countries. 
The Commission further demanded that the activities of the EC’s GMP should never be 
usurped by the EAD, but that the activities of the two should be coordinated.686  
The Commission was not willing to make any concessions in the work on the GMP 
agreements already in progress because of the development of the EAD.687 Initially this 
unwillingness was seen in how the Commission attempted and succeeded in limiting the 
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initiatives of the Member States for the EAD’s scope, so that overlapping initiatives were not 
taken in areas where the Community already was actively pursuing policies. One instance of 
this was when the Member States suggested that the EAD should encompass aspects that 
would double the EC instruments already in existence for economic support in reconstructing 
areas damaged by war in Egypt, Jordan and Syria.688 It became evident that the Commission 
held the upper hand in these discussions because it was the actor with most information about 
existing EC policies. The EPC Foreign Ministers were not fully aware of the detailed aspects 
of the Community’s existing external relations and had to follow the Commission’s lead. The 
Commission made it quite clear that the Community would neither make its EC policies 
dependent on the negotiations under EPC, nor would it allow for duplication.689  
Expertise became the basis for the Commission’s role in the EAD. As it turned out, after oil 
and energy were excluded from the dialogue, it was the Community and thus the Commission 
which held the key in terms of the actual content of detailed cooperation that could take place 
‘on the ground’ between the Arabs and the Europeans. The Commission had already opened 
some doors through the developments of policies within the EC.690 The Member States and 
the EPC machinery recognised the role of the Commission. So did the Arabs, who began 
contacting the Commission directly with EAD-related enquires.691 Remarks made both in the 
Political Committee as well as unofficially showed that the Political Directors as well as the 
‘Middle-East experts’ were deeply impressed with the Commission’s expertise. The opinion 
that the Commission’s expertise could provide the EAD with “genuine substance” was now 
widely held.692  
By June 1974, the Commission was emerging as an asset for the EPC side on the issue of how 
to form and conduct the economic side of the cooperation between the Arabs and the 
Europeans. It kept demanding that the EC’s policies should not be made contingent on EPC; 
the Community procedures and the treaty-based provisions needed to be upheld.693 To this 
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effect, the Commission’s representatives should be the ones always expressly imprinting the 
fact that EAD was a joint EC and EPC venture upon both the Arabs and the EPC Member 
States.694 Acknowledging the asset the Commission would be in the EAD, EPC 
representatives suggested that the formula for meeting the Arabs would consist of the sitting 
and future EC/EPC Presidency and, to the satisfaction of the Commission, a Commission 
representative. By May 1975, this formula had emerged in official terms as the «Troika», now 
also including the past Presidency. 695  
At the EPC meeting between the Nine’s foreign ministers on 10 and 11 June 1974 in Bonn, 
the Commission’s President Ortoli was present throughout, and concluded that it had been a 
most excellent atmosphere that had produced several politically significant results.696 The 
reassurance of the Commission’s status in the Euro-Arab cooperation was repeated by the 
express confirmation of participation at all levels of the procedures of the cooperation.697 One 
of the Commission’s remaining concerns was over trade, especially the possibility that the 
EAD would create indirect relations between the cooperating parties that resembled “quasi-
preferential” relationships. This was one of the specific points the Commission kept close tabs 
on.698  
As the developments of the EAD initiative commenced, the Commission continued its stance 
of protecting the EC policies within the GMP. The Commission demanded that content-wise, 
the EAD initiative had to conform to the line of policy already adopted by the Community by 
not encouraging Arab hopes for the extension of association agreements to non-European 
countries except for the ones already covered by the EC, by not giving the impression that the 
EAD would entail preferential agreements with non-European countries except for the ones 
already covered, and to ensure that the EAD was in keeping with strict equality in the 
treatment of Israel and the Arab countries.699     
At this June EPC meeting, the Foreign Ministers officially agreed to begin the EAD by 
sending a “European mission” to Cairo for initial talks with the representatives from the Arab 
League.700 This “mission” would include the persons responsible for the Middle East, namely 
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Redies from the Auswärtiges Amt, Rouillon from the Quai d’Orsay, and Meyer from the 
Commission, a position that served to place both Meyer and the Commission in an influential 
position in the EAD.701 These three then formed an early version of the EPC “Troika” on the 
lower level of representatives from Foreign Ministries and the SG of the Commission. They 
went to Egypt from 18 to 20 June 1974 to hold preliminary discussions with their counterparts 
in the Arab League.702 By the time of Meyer’s trip to Egypt, he was under the impression that 
the impending French Presidency would indeed honour the German Presidency’s promise of 
Commission involvement in all levels of the EAD.703 
By July 1974 the Commission also ventured as far as making suggestions for the institutional 
framework of the EC, the EAD and EPC that would serve to protect the EC. Regardless of the 
assurance of its own role and competence, the Commission expressed concern that the EC 
machinery as such was not up to the task of handling the EAD in the same way as EPC. In the 
Commission’s view, EPC was better equipped through its organisation of expert groups, the 
Political Committee and the Foreign Ministers’ meetings.704 The Commission suggested two 
improvements to the EC structure. First, that an expert group for the COREPER be set up to 
prepare adequately for EAD questions within the EC; this was achieved, as the EC Member 
States indeed went on to set up a sub-group for the COREPER to prepare its discussions on 
the EAD.705 Second, for the ‘mixed’ EC and EPC work that the work towards the EAD 
already entailed, that a “group of coordination of the Nine” be set up that would be made 
capable of dealing with issues that came within the spheres of both the EC and EPC, and thus 
managing the day-to-day work between the spheres. The Commission suggested that this 
group be formed by the EPC expert groups and the suggested COREPER group.  
6.4 The Commission’s acquirement of a role in the Euro-Arab Dialogue  
By July 1974, the EC and the Commission’s role in the EAD had been secured and 
strengthened. On the highest level, the Commission’s position in the EAD was visible by the 
decision, made without conflict, that the Commission’s President Ortoli would go to the 
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official launch of the EAD’s preparatory phase in Paris on 31 July 1974 as one of the two 
representatives of the European side.706   
The Commission’s role and function in the EAD was to represent the Community alongside 
the Presidency, which represented EPC vis-à-vis the Arabs. In the CSCE, the Commission 
had been part of the EC Presidency, forming a part of the national delegation of the country 
holding the Presidency. In the EAD, the Commission was by contrast an acknowledged and 
independent representative of the EC, as it alone could take the word and speak on the EC 
matters on which the Treaty defined it as the sole negotiator. In a manner similar to the 
CSCE, in the cases where competences were shared between Member States and the 
Community it would share this role as negotiator with the EC’s Presidency. It was the 
Commission’s task to make sure that the EAD was considered a joint EC/EPC venture by the 
Arabs.707 Likewise, the Commission would have to ensure that the normal Community 
procedures were used when this was appropriate.708  
As the official preparatory phase of the EAD commenced on the 31 July 1974, the European 
side was jointly represented by the French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues (representing 
EPC) and the Commission’s President Ortoli (representing the EC).709 In this meeting, the 
two sides decided that a General Committee of the rank of ambassadors would form the 
highest level of the EAD.710 In the General Committee, the European side would be jointly 
represented by the EPC Presidency and the Commission. Following the meeting, both the 
Arab and the European sides went on to prepare their internal organisation for the EAD.  
French misgivings towards the Commission were still evident, regardless of the concessions 
that had been made to the Commission’s demands on all levels of the EAD. One instance of 
this distrust was the initial failure to invite the Commission’s President Ortoli to a working 
dinner with the Heads of State and Governments organised by the French President on 14 
September 1974.711 In the days before the planned dinner, the Commission voiced its 
discontent that Ortoli had not been invited; it brought up the commitment the Member States 
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had to the EC, and reminded the Member States that attaching the EC machinery to EPC 
would serve to strengthen EPC policies, including the EAD.712 Following a meeting between 
Pompidou and Ortoli on 9 September in which Ortoli presented his arguments, the French 
President changed his mind, and on 12 September the Commission’s President received an 
invitation to the dinner. 713 
The Commission continued to protest against what it perceived as “an exaggerated insistence 
on intergovernmental solutions where logic and efficiency would demand common 
instruments.”714 In a speech given on 13 September, Ortoli referred to the current period of 
the European project as one of potential stagnation. While he saw there was considerable 
desire to get Europe “moving” again, Ortoli had qualms over the basis for these moves and 
the intergovernmental direction they would lead Europe in. Countering this intergovernmental 
direction, Ortoli emphasised what integration within the EC could provide Europe with. In the 
context of the EAD, he highlighted the EC’s GMP policies and the Commission’s initiatives 
for an energy policy and a development policy as important steps towards a more substantial 
European external vocation.715    
Ortoli can be seen as criticising EPC and the EAD as he spoke for the need for Common 
policies as the basis for success on the European level; in his view, mere cooperation was 
potentially useful, but could never advance the construction of Europe.716 Ortoli placed the 
role of the Commission at the heart of the Community’s political and institutional set-up. This 
role, which was given to the Commission by the Treaty, constituted a “guarantee against the 
imbalances which could one day arise as a result of the varying importance of our Member 
States” by providing institutional continuity; the Commission was the actor that would 
balance national and European interests.717  
Following Ortoli’s criticism of the intergovernmental direction of European cooperation, the 
Commission continued to make further progress in shaping the EAD. Any remaining doubts 
about the EC’s and the Commission’s position in the EAD came to an end as the position of 
the Commission was institutionalised within the EAD by the creation of a Coordination 
Group. This Coordination Group was created on the basis of a French and Belgian proposal to 
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the EPC Foreign Minister’s meeting on 16 September 1974 and merged the EC and EPC 
machinery for the EAD.718 This proposal and the resulting Coordination Group was in in line 
with the suggestions the Commission had already made in July.719 
The creation of the Coordination Group strengthened the Commission’s role in the EAD. The 
task of this group was to prepare the European position in the EAD and prepare the work of 
the EAD’s General Committee and its Working Groups. The Coordination Group, which took 
over the work carried out in the Middle East expert group with the Commission present when 
needed, now comprised the Commission as a regular member to ensure consistency between 
the EC and EPC. The Coordination Group reported to both the EPC Political Committee and 
to COREPER on Community matters. The Commission was the only actor represented in 
both forums. The EC Member States had set up a sub-group for the COREPER to prepare its 
discussions on the EAD. However, this group did not consist of the same members as the 
Coordination Croup of the EAD, except for the Commission.720 The Commission was placed 
in an ever more advantageous position.  
In Meyer’s and the Commission’s view, the formula of the “double-hatted” Coordination 
Group was an institutional innovation representing the optimal solution to the challenges the 
EAD posed for the EC-EPC relationship.721 Emile Nöel suggested Klaus Meyer as the 
Commission’s representative in the Coordination Group, undoubtedly by reason of his 
personal ability and experience in the area. He was deliberately chosen in line with the 
Commission’s aim to “work efficiently”. In Nöel’s view, Meyer would be able to assure the 
quality of the work, which was required due to the great complexity and large number of 
areas the EAD would comprise. Meyer would also be able to provide “the delicacy” needed to 
create adequate relations between the EC and the EPC machinery.722 For the same reasons, 
Klaus Meyer was also put forward as one of the candidates for the Commission’s seat in the 
EAD’s General Committee.723 
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The Commission was satisfied.724 By September 1974, it had obtained adequate inclusion in 
the work that already had been done in the EAD. Inclusion was formalised by the 
Commission’s now permanent seat in a new joint EC and EPC structure. The Coordination 
Group was created to ensure that both sets of EC/EPC machinery were included and worked 
according to their respective competences. An illustration of how well the Commission was 
integrated into EPC work on the EAD by this time is seen in Klaus Meyer’s remark that he 
had faced no difficulties when stating what the Commission viewed as its legitimate rights.725 
In the Political Committee’s discussions leading to the creation of the Coordination Group, 
the Commission had reserved for itself the right to work within the ordinary Community 
procedure, independently of the work in the Coordination Group.726 The lack of protest about 
this reassured the Commission that the Community procedure and interests were duly 
protected and that its own role was respected. To illustrate the acceptance of the 
Commission’s contribution within the Coordination Group further, there were no objections 
when Klaus Meyer was allowed to speak in the Coordination Group on the highly political 
issue of the formula for the inclusion of the PLO. Admittedly Meyer himself remarked that 
they were his personal views, but they were made by Meyer as a member of the Commission 
competent in the area and he faced no objections.727  
The next milestone in the work on the EAD came following the settling of the PLO issue by 
the EPC Foreign Ministers meeting in Dublin 13 February 1975, which provided for meetings 
of experts in a single European Delegation and a single Arab Delegation without individual 
representation for the respective member countries. The work on the EAD commenced with 
the launching of the Expert Groups in the summer of 1975, when three EAD Expert Group 
meetings were held. In their plenary sessions, the European side was represented by the 
Presidency of the EC/EPC and the EC was represented by the Commission and Klaus Meyer. 
By then, the emerging Troika formula (without the former Presidency) had been used in the 
preparations for the EAD from June 1974 and at the start of the preparations for the first 
EAD-GC meeting on 18 December 1974.728 The full Troika formula comprising the sitting 
EC Presidency and the Commission’s representative, assisted by the former and following EC 
Presidency, was baptised as such and formally used from the first General Committee 
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meeting, while the decision to instate it was taken at the EPC Foreign Minister’s meeting on 3 
May 1975.729 The Commission had experienced no problem in being included.  
In the first meeting of the Expert Groups in Cairo from 10 to 14 June 1975, the EAD’s 
principles and objectives were settled. Seven EAD Working Groups were established to study 
and examine the areas of cooperation agreed upon in detail.730 The decisions made in the first 
Expert Group meeting in Cairo strengthened the Commission’s status in the EAD. Two of 
these EAD Working Groups – the one for agriculture and rural development as well as the 
one for trade – would be chaired on the European side by the Commission.731  
This made the Commission responsible for one of the EAD’s most difficult aspects: trade. 
The Europeans and the Commission had for some time tried to keep trade out of the EAD as a 
defined area, unwilling to concede to Arab demands. According to the Treaty, it would fall to 
the Commission to negotiate trade with third countries on behalf of the Europeans. When 
trade was included as a defined Working Group in the EAD, the Commission’s role in this 
area was not disputed within EPC.732 The Commission was thus placed in a position where it 
was able to protect the CCP in the EAD as well as the other aspects that were Community 
matters.733 The results of the Expert Group meetings were to the Commission’s satisfaction. 
In community matters, the work in the EAD would follow the proper Community procedure 
and be prepared by the Commission and the COREPER’s machinery.734  
The internal and external success of the formula found for the EAD was in part based on the 
Commission’s contribution. In that respect, the first EAD Expert Meeting in Cairo had been a 
test case for the European side, not least for the Commission and Klaus Meyer, who held the 
task of coordinating the EC and EPC work. The Commission succeeded. The meeting in 
Cairo was highly complex, as the material the European delegation and the Commission had 
to handle was diverse. It covered matters under the jurisdiction of sole Member State 
competence, matters under the sole jurisdiction of EPC competence and matters under 
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Community competence.735 The Commission proudly declared its satisfaction with the fact 
that the European delegation had been able to act outwards with perfect unity and 
effectiveness and that internal institutional quarrels had been avoided.736  
6.5 Playing a double game or finally bridging the divide? 
According to the above account of the development of the Commission’s role in the EAD, 
smooth sailing seems to have been the case. But while there was less debate over whether and 
how the EC and the Commission should and could participate in the case of the EAD than 
there had been in the case of the CSCE, there were instances of criticism towards the 
Commission and instances of what might have amounted to subtle forms of excluding the 
Commission. Before turning to the culmination of the Commission’s role in the EAD, the 
General Committee’s first meeting, the fact that the Commission’s journey in the EAD was 
not completely unproblematic needs some attention.  
Interestingly, what this analysis shows is a shift. The Commission was criticised, but as its 
role in the EAD increased, the criticism was no longer limited to the Commission’s role in 
EPC. In the case of the EAD, criticism was also extended to accusing the Commission that its 
role in the EAD affected the EC and the Commission’s role in the EC negatively. However, 
criticism along the traditional lines claiming that the Commission did not ‘fit’ in the EPC 
framework still existed. For instance, there were questions concerning the Commission’s 
ability to keep EPC matters confidential when the EAD preparations of the EPC meeting of 4 
March 1974 were leaked. The Commission’s interpreters were blamed for this leak, which 
resulted in a “certain reluctance” in providing the Commission with the EPC documents it 
was entitled to, and the failure to invite the Commission to a privately held meeting of the 
EC/EPC Presidency and the Foreign Ministers. Deservedly or not, the Commission still 
experienced being shut out from parts of EPC to a certain extent, even after having been let 
into the EAD.737 The account of how the Commission still managed to place itself in a pole 
position in the EAD indicates that its skills were deemed too valuable to exclude.  
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In the second half of 1974, the Commission questioned how it would fare as the French were 
about to take over the EC/EPC Presidency.738 In practical terms, the Commission’s role in the 
process towards an EAD continued unchallenged during the French Presidency. In fact, the 
developments that particularly tied the Commission to the leadership of the European side of 
the EAD process occurred within this period. Nevertheless, there were instances of what 
might be seen as evidence of remnants of French misgivings towards the Commission, for 
instance when Klaus Meyer had to approach the French Presidency because the Commission 
had not received several transmissions related to the EAD.739 The initial refusal to invite 
Ortoli to the EPC dinner discussed above can also be seen as remaining reluctance on the part 
of the French.740 
While Gfeller’s assertion that France adopted a more conciliatory approach towards the 
Commission within the remit of the EAD holds true on the whole, the Commission continued 
to face opposition.741 Now the criticism was that the Commission had increased its role in the 
EC at the expense of the Member States’ control due to its more evident role in EPC and the 
EAD in particular.742 Contrary to what had been the case when the Commission worked for 
inclusion in EPC, for instance in the case of the insertion of the EC and the Commission into 
the CSCE, the criticism now came from within the EC machinery. Previously the EPC 
Member States (and France in particular) had criticised the Commission for demanding too 
much in aiming for inclusion in EPC.743 The problem was now that that the Commission 
‘finally’ had entered EPC the Member States within the EC machinery complained through 
COREPER that the Commission had become too entrenched in the EPC machinery, acting too 
autonomously within the EPC sphere of the EAD and disregarding EC procedures.744  
The accusation that the Commission was disregarding its role in the EC is illustrated by 
several instances where the Commission was heavily criticised over the procedure it used 
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when working in the EPC sphere. While this criticism came from France in the first instance, 
it was not the only Member State to voice its misgivings concerning what they perceived as 
the Commission acting on its own in EPC without including the EC machinery in the 
appropriate manner.745 The French representatives were vocal in their laments immediately 
before France took over the EC Presidency on 1 July 1974, marking the French stance on the 
Commission’s role in EPC and the EAD. The intention behind this might have been just to 
make a traditional statement of discontent before taking over the Presidency in relation to 
France’s long-held aim of keeping the EC and EPC spheres separate.746 
This illustration from the COREPER meeting of 27 June 1974 might also signalise a shift in 
the criticism of the Commission. The French permanent representative in Brussels reported 
that he had reacted to the proceedings in the COREPER meeting in the discussion regarding 
the Euro-Arab Dialogue.747 The French representative highlighted the inappropriateness of the 
Commission being the one to report on discussions held with the Arab League concerning the 
EAD. In his view, this task fell to the EC Presidency, which was and should continue to be 
the body holding the double role with participation both in the EC and EPC. The French 
conclusion, which admittedly followed the lines of a more traditional critique of the 
Commission, was that the Commission’s action was a result of its attempts to achieve as 
much control as possible over processes outside the EC’s and thus the Commission’s sphere. 
The EAD was used specifically by the French as an example of a project outside the EC, the 
type of activity that the Commission feared and thus tried to control. The French believed that 
they were the only ones to react to this as the other EC/EPC partners were afraid that the EAD 
would turn into a French-German-led enterprise, and that this was why they supported the 
Commission in its struggle to be included.748 Traditionally, the French view had been and 
continued to be that the EPC and the EC spheres could and should be kept separate. To 
include the Commission further was not recommended by the French representative.749 
The Member States’ representatives within COREPER continued to criticise the Commission 
for the manner in which it operated the EPC sphere, allegedly circumventing ‘normal EC-
procedure’. In yet another COREPER setting (a lunch this time) a Commission paper and 
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questionnaire on the EAD were discussed.750 Unsurprisingly, in light of the permanent 
representatives’ misgivings concerning the Commission’s extensive role in the EAD, the 
Commission came under “heavy fire” from many of the representatives for its handling of this 
subject.751 The Commission’s ‘crime’ was that it had circulated the documents in question 
within the EPC sphere by addressing them directly to Mr. Kennan of the Irish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs as the representative of the ECP Presidency without going via the Irish 
Permanent Representative and asking him to forward it to the EPC machinery.752 The 
Permanent Representatives noted that if the Commission had followed procedure they would 
all have had to agree to the documents being sent over, thus retaining some control over the 
Commission’s activity in the EPC sphere.753  
Meyer defended the Commission’s actions “as best he could” and did so coolly and 
unapologetically, but still along non-provocative lines. He merely stated that the contents of 
the documents in no way were meant to be hidden from the Permanent Representatives and 
contained nothing to “get worked up about”.754 In fact, Klaus Meyer and the Commission 
emphasised that in sending these documents he followed the agreed procedures for EC-
EPC.755 But the letter to Kennan reveals that as Klaus Meyer had made an agreement with 
Kennan to send it directly via the EPC network, he was acting somewhat autonomously. He 
also made a reference to merely “keep the Committee [COREPER] in the picture”, which of 
course would be provoking to the permanent representatives.756 
These incidents are illustrations both of the Commission’s role within EPC and of this role’s 
effects on the Commission’s status in the Community sphere. The Member States allowed and 
took advantage of the Commission’s expertise within EPC. In the EC sphere, however, they 
voiced criticism of the Commission for disregarding the appropriate EC machinery. The 
Member States wanted the link between the EC and EPC to be held by the EC Presidency, 
thus retaining intergovernmental control over both spheres. However, as the analysis of EPC 
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in general and the cases of the CSCE and the EAD in particular have shown, even from within 
this Presidency formula the Commission had managed to enter EPC, and ended up with a role 
more autonomous than that desired by the Member States. Importantly, the discontent over 
this was visible in other Member States than France alone; the UK was also worried about the 
implications this could hold for the future role of the Commission.757  
As the Commission was gaining a greater role in EPC by its work in the EAD, the Member 
States increasingly argued that it was “playing a double Community and Political Cooperation 
game” by attempting to straddle the bridge between the EC and EPC that should really be 
done by the EC Presidency.758 For the British, the question was the extent to which it should 
support the Commission in this case, as it was important to control just how “substantial a 
foothold” the Commission gained in EPC in light of the implications this might hold for a 
potential common foreign policy.759 This is evidence that some Member States at least were 
alerted to the possibility that the Commission’s agency might impose a form of path 
dependency for future development.760  
Notwithstanding the fact that the Commission had faced opposition in the case of the EAD 
also, the culmination of its role in the EAD came in May 1976. By the time of the first 
meeting of the EAD’s highest level, the General Committee of the EAD, from 18 to 21 May 
1976, the Commission was participating at all levels and in all forums of the EAD.761 Again, 
Klaus Meyer was the Commission’s and the EC’s voice. The Commission’s involvement in 
the EAD went beyond mere participation. This was seen in the opening session of the EAD’s 
General Committee, where Klaus Meyer gave the initial statement on behalf of the 
Community following the initial statement of the Luxembourg Ambassador Jean Wagner, 
who was representing the EC/EPC Presidency.762 Meyer also took part in the following 
discussions and negotiations, in which he expressed satisfaction with how well prepared the 
European side was compared to its Arab counterpart, a trait that reflected the Commission’s 
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express aim of efficiency and the prior experience it had gained from the meeting in Cairo in 
June 1975 as a test case.763 
The meeting included long and difficult negotiations with the Arab side over the principles of 
the EAD’s economic aspects. These negotiations on the substantial, complex and detailed 
economic aspects were almost entirely negotiated for the European side by the Commission’s 
representatives.764 Meyer was satisfied with the Commission’s contribution, as the 
Commission’s representatives had almost singlehandedly negotiated the elements of the Final 
Communique in which the detailed contents of the EAD were set out, also succeeding in 
determining their specific terms.765 Klaus Meyer placed particularly high value on the 
Commission’s vital contributions in protecting the EC’s GMP and the CCP in the Final 
Communique’s paragraph 7 on trade.766  
The basis of this success was that the Commission at no point conceded to any of the Arabs’ 
more challenging requests for multilateral agreements in the field of commercial policy, for 
the creation of a Euro-Arab free trade zone, and for agreements of non-preferentiality. The 
Commission’s representatives had made the Arabs agree to a paragraph on this that in 
Meyer’s view was innocuous, limited and declaratory.767  
The Commission was instrumental of protecting the EC by never letting the “Dialogue tail 
wag the Community dog”.768 Prior to the negotiations, the Commission had urged the EPC 
Member States to commit to the EAD so as not to place too much of a strain on the GMP and 
the CCP, which inevitably would be the result if the Europeans came to the Dialogue visibly 
“empty-handed”.769 EPC’s aim of avoiding the political elements, which the EPC Political 
Committee still saw too positively according to Meyer, would come at the price of pressure 
on the EC’s policies. In the end, in the negotiations concerning the General Committee’s Final 
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Communique, something had to give for agreement to be reached, and it proved to be not the 
economic realm over which the Commission reigned. The Europeans, who were led by the 
Commission in the negotiations, made the publication of the EAD’s Final Communique 
(which did entail a political “handout” of sorts to the Arabs) contingent on the Arabs 
dropping, for the time being at least, trade agreements with the EC from their demands for 
further concessions in the EAD’s contents.770 
In his initial statement in the General Committee, Klaus Meyer stated that the EAD was a 
novelty and that it constituted a new dimension for both the EC and EPC:771  
By these provisions and the fact that the political subjects have ceased to be taboo in this context 
[of the EAD] one can consider that the Euro-Arab Dialogue from now, after this first meeting of 
the General Committee, is a permanent reality, adding a new global dimension to the bilateral 
relations of the Member States, and the relations of the Community with a certain number of Arab 
countries.772  
Klaus Meyer’s individual role made him the ‘living memory’ of the European side, a role 
which even the French acknowledged.773 The manner in which the Commission not only 
participated, but even led discussions, chaired EAD Working Groups for the European side, 
and thus made its mark upon and shaped the EAD is remarkable, since this was a Dialogue 
that from its outset was an EPC venture. By the time it finally commenced as a regional 
dialogue at the highest level of this cooperation, it was a joint effort in which both the EC 
machinery and the EPC machinery worked both side by side and together, thus linking the EC 
to EPC in the manner that had been the Commission’s aim ever since the early days of EPC in 
1971.774  
The Commission had made the EAD work by providing it with what it needed: 
administrative, juridical and technical expertise. It had protected the EC’s economic policies 
by pressuring the Member States to give some political concessions, however limited, to the 
Arabs.775 The Commission contributed to the EAD in a manner that was acceptable even for 
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the Member States that previously had ordered it “back where it belonged” – to the EC sphere 
– at a time where there was little or no room for it in the EPC sphere. By May 1976, this was 
no longer the case. The EC was now represented within EPC, as the EAD had developed from 
being an EPC initiative to a joint venture between the EC and EPC.  
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7. Conclusion – a second generation 
Commission and its role in European 
Political Cooperation 
Each man begins the world afresh. Only institutions grow wiser; they store up the collective 
experience; and, from this experience and wisdom, men subject to the same laws will 
gradually find, not that their natures change but that their experience does.776  
This thesis has studied the Commission, a supranational institution that played an unintended 
role in the intergovernmental structure of EPC. To answer the main research question posed 
by this thesis of how the Commission ended up with a role in EPC, I have investigated the 
period 1969-1976 and applied a two-step analysis. 
In the first step my analysis investigated the Commission’s activity towards EPC and 
answered the questions of how the Commission responded to the establishment of EPC, and 
how its approach to EPC developed. I argue that the Commission’s activity was characterised 
by a relentless quest for participation, driven by a wish to protect the EC. Moreover, I argue 
that the Commission’s approach aimed to link the EC to EPC and to shape EPC. The second 
step of the analysis is on an aggregate level and addresses the question of what kind of actor 
the Commission that acquired a role in EPC was. On this level the results from the first step 
were used as departure points for an analysis of the Commission as an actor. I argue that the 
Commission as an actor approached EPC in a distinct manner, as I suggest that it was a 
second generation Commission which had adjusted to its environment that successfully 
managed to acquire a role in EPC.  
In the thesis the basis for and the Commission’s response to the establishment of EPC has 
been investigated in chapters two and three. By breaking the chronological approach to the 
theme of the thesis, chapter four enables the investigation of the developing approach of the 
Commission towards EPC that is found in chapters five and six while at the same time 
initiating the investigation of the Commission as an actor. The thesis’ conclusion in this 
present chapter is however structured along the lines of the two-step analysis followed by 
some concluding remarks and implications.  
                                                          
776 Monnet, Jean. Memoirs, London: Collins, 1978: 393. Jean Monnet, French. “Founding father” of the 
European Coal and Steel Community and proponent of the supremacy of supranational institutions and 
integration often used this quote by the Swiss philosopher Henri Frédéric Amiel.  
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7.1 The Commission’s response to the establishment of European Political 
Cooperation  
In search for the Commission’s response to the establishment of EPC, I explored the 
Commission’s struggles to gain entrance to certain activities that the Member States of the EC 
engaged in in the period following the empty chair crisis.777 These activities had the effect of 
bypassing the EC-structures and the Commission. In the case of France, this was an 
intentional effect. The evidence shows that the Commission responded with calls for EC and 
Commission inclusion even before the initiative to EPC was a fact, beginning with the 
Summit in The Hague. As EPC was initiated and established, it became clear that this 
structure for political cooperation was intended to be a separate structure from the EC, with 
no defined role for the Commission. The Commission disputed this separation and exclusion.   
Through the investigation I found that the basis for the Commission’s response to the 
establishment of EPC was what the Commission itself viewed as legitimate claims for 
participation based on its role in the EC. I present the basis for these claims in chapter two’s 
overview of the Commission’s legitimation for participation. I argue that in general the 
Commission resorted to treaty-based legitimation claims from a stated mandate for the 
Commission to independently perform its duties in the general interest of the Community.778 
This mandate in turn served as a basis for the myth of the Commission as sole holder of the 
Community’s interest.779 More specifically for the EC’s external relations, the Commission 
claimed inclusion in EPC based on the Treaty’s provisions for its role in Community 
agreements with third countries and its role in negotiations with international organisations. In 
particular, the Commission legitimated participation in EPC based on the Treaty’s provisions 
for a Common Commercial Policy, an area that was touched by the establishment of EPC.  
The legitimating aspects found in the thesis’ chapter two form the basis for the thesis’ further 
investigation of determining factors of the Commission’s response to EPC where the activity 
towards EPC in the period 1969-1973 is assessed. I argue that in this initial response seeds of 
an adjustment of the Commission were sawn by the first Commission President that faced 
                                                          
777 Prior to the establishment of EPC, Summitry and in particular the Hague Summit in 1969 that led to the 
initiation of EPC were examples of such activities that had these effects.  
778 Treaty of Rome - Article 157(2) The members of the Commission shall perform their duties in the general 
interest of the Community with complete independence. 
779 Ibid.  
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EPC, Franco Maria Malfatti. 780 I argue that evidence of these seeds were found in Malfatti’s 
expressed statements that the Commission held no ambitions to become a super-government 
along with his calls for realism and flexibility as the new manner in which the Commission 
should act. 781 Malfatti continued to legitimate the Commission’s claims by the Treaty, but in 
a markedly un-expansionist manner, as he explicitly stated that the Commission would use the 
Treaty; but not go beyond it. I argue that these endeavours by Malfatti signify the emergence 
of the Commission as a realist in an attempt to change the image of the Commission as an 
actor.  
As the chronological analysis in chapter three makes evident, the formation of a response to 
the establishment of EPC contained discussion and internal division over how and why the 
Commission should seek participation in EPC. I argue that three distinct fractions existed 
within the Commission at the time of the establishment of EPC: the first was a traditional, 
federalist fraction inclined to look back in time to the ‘golden age’ of the first generation 
Commission under Hallstein. For this group, the EPC was an unwanted structure to which the 
Commission needed to boldly react in order to minimise damages to the EC and political 
unification that belonged there. Caution and strategy were not the concern for this group who 
were ‘expansionists’ at heart. The second fraction, that the analysis proves gained the upper 
hand in the formulation of a response to EPC, argued for a cautious, pragmatic approach to 
EPC based on concrete contributions the Commission could offer EPC and strategic 
considerations. Opposed to what was termed as ‘blindness’ induced by supranational 
idealism, a third fraction influenced the Commission’s response. I argue that the influence of 
this third fraction was increasingly seen in the developing approach towards EPC. This 
fraction represented a more positive stance toward the creation of EPC, and was more geared 
towards how the Commission could contribute in order to make EPC a success, with what I 
claim to be the interest of the EC at heart.  
In tracking the formation of the Commission’s response, while I argue that seeds were sawn 
by Malfatti’s attempt of changing the Commission’s image, I furthermore argue that elements 
of both change and continuity were found in the document SEC (71) 650. This document was 
the result of a debate which I argue was marked by internal division where new ideas of how 
                                                          
780 TNA, FCO 30/568, copy of interview with Malfatti in Le Figaro 23 September 1970 attached to Political 
Unification: the place of the European Commission, 25 September, 1970; AEI, Franco Maria Malfatti: A 
Realist's Europe in European Community no.144, April, 1971, retrieved 15 June 2015 from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/43786/1/A7529.pdf.  
781 Ibid. 
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the Commission should act towards EPC were found.782 SEC (71) 650 was the most directly 
expressed element of the Commission’s response to EPC. It covered the Commission’s view 
of the implications of EPC on the EC as well as role of the Commission in EPC in particular. 
In the document the Commission presented what appears as a coherent view; where it was 
critical to the establishment of EPC, but where the Commission forcefully presented its case 
for participation.  
The role the Commission wanted to play in EPC was in SEC (71) 650 described as one that 
would serve to achieve three goals; the first was to participate in EPC in order to protect the 
EC from unwanted effects of the establishment of EPC. The second goal was to become the 
institutional link between the EC and EPC-machineries and what I argue as an implicit 
intention of drawing them nearer. I argue that implicit to these two goals and the 
Commission’s stated response was that it would pursue these goals in a relentless manner. 
Moreover I argue that in this response there were seeds of an adjustment of the 
Commission’s actions, evident in the internal division that shaped the Commission’s 
response and approach. I claim that forces within the Commission that argued for a more 
pragmatic manner in which the Commission could play a role in EPC were visible in this 
approach. In addition, I argue that this pragmatic manner signified a more constructive 
approach to the intergovernmental direction European integration was characterised by in the 
period investigated. Furthermore, I claim that the manner in which SEC (71) 650 described 
how it should approach the Member States in order to facilitate a realistic role viable in the 
long-term implies caution on the part of the Commission. The third goal expressed in SEC 
(71) 650 was explicit; the Commission should participate in the work of formulating the 
second report of EPC commissioned by the first report. I argue that implicit to this third goal 
was a more general intent for the Commission to shape EPC, in the interest of protecting the 
EC. By the time of the second report on EPC and the end of EPC’s earliest and most 
formative phase the Copenhagen report of July 1973 EPC moved ever so slightly in the 
direction closer to EC. I argue that by the time of the Copenhagen Report the Commission’s 
response to the established EPC had resulted in a foot in the door for the Commission, but 
that this was not satisfactory to an institution that wanted more. The relentless work 
continued as EPC developed.  
                                                          
782 HAEU, FMM-37, SEC (71) 650, Coopération en matière d’“ Union Politique”, 17 February 1971.  
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7.2 The Commission’s developing approach to European Political 
Cooperation  
In answer to the second operationalising question of how the Commission’s approach to EPC 
developed, I argue that the results of the analysis show a continuation of the Commission’s 
claim for participation in EPC. I argue that the developing approach was marked by the same 
elements that had been decisive for the Commission’s response to the establishment of EPC, 
for instance the calls for realism and flexibility in the Commission. As EPC developed, the 
Commission’s approach matured.  
The CSCE and the EAD were areas that in the Commission’s view merited EC and 
Commission participation. The analysis of the Commission’s acquirement of a role shows 
how the Commission increasingly used its expertise-based role in the EC as a legitimating 
factor for a role in both the CSCE and the EAD. The Commission’s expertise on areas like 
trade, agriculture, energy, environment policy, development and cooperation policy, and not 
least on the regions that EPC now entered into were skills that the Member States of EPC 
seemed keen to take advantage of. The result was EC and Commission participation in the 
two most prominent cases in EPC’s early phase; the CSCE and the EAD. I argue that the 
unprovocative manner in which the Commission made this expertise available to EPC was 
crucial in order to gain the Member States’ acceptance.   
I claim that the continuing feature of the conflict between France and the Commission had an 
effect on the Commission’s developing approach to EPC. This effect is found in the analysis 
of both the CSCE and the EAD. Chapter five presents evidence for continuous French 
opposition to the Commission in the case of the CSCE, and an initial opposition towards the 
Commission’s participation in EAD is found in chapter six. Conflict between France and the 
Commission was still visible in the case of the EAD, although less prominent than in the case 
of the CSCE. The Commission was initially attempted excluded from the EAD in December 
1973 by a French dismissal of the Commission’s competences in the area. There were still 
remnants of French opposition by late June 1974 as the French criticised what in their view 
was the Commission’s “intrusion” in the EAD. However, in the case of the CSCE I present 
evidence for how the Commission deliberately approached it in way that made it able to 
bypass this French opposition. I argue that the Commission framed the case for its 
participation in the CSCE as a test-case for the Member States’ commitment to the EC. The 
same is found in the case of the EAD. However, in the case of the EAD the Commission went 
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even further to protect EC trade policy in the negotiations with the Arabs. While the costs for 
the Member States of EPC were admittedly minor, I argue that in this case the Commission 
successfully and directly pressured the Member States. This pressure was undertaken by the 
Commission confronting the Member States and demanding that they gave some political 
concessions to the Arabs in the first meeting on the highest level of the EAD in May 1976, in 
order to ease the pressure on the demands for EC trade agreements. I argue that these findings 
signify a development in the Commission’s approach, but that it was based on the same 
elements as the response to the establishment of EPC; to participate in order to protect, link 
and shape.  
The role of the Commission in the EAD was based on what it already had achieved in the 
CSCE and on competence acquired in the EC that now was needed in the EPC. Following its 
inclusion at all levels in the EAD, and its function as a coordinator between the EC and the 
EPC, it is fair to say that in the case of the EAD it most clearly both linked the EC-machinery 
to the EPC-machinery, and indeed shaped the EPC through its role in the EAD. Expertise 
formed the basis for the Commission’s advantageous position in the EAD, through its 
standing in the existing EC policies and initiatives.  In addition to this came the fact that the 
Member States’ representatives in EPC held little knowledge of for instance the GMP in 
contrast to the Commission’s competence, while the Commission received recognition for its 
expertise by the EPC’s Political Committee.783 The importance of the Commission became 
even more evident when the Arabs began consulting the Commission directly over EAD 
questions. The notion that the Commission would provide the EAD with “genuine substance” 
became widespread.784 This resulted in the Commission having the upper hand in the 
negotiations with EPC Member States over the contents of the EAD, which again enabled the 
Commission to protect the EC by not allowing for overlap between the GMP and the EAD 
initiatives.  
The EAD provided the Commission with a highly coveted link between the intended separate 
spheres of the EPC and the EC. The first meeting of the EAD’s GC provides for a suitable 
end point for an analysis of the Commission’s contribution to the EAD that went beyond 
participation and that amounted to both linking the EC to the EPC and shaping the EPC. 
These elements form the basis for the argument that the Commission had by 1976 in the EAD 
and by in the previous case of the CSCE now managed to reach de facto and to some extent 
                                                          
783 HAEU, KM-39, Note à l’attention de Monsieur Cheysson, 29 May, 1974. 
784 Ibid. 
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formally the aims from its response from 1971 that had developed into a successful approach 
of the Commission towards the EPC.  
7.3 The Commission as an actor that acquired a role in European Political 
Cooperation   
I argue that this thesis presents evidence of an actor that adjusted. Furthermore, I argue that 
this adjustment was deliberate and characterised by a pragmatic approach in order not to 
provoke member states. In chapter four of the thesis I open the black box of the Commission 
by investigating voices of change and of continuity and the Commission’s presidents in the 
period 1958-1976. I argue that while forces of both change and continuity were represented in 
the case of the Commission’s approach to EPC, forces of change proved to be determining for 
the formation of the Commission as an adjusting actor. The development of an adjusting actor 
was particularly visible in the investigation of the Commission at its highest level over time. 
The changes in European integration that EPC represented was an environment where it was 
no longer, if ever, a good idea for the Commission to present itself as an institution attempting 
to be a super-government or a proponent of an European interest that had to “hurt” for it to be 
the true European interest. 785  
In this thesis I trace the beginning of a process of adjustment to the time of the initiation and 
establishment of EPC. This process of adjustment is partially seen in Rey’s last period as he 
cautiously argued for inclusion in Summits, and is more evident in Malfatti’s attempt to 
remove the perception of the Commission as an ambitious super-government. The deliberate 
adjustment of the Commission as an actor over time is even more pronounced when the 
‘break’ of Mansholt’s period as Commission President is taken into account. The Mansholt 
period is by this thesis seen as a contrast to Malfatti’s period as well as the period after. I 
argue however that the legacy that Mansholt’s period built on most clearly was that of the first 
generation Commission, but also that the effects of this was mostly rhetorical and had few 
                                                          
785 Dahrendorf 1979. The quote in its entirety is found on page 19-20: “This however leads me to the second 
main ingredient of a reappraisal of European policies which is necessary. I have often been struck by the 
prevailing view in Community circles that the worst that can happen is any movement towards what is called an 
Europe a la carte. This is not only somewhat odd for someone who likes to make his own choices, but also 
illustrates that strange puritanism, not to say masochism which underlies much of Community action: Europe has 
to hurt in order to be good. Any measure that does not hurt at least some members of the European Community 
is (in this view) probably wrong. In any case it is regarded as unthinkable that one should ever allow those 
members of the Community who want to go along with certain policies to do so, and those who are not 
interested to stay out. The European interest (it is said) is either general or it does not exist.” 
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consequences for the Commission other than some reinforced ill-will being thrown in its 
direction. 
The Commission was led by President Ortoli in the last phase of the period investigated by 
the thesis when the Commission undoubtedly had gained a role in EPC. I argue that by this 
time the Commission had recognized that in order to make European integration function and 
move forward its best chance was to become a mediator and a go-between between the 
Member States’ national interests. The claim is that the Commission at this time intended to 
be a compromise-maker more than an independent initiator of a European interest that to an 
extent had been its intention in the period of the first Commission. As European integration 
and the EC changed, I argue that the Commission adjusted, and that the case of the EPC is a 
good illustration of how this adjustment occurred, what forces that was at play and which 
fractions that “won”. 
The distinct manner in which the Commission approached EPC that I argue illustrates a 
process of adjustment is found in both cases analysed in this thesis. I argue in the thesis that 
one of the main aims for the Commission was to evade detrimental discussions with the 
Member States over its role in EPC. In the case of the CSCE the desire to evade conflict was 
expressly stated, and the Commission presented a deliberate stance to act in a discreet and low 
key manner. I claim that the relentlessness of the Commission’s approach is seen as it worked 
towards its aim of protecting the EC continuously, which is tracked in the thesis’ analysis of 
the CSCE in chapter five from 1971 until the formulation of the Moro-declaration and the 
signing of the Final Act of 1 august 1975. The analysis points on an individual level to the 
importance of Nöel and Meyer. They were relentlessly working for the Commission, and in 
addition to the level of the SG they emerged as collective memory. I argue that the feature of 
the Commission as a collective memory was an advantage for the Commission in its battle for 
inclusion in first the CSCE, later also in the case of the EAD. 
The result of the two-step analysis that I have undertaken in this thesis is the emergence of a 
second generation Commission that approached EPC in order to participate in order to protect 
the EC, to link the EC to EPC and to shape EPC. The Commission managed to draw EPC 
closer to the EC, by securing an unintended role for itself. This adjustment and its results was 
a success for the Commission.  
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7.4 Concluding remarks on the implications of a second generation 
Commission’s role in European Political Cooperation   
This thesis’ investigation of the role of the Commission in EPC in the period 1969-1976 
presents evidence of an instance where a supranational institution “mattered” in an 
intergovernmental setting.786 I argue that the Commission mattered as it managed to achieve a 
role in EPC; it mattered as it participated and protected the EC, linked the EC to EPC and 
even to an extent managed to shape the contents of EPC. Furthermore, I argue that the results 
of my analysis on the activity and on the Commission as an actor prove that while EPC was in 
essence Member State-controlled, and thus a Principal led structure; the Commission as an 
Agent managed to carve out a role for itself within this structure. I claim that the acquirement 
of an unintended role for the Commission in EPC proves that it to an extent still could follow 
its own preferences despite the fact of the intergovernmental characteristics of this period, 
which in essence was hostile to Commission agency. In this thesis I present evidence of the 
Commission as a competence-maximizer on the EC’s behalf as it aimed for inclusion in order 
to maximise the scope of the EC’s activities. In addition the thesis presents evidence for how 
the Commission acted as a purposeful opportunist through the analysis of the manner in 
which the Commission approached EPC. I argue that this merits a particular conceptualisation 
of the Commission as a second generation Commission. Moreover, based on the findings in 
the thesis I claim that the role the Commission acquired in EPC illustrates the effect of a 
deliberate change where the Commission adjusted from a first generation to a distinct second 
generation Commission. The characteristic of this second generation Commission were one of 
active supranational agency, where deliberate choices were made on the basis of adjusting to a 
changed environment but also based on diverging views within the Commission.  
The thesis thus presents evidence of the resilience of supranational institutions. Even after 
what has been termed as an “intergovernmental turn” of the European integration project the 
Commission managed to gain access to new areas of cooperation between the European 
national states that were intended as intergovernmental. As a result the thesis’ main findings 
and argument underpin Rational Choice Institutionalist notions of supranational agency. This 
thesis contributes a historical perspective to these RCI-notions that might serve to expand 
                                                          
786 The question “do supranational institutions matter” as in “do they deserve the status of an independent causal 
variable” is posed by one of the main scholars adhering to Rational Choice Institutionalism, Mark A. Pollack 
(1997: 99). Here, Pollack also questions “the conditions under which, and the ways in which, supranational 
institutions exert an independent causal influence on either EC governance or the process of European 
integration”. 
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them based on the new empirical material presented. The thesis might thus inform P-A 
models occupied with questions over the potential for supranational agency versus an 
instrumental role for institutions. The thesis’ empirical evidence of the Commission’s agency 
holds implications for the notion of path dependency. I argue that the Commission 
deliberately made use of the prior commitments the Member States held through the existence 
of the EC and that these commitments constituted a ‘path’. Furthermore, I argue that the 
Commission successfully played the card of prior commitments of the Member States to its 
advantage in the case of entering into EPC, in order to keep them within this path. As a result 
I claim that the Commission’s use of these commitments amounts to an instrumental use of 
path dependency, which is part of what I suggest as defining a second generation 
Commission. The Member States were less autonomous in EPC as an effect of their creation 
of the EC and the Commission, and importantly, it was the Commission that could make use 
of this effect, and my argument is that it did.  
Admittedly, the autonomy of agency is difficult to measure, but this has not been an aim for 
this thesis.787 Neither is autonomous agency my claim for the Commission in EPC. The 
resilience of the supranational institutions presented in this study does not signify their 
supremacy or domination over national states, but it should serve as a foundation for 
questioning of total intergovernmental supremacy. The development of a role for the 
Commission in the EPC in the period covered by this thesis is undebatable, but the material 
that exists does not expressly describe a causal relationship in which the Commission did one 
thing, and the Member States based their decisions and actions in the EPC expressly and 
directly on this. However, based on the findings of my analysis I argue that the agency of the 
Commission had effects on EPC. This argument is based on the fact that the results of the 
Commission’s participation in EPC compares well with its stated objectives and goals. 
Additional support for this argument is found as the Commission directly stated that it was 
satisfied with what it had achieved in both of the early, formative and influential EPC-cases 
explored in this thesis.  
Based on the results of this thesis’ analysis I argue that Member State control over the 
Commission as an agent was not total, and that the Commission was in a position where it to 
an extent could pursue its own preferences. My argument is that in the case of EPC the 
Commission acted deliberately, rationally and in accordance with what it anticipated from 
                                                          
787 Pollack 1997: 110 notes the exceedingly difficulties in measuring the autonomy of agency as the Agents 
rationally anticipate the behaviour of the Principals, and act accordingly. 
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Member States, and that this was the successful approach of a second generation 
Commission. My claim is that the manner in which the Commission rationally anticipated the 
behaviour of the Member States; along with an acceptance that an adjustment of the 
Commission as an actor was necessary, was exactly what made a much wanted role in EPC 
possible.  
The argument of the resilience of supranational institutions is not unconditional. I call for a 
greater sensibility for the complexity of such Principle-Agent relationships that has been 
investigated in this study. In no way can it be argued that the Commission or any other 
supranational institution of the EC were dominant in the period of European integration 
explored in this thesis. The Commission managed to play a role in EPC in the 1970s, but at 
the same time it failed in its quest for political unification within the EC. There was no 
European Union before the Maastricht Treaty 1993, more than 20 years after the Commission 
began its work for inclusion in EPC. Based on this, studies in European integration history 
should strive to refrain from treating it as a zero-sum game in which it is either Member 
States or supranational institutions that “wins”. I suggest rather embracing the complexity of 
these structures and actors. Further studies should seek to accept what can be termed as high 
and low tides of the Commission as an institution, but also the ability of the institution to 
manoeuvre an ever-changing environment more or less hostile to ambitious supranational 
institutions in order to survive.  
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